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Our only security is our ability to change.
John Lilly
Abstract
Policy engineering for access-control security has traditionally focused on specication and veri-
cation of safety properties (\nothing bad happens"). In most real systems however, resources and
access mechanisms are regularly compromised, either maliciously by attackers, or inadvertently
due to vulnerabilities caused by poor systems-engineering. I argue that the all-or-nothing nature of
assurance provided by safety-engineering cannot describe or reason about systems that are secure
and survivable|systems that can be engineered to proactively or reactively change their security
policies and policy enforcement mechanisms, and thereby continue to provide assurance for critical
resources, in spite of compromises and failures.
In this thesis, I present a framework that extends traditional state-transition models of access
control security, to describe timing guarantees and stochastic behavior, and show how we can
introduce notions of information compromise, subsequent recovery (whenever possible) and flexible-
response in a modular fashion. Our framework is also capable of describing insider attacks. I show
how we need to focus on liveness properties (\something good eventually happens") to explicitly
capture the temporal and dynamic nature of enforceable guarantees required for survivability. I
develop a new class of properties expressed as branching-time temporal logic formulas that focus
on secure availability as a measure of survivability. For nite-state models, the validation of these
formulas is decidable in polynomial time using automated model-checking techniques.
To showcase the expressive power of our framework, I apply it to study network Denial of Service
(DoS) attacks, and model resilience to such attacks as a survivability property. I show how we can
systematically analyze the relative impact of dierent anti-DoS strategies by changing policies and
mechanisms during an attack. Using our automated verication methodology, we formally prove for
the rst time whether strategies such as selective ltering, strong-authentication, and client-puzzles
reduce the vulnerability of an example network to DoS attacks.
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In all aairs, it’s a healthy thing now and
then to hang a question mark on the
things you have long taken for granted.
Bertrand RussellChapter 1
Introduction
Security engineering for information protection begins with the specication of security policies.
An information protection system consists of a set of information resources that can be accessed
by dierent sets of users. Policies are specied within the framework of an abstract system model
that describes relevant system entities and their behavior. An information protection policy or a
security policy species what is and what is not allowed by dierent entities in the system, in
terms of their information access behavior and interaction [21, 42].
Policies are enforced by security mechanisms that form an integral part of the system imple-
mentation. Distinguishing between policy and mechanism allows one to model security requirements
at a higher level of abstraction, independent of how they are actually implemented across dierent
platforms.
A system is secure if the set of all possible actions allowed by the mechanisms is a subset of the
authorized actions described by the policies. The system is precise if the set of all actions enabled
by the mechanisms is exactly the same as the actions authorized by the policy specication.
The process of describing security requirements, such as condentiality or integrity properties in
an information protection system using appropriate terminology, and analyzing whether the system
implements these requirements is called assurance.
In this thesis, I argue that existing models of information protection systems cannot model sur-
vivability|the ability of a system to continue to provide assurance under threat or actual attack.
In particular, I investigate how response actions(RAs) by trusted users to change security policies
and their corresponding enforcement mechanisms, can provide flexible-response against threats and
attacks in an information protection system. For example, in the case of a buer overflow attack,
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restricting the access rights of a compromised process can preserve the condentiality and integrity
of sensitive information. I demonstrate how this ability to change policies and mechanisms in a
controlled manner can extend the nature and scope of security guarantees for critical information
resources.
Historically, security engineers have attempted to validate the design of information protection
systems using an abstract mathematical model of dynamic system behavior. These formal models
of information protection systems provide security engineers with a framework to analyze what
security properties a system can guarantee as it evolves over time. The process of proving that a
system model is secure with respect to a security policy (or property), also called policy engineering,
can be divided into three inter-related tasks: system modeling, policy specication, and policy
verication.
An important point to note here is that proving that an abstract system model can satisfy
a security policy specication does not imply that the system is secure. In order to prove that
the system is secure, it is necessary to show that the system correctly implements the model.
In general, it is dicult to establish this fact for any suciently large or complex system, and is
outside the scope of this thesis. I focus on the ability to specify security properties in the framework
of an abstract model, and verify that this model satises the security property of interest. This
methodology has exposed several critical design flaws and provided a terminology for describing
provably secure systems, and as such plays an important role in security engineering.
In the next few sections of this chapter, I briefly summarize existing models of access control
security (Section 1.1), explain what I think is a major limitation of modeling security as safety
(Section 1.2), justify why I think it is important to think beyond safety, present a short overview
of how I extend this formalism to model and describe survivability, and highlight the important
contributions of this thesis (Section 1.3).
1.1 Policy Models and Properties
A system model is an abstract description of the users and resources of an information protection
system, and actions that represent information access and modication behavior. Resource access
is specied by an access control model. Access control is the most commonly used mechanism
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to enforce information protection policies in operating systems and networks. Formal models of
access control behavior are typically specied as state-transition graphs. A state, also known as
a protection state, is a snapshot of the sets of subjects, objects, and a data-structure called the
access matrix that represents relevant policy assertions in the system at a particular point in time.
A transition changes the values of some or all of these sets, in response to an action issued by a
subject, and captures the evolution of the system over time.
Security policies model desirable properties of this access behavior. The process of policy
verication involves validating that the access control mechanisms conform to the behavior de-
scribed by system policies. In terms of the state-transition graph, the goal is to ensure that all
states reachable from a known initial state that is consistent with the policies, through authorized
transitions that correspond to mechanisms, are also secure. This reachability condition is what is
called a safety property on the graph.
A property is a set of nite or innite sequences of states [3]. Safety properties specify \nothing
bad happens". If a \bad thing" happens in an innite sequence, then it must do so after a nite
prex and must be irremediable. Thus if a given model (or state-transition graph) does not satisfy
a safety property, then there must be some prex of states and transitions for which no extension
to an innite sequence will satisfy the property. Therefore a property is called a safety property [2]
if and only if each execution violating the property has some nite prex violating that property.
Traditionally, the relationship between policy and mechanism is expressed as the access control
safety property. This property states that access should be allowed in a system if and only if
the corresponding right-to-access is authorized by system policy. Enforcing this property is usually
trivial if the protection state does not change over the lifetime of the system. In most system
congurations, these access rights can change in authorized and unauthorized ways over time. For
example, a user or administrator can choose to delegate or transfer the right to access an object
(typically objects that they own) to other users in the system.
Harrison, Ruzzo, and Ullman [67] were the rst to formalize this relationship between autho-
rization and rights-transfer behavior for secure access control in their HRU access-matrix model.
They discuss this in the framework of a state-transition model where the state represents a snapshot
of entities, resources, and policies in the system, and the transitions are actions that can change
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the protection state. They use this framework to describe how an access right can \leak", whereby
a user can obtain permissions to access an object that he or she is not allowed to access according
to the policy. Using this abstraction, they reformulate the access control safety question as follows:
\Is there an algorithm that can decide if the transfer of a generic right violates the security policy
of an access control system?"
Their results show how verifying this reformulated safety question for access control for a general
access control model is undecidable. Denning et al. [40] further prove that the prospect of developing
a comprehensive theory of assurance based on this question, or even a nite number of theories is
unattainable. These results however do not rule out the existence of restricted models of access
control behavior whose assurance is decidable. Following these results, a paradigm shift occurred
in the formalism of access control security, and researchers [74, 98, 118] began to look at restricted
notions of rights-transfer to ensure that answering the reformulated safety question is eciently
decidable.
In addition to this formalism of access control security, researchers have also looked at secu-
rity policy models from the view-point of users in the system. The three standard user-oriented
security properties are condentiality, integrity, and availability. Condentiality properties model
information disclosure, and are enforced on read-access by access control mechanisms. Integrity
policies model authorized modication of information and are enforced by controlling write-access
in a typical system implementation. An availability policy, as the name indicates, models the ability
to access information over time, and has not been as well-studied as the other two [42, 21].
The most popular model of user-oriented security policies is the Bell-LaPadula (BLP) model [14]
of condentiality. In this model, each subject or object in the system is assigned a security level.
The set of levels forms a lattice-like hierarchy. The right to access an object depends on the security
level of both the subject and object. The BLP model species rules that have to be enforced by
access control mechanisms in order to guarantee security. If the mechanisms can prevent read-
access to a higher level, or and write access to a lower-level, then the system can never enter an
\unsafe" state. A system is said to be secure under the BLP model if all states reachable from a
known safe state are also safe. Biba [20] proposed a dual of the Bell-LaPadula model for integrity,
and other rule-based models that constrain access behavior by dening \authorized" transitions in
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a similar fashion have been proposed [30, 62, 25].
The BLP model was further rened by McLean [87], who exposed a critical weakness of this
formalism by arguing that it can be trivially satised by a system that downgrades the security
levels of all users and objects, and subsequently allows all accesses. As a result, the \Principle of
Tranquility" was introduced to the modeling process, where a user’s level is allowed to change only
in authorized ways before or after an access request.
An important point to note in all the models summarized so far, is the emphasis on modeling
security as safety properties. This property is typically veried by performing a reachability analysis
on a state-transition graph created by starting with a safe initial state and expanding it to include all
states reachable by authorized transitions that apply at each state. In all these models, assurance is
provided by modeling \good behavior" in terms of authorized states and transitions, and asserting
\bad things" are not allowed to happen. In the next section, I argue that this is a major limitation
of existing information assurance models.
1.2 The Need for Recovery-Oriented Security
We motivate the need for a new model of access control security by questioning the assumptions
made by existing approaches. The HRU, BLP and other state-of-the-art formalisms model only
desirable behavior. In all these models, the relationship between policy and mechanism is implicit.
The access control decision is made based on whether the right-to-access can be found in the access
matrix. The assumption is that since only authorized users can change this matrix, in accordance to
the policy, the system is secure. No checks are made to ensure that the mechanisms are consistent
with the system policies at runtime. The policies themselves are not available in the system in any
other form.
In real systems, access control mechanisms are routinely compromised. I present two represen-
tative examples to illustrate this point: :
 The rst example is the privilege escalation attack. In most standard operating systems,
users are classied into two authorization or privilege classes: superuser and regular. A
regular user can typically only change access rights to objects he or she owns. A super-user
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on the other hand is allowed to change any entry in an access-rights matrix.
A privilege escalation attack is when the control of a process running as superuser is hijacked
by a regular user, e.g., through a buer-overflow attack. The attacker subsequently launches
other processes, such as an interactive shell, which now run as processes with super-user
privileges. The attacker can now assign itself any access-right in the system, thereby compro-
mising the security of the system. However, the policy-enforcement mechanisms in the system
are unable to detect this attack, since they only check if these newly updated access-rights
are present in the access matrix, and allow the masquerading user to execute \unauthorized"
actions. As a result of this attack, all condentiality and integrity policies in the system may
be compromised. The situation where an access matrix may contain insecure access rights
is not factored into the design of these enforcement mechanisms, even though this behavior
is clearly insecure. Privilege escalation is very common, especially in buer-overflow attacks,
which constitute up to 80% of all reported attacks on computer systems [36].
 Another example where a system mechanism may not always enforce a policy correctly is
a resource-exhaustion or denial of service (DoS) attack, where a legitimate user is denied
access to an authorized resource by the resource-access mechanisms, either because of system
overload, or because of resource-hijacking by malicious users. This unavailability of a resource
to a legitimate user, because of actions by unauthorized users, cannot be expressed adequately
by existing models of access control.
In the rst example presented above, the system enters an insecure state by executing an
unauthorized transition. However, the policy enforcement mechanisms are unable to recognize this
attack. If this behavior could be modeled, whenever an escalation of privilege is attempted, the
system may be able to intervene and restrict the operations the process, or any processes it spawns,
can execute in the future. If there is no attack, no restrictions are necessary.
Since runtime monitoring and intervention can be expensive, many Unix systems handle this
problem by designing what is called a chroot jail [29] that constrains the address space visible
to a process running with super-user privileges. The aim of these jails is to restrict the damage
caused by a privilege escalation attack. However, an attacker could still succeed in violating some
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system policies. Achieving this balance between functionality and choosing appropriate restrictions
can become complicated.
In the second example, this behavior temporarily impacts the availability of an uncompromised
resource to legitimate users in the system. It may or may not impact the condentiality or integrity
of the information 1. In recent years, network DoS attacks have become extremely popular with
attackers, who attempt to deny legitimate users access to networked information resources. These
transient aberrations in policy enforcement behavior are largely ignored by current models of access
control security, which lack the expressive power to include ne-grained representation of resource-
consumption behavior.
Another motivation for a more expressive model is our claim that the ability to perform an
RA and change access control policies to preserve the security of uncompromised entities, in re-
sponse to a vulnerability exposure is a powerful attack-prevention and damage-containment mech-
anism [85, 26]. Moreover, it is frequently used in practice (e.g., changing rewall rules) to increase
the survivability of the system.
Describing an attack, whether it is a violation of a safety property, or an availability requirement,
and modeling the eectiveness of countermeasures (such as RAs) against such attacks cannot be
expressed as simple safety properties. A safety property ceases to be true once an unauthorized
transition occurs. We cannot describe the eect of a recovery strategy that can restore this property
at a future state in the system as a safety property. In Section 1.3, we argue that we need to focus on
what are called liveness properties (\something good eventually happens"), to describe survivable
systems. A property is a liveness property if no partial execution (in terms of states and transitions)
is irremediable. That is, every nite execution prex in a model contains at least one continuation
where the property can be satised eventually.
In the next section, I explain how to extend the traditional state transition access control model,
specify policies that can describe survivability properties, and explore methodologies to verify this
property within the framework of this model.
1If integrity encompasses the notion of freshness of information, this may be viewed as an integrity failure.
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1.3 Modeling, Specifying and Verifying Survivability
In Section 1.2, we argue informally how the all-or-nothing nature of safety engineering cannot
describe or reason about the ability of a system to pro-actively or reactively change its policies or
mechanisms and survive a threat or an attack.
With this as our motivation, we develop a new policy engineering methodology, starting with
a more expressive model in Section 1.3.1, and dene a new class of policies in Section 1.3.2. We
explore the use of automated verication and monitoring techniques for this class of survivability
properties in Section 1.3.3, summarize the major contributions of this thesis, and present a road-
map in Section 1.3.4.
1.3.1 Modeling Insecurity
In order to develop a theory of recovery-oriented security that focuses on the ability of a
system to change its mechanisms to survive threats and attacks, I argue that we need to extend the
standard state-transition model to include actions that model how an attacker or adversary can
influence behavior at a given state in the access control model and cause an insecure transition
to occur. In the context of the access control model, this undesirable behavior can take one of two
forms:
1. An access-request that is not authorized by system policy is executed by an attacker, or
2. An access-request that is authorized by system policy cannot be serviced.
The rst type of insecure transition models malicious behavior of an adversary who deliberately
violates system policy. As a result, the system may evolve to a state where the integrity or conden-
tiality of information is compromised. The second type of transition models resource-engineering
limitations that cause the policy enforcement mechanisms to fail (e.g., in a DoS attack). In both
cases, it may be possible to recover from this insecure behavior if e.g., a system administrator
intervenes and assumes control over future behavior. Note that it may not always be possible to
recover from compromise. The condentiality or integrity of information may be lost permanently,
or the resource may become permanently unavailable. In this case, the system may operate under
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weaker guarantees, or parts of the system that are unaected by the compromise can continue to
operate securely.
We formulate our notion of a recovery strategy, in the context of a state-transition model of
access control augmented with policy assertions. These assertions capture the impact of executing
both secure and insecure transitions on a protection state in our model. We use a standard model
of state-transition graphs called Kripke structures [33], which are typically used to represent qual-
itative aspects of temporal system behavior. The need to model time is implicit in our notion of
recovery. A state in a Kripke structure is captured by the set of atomic propositions, including
policy assertions, that are true in that state. A state evolves when any of these atomic propositions
change their value as a result of an action issued by an entity in our system.
Within this framework, a recovery strategy is specied as a state-transition subgraph that starts
from an insecure state, evolves through a sequence of secure and insecure states through transitions
that model both the attacker’s and the system’s interactive behavior.
We identify two types of users in this context: adversaries and controllers. An adversary
issues a request that is capable of causing an insecure transition. A controller can change the
behavior of dierent entities in the system using a response action (RA), including adversaries
(possibly). A recovery strategy is eective if the controller can always force the execution of the
system to choose a path that ends in a secure state. A recovery strategy is property-preserving
if it is eective, and we can assert specic qualitative or quantitative properties along its paths.
In many cases, it may not be possible to model an adversary or a controller’s behavior in a
strategy deterministically. In the case of the buer-overflow attack, the system cannot know a
priori if an attack is being attempted. In the case of a DoS attack, the attacker’s behavior can be
modeled in terms of inter-arrival times between attack packets. Such probabilistic behavior can
be studied by modeling dierent entities as stochastic processes. Motivated by these examples,
we show how to extend our state-transition graphs to represent probabilistic and nondeterministic
behavior using a Probabilistic Non-Deterministic System (PNS) [109, 110].
While qualitative and probabilistic statements about the eectiveness of a strategy are impor-
tant, it is sometimes also useful to model time explicitly to make quantitative statements about
the eectiveness of dierent recovery strategies. I show how we can extend our model carefully to
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include timing guarantees using the abstraction of a timed-transition system (TTS) [5] to make the
quantitative analysis of such systems tractable. An extension of this representation using a Timed
PNS (TPNS) is useful for specifying real time in these models.
A PNS or TPNS can be reduced and analyzed as a purely stochastic discrete-time Markov chain
(DTMC), or include continuous time as a continuous-time Markov chain (CTMC). In addition, they
can also be analyzed as a Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) when nondeterminism is present.
Analysis of such state-transition systems is suciently mature and we show how we can adapt
these techniques for analysis of survivability properties.
1.3.2 Specifying Survivability Properties
A more expressive model is only the rst step in this new theory of recovery-oriented security. In
order to express and evaluate the eectiveness of RAs in recovery strategies, we dene a new class
of security properties called survivability properties that explicitly model the ability of a system
to recover from information compromise. This formulation is explored in the context of whether
the behavior of a critical system service can survive attacks and continue to provide useful service
from the viewpoint of legitimate users in the system.
When comparing two dierent models of resource access and consumption, availability lets us
contrast their ability to recover from policy failures or insecure behavior in quantitative terms.
The longer the system can operate securely without being subject to integrity or condentiality
compromise or a DoS attack, the longer the resource is available, and therefore usable by legitimate
users in the system. However, once a compromise occurs, the shorter the time it takes to restore
the system to an authorized state using an RA, i.e., the shorter the recovery time or unavailability,
the better the strategy. We can therefore measure survivability by bounding how long the system
can remain secure, before \something bad happens," as well as how fast it can recover (if it can),
when something bad happens in the system.
Our notion of survivability models the recovery behavior of a system under attack or threat
of attack. We are interested in the situation when something bad happens, and want to evaluate
if something good can eventually happen. This formulation of survivability is a special type of
liveness property. We are specically interested in the state-transition behavior of strategies that
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capture the interaction between adversaries and controllers. Survivability properties specify quali-
tative and quantitative bounds on recovery. To specify such constraints on recovery strategies, we
use well-known branching-time logics, especially CTL [33] (Computation Tree Logic), PCTL or
Probabilistic CTL for DTMCs and MDPs, and CSL (Continuous Stochastic Logic) for CTMCs.
Survivability properties are expressed as bounded-response properties in this context.
We showcase the applicability of our framework by modeling the network DoS problem using
our extended access control model, and show how we can dene resilience to DoS as a survivability
property. We also show how we can evaluate the eectiveness of dierent anti-DoS strategies using
our model and its accompanying validation techniques.
1.3.3 Verifying Survivability
The next step in survivability engineering is the verication of these properties within these dierent
system models. Specication and verication of dierent types of temporal logic formulas in a PNS
is well-understood [19]. In particular, dening system behavior using the graph-based formalism
of Kripke models, specifying safety and liveness properties using temporal logic over traces of
computation in this model, and verifying if the model satises these properties are all suciently
mature areas of model-checking research [33]. Therefore, we can leverage these techniques directly
and automate the verication process of survivability assurance, relying on existing tools and
methodologies. Furthermore, we can integrate future developments in this area into our models
seamlessly.
Model checking is useful to evaluate the existence or non-existence of an eective recovery
strategy and quantify bounds on recovery times. Automated model-checking is only decidable for
nite-state models of concurrent behavior. For large nite-state models, it may become computa-
tionally expensive and suer from what is called the state-space explosion problem. Our approach
to describe and evaluate strategies is inherently modular, and reduces the size of the system we
are modeling by design. Furthermore, standard techniques such as abstraction, symmetry and
composition can reduce this overhead further. In this thesis, I show how we can model the network
DoS problem using our formalism to showcase the expressive power of our framework and present
a proof-of-concept application of these techniques to show that it is feasible.
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A complementary technique that can be used to evaluate the properties of dierent strategies
that may not be nite-state is run-time verication. Run-time verication techniques dene mon-
itors that can observe nite traces of system behavior and evaluate what properties are satised
by these traces. Even if the behavior of a system cannot be described using nite-state semantics,
the observable behavior of a system can be modeled as a nite set of traces. Evaluating temporal
logic formulas over nite traces for safety properties is well studied, and is infeasible for generic
liveness properties. Recent results [79] show how a restricted version of liveness called \bounded
availability" can be monitored on execution traces.
An important point to note here is that given an abstract model of an existing system, we may
not always be able to guarantee recovery. Our analysis may expose the weaknesses in the model that
make it impossible to provide such assurances. In this case, a system-designer may be able to choose
which resources to isolate from the rest of the system, in order to keep a smaller, but more critical
subsystem immune to the threat of attack. Because of dependencies and trust relationships, large
parts of the system may need to be disabled to keep it survivable. Our survivability engineering
framework can help the designer make these choices.
1.3.4 Summary of Contributions
Exploring how access control mechanisms and resource-consumption behavior can be made surviv-
able, extending the traditional state-transition graph with explicit insecure states and transitions,
including time and stochastic behavior, modeling the notion of recovery from compromise, speci-
fying and analyzing survivability as safety and liveness properties of subgraphs of system behavior
using automated verication and run-time monitoring techniques, formalizing the network DoS
problem as a survivability property, and analyzing the relative costs and benets of dierent DoS
prevention strategies, are all original contributions of this thesis.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter 2 of this thesis I present a detailed
discussion of existing models of access control security, as well as dierent types of security prop-
erties. In Chapter 3, I dene my thesis problem, situate it in the context of background research,
and describe my extended behavioral model of access control. With the help of this model, I de-
scribe how to specify survivability, recovery, and DoS-free behavior as availability properties and
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study recovery using dynamic access control in Chapter 4. I explore the DoS problem and describe
formalisms to specify and verify DoS resistance and resilience properties in Chapter 5. Chapter 6
presents related research, including work on formal models of DoS prevention, fault-tolerance, sur-
vivability, availability, dynamic access control, and DoS attacks and prevention strategies. I present
my conclusions in Chapter 7, with a summary of contributions, lessons learned, and future work.
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A theory has only the alternative of being
right or wrong. A model has a third
possibility: it may be right, but irrelevant.
Jagdish Mehra, The Physicist’s
Conception of Nature, 1973Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter, I present a summary of background research in the context of security policy
terminology, formal specication, and policy verication. This chapter is a description of the state-
of-the-art with respect to modeling of information protection policies, and motivates the problem
I describe in Chapter 3.
In the next few sections of this chapter, I describe how information protection systems are
specied formally as state-transition models, and how the notion of information security is expressed
as safety properties (\nothing bad happens") that can be veried within the framework of these
models. I also highlight several fundamental results with respect to what types of properties can
be veried within the framework of these models.
I begin this chapter with a description of access matrix models in Section 2.1 that forms the
basis for the formalism of the policy engineering process.
2.1 Access Matrix Models
The principal mechanism for information protection in most systems is access control. If imple-
mented correctly, access control can ensure that all accesses to resources are authorized by the
system policy, thereby preventing inadvertent or malicious information exposure. An information
protection system is typically described using an access matrix model. An access matrix describes
the set of authorized access rights in the system. An access right is a relation between a subject,
object and a privilege. For example, an access right of the form huserU ; f ileF ; readi species that
subject userU has the right to read le object fileF .
14
The access matrix model was rst formulated by Lampson [82] in the context of operating sys-
tems and rened by Graham and Denning [61, 43]. A similar abstraction, developed independently
and called a security matrix, was introduced by Conway et al. [34] in the context of databases.
The eectiveness of access control depends on two important pre-conditions [42]: proper user
identication using appropriate authentication mechanisms, and protection of access rights from
unauthorized modication. The rst condition, the ability to prevent impersonation of subjects is
crucial to secure information access. In addition, the safety of any access control system rests on
the ability of the system to restrict who can access and modify, add, or delete access rights.
In 1976, Harrison, Ruzzo, and Ullman developed a formal version of the access matrix model [67]
as a state-transition graph that captures the dynamic behavior of protection systems. This model
is commonly referred to as the HRU model, and denes access control as a safety analysis [21]
problem. The states in an HRU model correspond to a snapshot of the active entities, information
resources, and authorizations in the system represented by the access matrix, and the transitions are
actions (such as add entity, delete right etc,) that can change the access matrix. Dierent security
policies are dened as safety properties that can be validated by expanding the state-transition
graph to model the dynamic behavior of the system. Using this model, Harrison et al. study the
feasibility of proving properties about a high-level abstract model of a protection system, as the
system evolves over time.
With the help of their model, they prove that in the most general abstract case, the security of
computer systems, dened as safety properties in the framework of their model, is undecidable.
They show that the prospect of developing a comprehensive theory of information protection that
is general enough to provide automatic proofs or disproofs of safety is unattainable [42].
To put this result in perspective, it states that there are fundamental limitations on our ability
to prove properties about a generic abstract model of a protection system. Systems without severe
restrictions in their operations will have security questions that are too expensive to answer. As
a consequence of this result, researchers have shifted their focus from looking for a general theory
of safe systems, to the construction of specic protection system models that can be shown to be
provably secure [74, 98, 118]. These models explore the nature and scope of practical restrictions
that need to be imposed on the models to make safety questions tractable.
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I describe the HRU model in Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2, and highlight the important results
and their consequences with respect to the design of abstract models of secure systems in 2.1.3
and 2.1.4.
2.1.1 Protection State
In the HRU model, the protection state of a system is dened by a triple (S;O;A) where:
1. S is the set of subjects, or active entities in the model.
2. O is the set of objects or protected entities in the system. Each object has a unique name.
Subjects are also considered to be objects; thus S  O.
3. A is an access matrix, with rows corresponding to subjects and columns to objects. An entry
A[s; o] lists the access rights of subject s over object o.
In an operating system, subjects are typically processes, users, or domains. Objects can be
les, processes that represent services, or other resources. Access rights specify dierent kinds of
accesses that may be performed on dierent objects, including read, write, execute and append.
Special rights include the own right that represents ownership information, as well as the copy
right that allows its possessor to grant rights to another subject or set of subjects.
In the next subsection, I describe the set of transitions of the HRU model that capture the
evolution of the protection state over time.
2.1.2 State Transitions
As processes execute in the system, the protection state of the system may change over time, in
response to actions initiated by subjects. This change in state is captured by commands in the
HRU model. The HRU model assumes that there is a reference monitor associated with every
object that implements the policy enforcement mechanisms and controls access to the object. This
concept was introduced by Graham and Denning [61]. A monitor for object o prevents a subject s
from accessing o if A[s; o] does not contain the required right.
The HRU model identies six primitive operations that can change the protection state of
a system. These correspond to the number of ways subjects, objects, and rights may be added or
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op conditions new state
enter r into A[s; o] s 2 S S0 = S
o 2 O O0 = O
A0[s; o] = A[s; o] [ frg
A0[s1; o1] = A[s1; o1] 8(s1; o1) 6= (s; o)
delete r from A[s; o] s 2 S S0 = S
o 2 O O0 = O
A0[s; o] = A[s; o]− frg
A0[s1; o1] = A[s1; o1] 8(s1; o1) 6= (s; o)
create subject s0 s0 =2 O S0 = S [ fs0g
O0 = O [ fs0g
A0[s; o] = A[s; o]; s 2 S; o 2 O
A0[s0; o] = ; o 2 O0
A0[s; s0] = ; s 2 S0
create object o0 o0 =2 O S0 = S
O0 = O [ fo0g
A0[s; o] = A[s; o]; s 2 S; o 2 O
A0[s; o0] = ; s 2 S0
destroy subject s0 s0 2 S S0 = S − fs0g
O0 = O − fs0g
A0[s; o] = A[s; o]; s 2 S0; o 2 O0
destroy object o0 o0 2 O S0 = S
o0 =2 S O0 = O − fo0g
A0[s; o] = A[s; o]; s 2 S0; o 2 O0
Table 2.1: Primitive Operations
deleted from the system. The conditions required to execute these commands and their eect on
the protection state are summarized in Table 2.1.
Executing the primitive operator op in system state Q = (S;O;A) causes a transition to state
Q0 = (S0; O0; A0), written as Q j=op Q0 under the conditions shown in Table 2.1. A command in the
HRU model consists of a possible condition followed by one or more primitive operations written
as follows:
command c(x1;    ; xk)
if r1 2 A[xs1 ; xo1 ] and
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r2 2 A[xs2 ; xo2 ] and
  
rm 2 A[xsm ; xom ]
then
op1;
op2;
  
opn
end.
Here r1;    ; rm are rights (m  0), s1;    ; sm and o1;    ; om are integers between 1 and k.
The eect of a command c(a1;    ; ak) with actual parameters a1;    ; ak, on a state Q, yields
state Q j=c(a1; ;ak) Q0 as follows:
1. Q0 = Q if any one of the conditions of c is not satised, and
2. Q0 = Qn otherwise, and there exist states Q0; Q1;    ; Qn such that:
(Q = Q0) j=op1 Q1 j=op2    j=opn Qn,
which denotes the action of executing primitive operation opi after substituting the formal
parameters xi with the actual parameters ai.
The HRU model provides the basic abstractions, in terms of primitive operations, which can be
combined together using conditional commands to describe the access control behavior of a protec-
tion system. For example (adapted from Bishop [21]), a process p creating a le f with own, read
r, and write w permissions in a UNIX system can be specied as follows:
command create file(p; f)
create object f ;
enter own into A[p; f ];
enter r into A[p; f ];
enter w into A[p; f ];
end
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The next example shows how one can specify preconditions on primitive operations. In this spec-
ication, a process p can give another process q the right r to a le f only if it owns f . This is
written as follows:
command allow transfer right(p; q; f; r)
if own in A[p; f ]
then
enter r into A[q; f ];
end.
The above examples demonstrate the expressive power of the HRU model.
In Section 2.1.3 next, I describe the safety question, i.e., under what conditions does the abstract
model presented above implement a generic algorithm to automatically determine if the system is
secure.
2.1.3 Safety Question
Given an abstract model of a particular access control system, the question that has interested
researchers is the following [21], \Is there a generic algorithm that will allow us determine or prove
if this model is secure?". The quest for the answer to this question has driven policy engineering
research for the past two decades. In order to answer this question, one rst needs to dene what
is meant by the term \secure" precisely.
The conguration of an access matrix describes what subjects can do, not necessarily what they
are authorized to do. Within the framework of the operations in the HRU model, protection policies
or security policies divide the states and transitions of a model into two types: authorized and
unauthorized. Authorized states correspond to those states explicitly allowed by the specication.
By default, all other states are unauthorized. Transitions are only allowed between authorized
states.
Access control mechanisms can enforce the system’s security policies by ensuring that the phys-
ical states of the system correspond to the authorized states of the abstract model. This is achieved
by ensuring that a system is never allowed to initialize in an unauthorized state and unauthorized
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actions from authorized states are restricted by resource access mechanisms (e.g., interceptors,
monitors, etc.) that also enforce the policy. These mechanisms typically intercept access requests
and apply a test of policy membership to decide if the action is allowed or not, according to the
policy specication.
A policy in the context of a protection system species whether a particular set of subjects can
access a specic set of objects, and what actions (rights) the entities are authorized to perform,
either individually or as a group, on this set of resources.
I now present an example of a protection policy using the notation from the previous section. A
simple Discretionary Access Control (DAC) Security Policy can be specied formally as follows [42]:
Denition 2.1.1 (DAC Policy). Let Q = (S;O;A) be an authorized state such that own 2
A[p; f ] for subject p and le f , but r =2 A[q; f ] for subject q and right r. Let Q0 = (S0; O0; A0) be a
state such that Q j=c Q0 and r 2 A0[q; f ]. Then Q0 is authorized under the DAC policy if and only
if c = allow transfer right(p; q; f; r).
This policy states that only owners of objects are allowed to transfer rights to other subjects.
For the access control model described in Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2, Harrison et al. studied
the feasibility of proving properties about the security of an abstract system model. They dene
unauthorized behavior using the notion of a leaked right, and a safe state or authorized state as
follows:
Denition 2.1.2 (Leaked Right). A right r is leaked by a command c that when run in a state
Q, executes a sequence of primitive operations and enters right r into some cell of A not previously
containing r.
Denition 2.1.3 (Safe State). Given a system, an initial state Q0, and a right r, we say that
Q0 is safe for r if there is no sequence of system requests that, when executed starting in state Q0,
will write r into a cell of the access matrix that did not already contain it.
In many systems, leaking rights is allowed by the policies. For example, the DAC policy specied
above intentionally allows the owner of an object transfer rights to other subjects. This type of
transfer, specically allowed by the policy is called authorized transfer. Therefore the system
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may be implementing the policy correctly, but the initial state of a system may not be safe with
respect to all rights r. The security verication question therefore is whether the transfer of a right
r violates the protection policies of the system. This is typically expressed as follows:
Denition 2.1.4 (Safety Question). Is there any algorithm that can decide if the transfer of any
generic right r (or leaking) violates the security policies of a given protection system whose initial
state is Q0?
In Section 2.1.4, I summarize the results of the safety question for the HRU model and show
how it has impacted the design of safe systems.
2.1.4 Safety Analysis
Harrison et al. showed that access control safety, as dened in the previous subsection, is undecid-
able for an arbitrary protection system. They showed this by encoding the behavior of a Turing
machine, such that the leakage of a right corresponds to the Turing machine entering its nal state.
If the safety question is decidable, then so is the halting problem. However, since the halting
problem is undecidable, the safety problem is also undecidable.
Denning, Denning, Garland, Harrison, and Ruzzo [40] further proved that the prospect of
developing a comprehensive theory of protection, or even a nite number of theories is unattainable,
since this set is not recursively enumerable. Since the set of all safe theories is not recursively
enumerable, it cannot be recursively axiomatizable, and therefore, systems for proving safety are
necessarily incomplete.
While these fundamental results appear discouraging, they do not exclude the possibility of
generating smaller classes of safe systems with more constrained behavior that are decidable.
In the same article, Harrison et al. show safety is decidable if no new subjects or objects can be
created, and that it is PSPACE complete. They also explore the decidability question for a special
class of systems called mono-operational systems. A mono-operational system is one where
each command performs a single primitive operation. For this class of systems, once again, they
show that safety is decidable. Mono-operational systems are too weak to express many policies of
interest [94]. They cannot express policies that give subjects special rights to objects they create (for
example creating a child process). Harrison et al. also proved that the safety problem is decidable
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for systems that are both monotonic (no destroy and delete) and monoconditional (only one clause
in the condition). Such systems are still very limited as far as expressing useful properties.
As an important consequence of these results, much of the research into theory of safe systems
shifted from proving if arbitrary security systems are safe, to designing systems that were secure
from rst principles. To keep the analysis of leaking rights simple and tractable, most practical
models (such as Unix) severely restrict a subject’s right to grant privileges to other subjects, and
forbid further delegation of these rights.
Examples of protection systems that have decidable theories for the safety question include
the graph-based formalism of the Take-Grant model [74] introduced by Jones, Lipton and Snyder.
Vertices in the graph correspond to subjects and objects. Edges are directed and encode whether
rights can be taken or granted between the entities. A set of graph-rewriting rules codies how the
Take-Grant graph can evolve over time.
Jones et al. show that the safety question is decidable for the Take-Grant model, even if the
number of subjects and objects that can be created is unbounded. In addition, it is decidable in
time linear to the size of the initial state. An important point to note here is that the Take-Grant
model only describes the transfer of authority in the system, and does not describe the protection
state, thus abstracting only the information needed to answer the safety question. Lipton and
Snyder have also shown that the safety question for systems [83] with a nite set of subjects is
decidable, but computationally intractable.
The Schematic Protection Model (SPM) by Sandhu [118] is closer in spirit to the HRU model
and uses the abstraction of security types. A type acts as a generic class label for an entity. Rights
can be of two kinds: inert rights and control (such as take and grant) rights. Manipulation of rights
is controlled by two relationships: link predicates and lter functions. Link predicates capture the
relationships between subjects with regard to transfer of rights, and the lter functions impose
conditions on when transfers can occur. Sandhu shows that this model has a decidable subset
that is more expressive than the Take-Grant model. Amman and Sandhu [7] extend this work and
describe a model that is formally equivalent to a monotonic HRU, but with decidable safety.
More recently, Sandhu describes the Typed Access Matrix model (TAM) [117], which introduces
strong typing to the HRU model. The type of an entity is xed when it is created and remains
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xed throughout the lifetime of the model. The TAM operations are the same as HRU operations,
except that the create operations are augmented with types. Sandhu shows that a monotonic
TAM model, like monotonic HRU, is undecidable. However if one avoids cyclic creates, safety is
decidable. If all monotonic TAM commands are limited to three parameters, the resulting model
becomes decidable in polynomial time. This model is the current state-of-the art for generalized
access control policies [21, 94].
The HRU analysis and the results of safety analysis of other models discussed in this section
show how it is hard to analyze propagation of access rights, even if we have complete knowledge of
the mechanisms of propagation. However, the notion of policy in these generalized access control
models does not directly capture the primary security concerns that are of interest to most users of
an information protection system, in terms of what resources are visible to what users and how they
can be modied. In the next section, I show how the three standard properties, viz., condentiality,
integrity, and availability, directly address how information access rights and mechanisms aect
users in the system.
2.2 Information Protection Policies
Traditionally, information protection is dened in terms of condentiality and integrity policies
within the framework of an abstract state-transition model of a protection system. Information
Flow security is another desirable property and is intrinsically related to condentiality. Availability
is also often mentioned as a desirable information security property but is not as rigorously studied
as the other two and there are no formal denitions of availability policies in this framework.
A major part of this thesis is dedicated to the study of availability policies, as a measure of
survivability of condentiality and integrity properties. Therefore, as background information, this
section presents a brief overview of existing models of integrity and condentiality policies, and I
defer discussion of existing models of availability properties to Chapter 6.
In Section 2.2.1, I present standard denitions of condentiality and integrity policies from the
viewpoint of a set of subjects and their ability to access and modify information resources. In
Section 2.2.2 and Section 2.2.4, I describe condentiality and integrity policies, and follow it up
with a discussion on information flow in Section 2.2.3.
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2.2.1 Basic Denitions
Condentiality deals with concealing information, and preventing unauthorized access to a resource.
Integrity refers to preventing unauthorized modication. They are formally dened as follows
(adapted from [21]):
 Condentiality: A condentiality policy PC with respect to subset C  O of objects par-
titions the set of subjects S into two sets SC and SC . Subjects in SC have no knowledge of
the existence or contents of the information resources in C, nor can they access it using any
of the rights in A[s0; o]; 8s0 2 SC . PC explicitly species rights r that subjects s 2 SC can use
to retrieve specic information from C.
 Integrity: An integrity policy PI with respect to subset I  O of objects partitions the set of
subjects S into two sets SI and SI . Subjects in SI are not allowed to modify the information
in I. PI explicitly species rights r that subjects s 2 SI can use to use to modify specic
information in I. Changes made by any entity in SI are trusted by all entities in SI .
Information flow policies are an alternative way of looking at information protection. An in-
formation flow policy quanties the eect of observing a set of information requests and responses
and inferring the protection state of the system from this process.
From the description of the access matrix state-transition model, and the denition of dierent
security policies, one observes that condentiality and integrity policies can be enforced by inter-
cepting and validating actions against the policies, and denying the action if the corresponding
policy cannot be found in the system. For example, condentiality applies to read-permissions, and
integrity to write-permissions in a lesystem. Therefore policies act as guards on the transitions
between protection-state congurations.
The access matrix A should at all times only contain rights that are specically authorized by
these policies. Furthermore, access should be allowed if and only if the access right can be found
in the system. This property is called the access control safety property. Let R be the set of rights
in the system, and P = fhs; o; rijs 2 S; o 2 O; r 2 Rg be the set of condentiality and integrity
policies. The operator 2 is the standard \henceforth" operator from temporal logic and is useful to
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describe invariants that have to be satised by states and transitions in the model. Access control
safety in the framework of the access matrix model is specied as follows:
Denition 2.2.1 (Access Control Safety).
2((r 2 A[s; o] $ hs; o; ri 2 P ) ^ (allow access(s; o; r) $ r 2 A[s; o]))
In the next subsection, I describe the Bell-La Padula model for condentiality. This model
implements what is called the military-style classication based scheme for ensuring condentiality
in information protection systems.
2.2.2 Modeling Condentiality
One of the primary security concerns of users in an information protection system is that they
are often unaware of what a program acting on their behalf is doing [94]. Users have to trust
that programs written by other users, but executing on their behalf, do not transfer or distribute
their discretionary rights clandestinely, in addition to executing their legitimate functions. Such
seemingly innocuous but malicious programs are known as Trojan Horses.
In high-assurance environments, such as military applications, the DAC policy model that allows
users to pass rights to other users without constraints, is considered unsuitable. The Mandatory
Access Control model (or the MAC) model was therefore proposed to introduce constraints on how
access rights can be transferred. In a MAC system, transferring of rights is governed by system
policy, administered by a security ocer, and is no longer under control of users. The best known
example of a MAC policy is the multi-level security model used in the military with its lattice
of security levels that range from top-secret to unclassied. Rights to read a top-secret le, for
example, cannot be transferred to any user in a lower level by any mechanism in the system.
In 1975, Bell and La Padula formalized the multilevel MAC security model using a notation
similar to the HRU model. This model is popularly referred to as the BLP model [14]. Like the HRU
model, it employs subjects, objects, rights, and an access matrix, but there are several important
dierences between the two models. The sets S and O do not change from state to state, and the
set A contains only four rights: read, write, execute and append. For simplicity, we focus on only
read and write, since the other two rights do not aect the discussion that follows. In addition
to these abstractions, the BLP model also introduces a lattice of security levels dened by the
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partial-order L of labels, and the set of categories C that add attributes to a security classication,
making it easy to implement the \need-to-know" principle [42]. The function F : S [ O ! L C
yields the security level of a given subject or object.
A state in v 2 V in the BLP model is the tuple (F;A). A system in the BLP model consists of
an initial state v0, a set of requests R = fhs; o; rijs 2 S; o 2 O; r 2 Rg, and a transition function
T : V  R ! V . T transforms the system from one state to another when the request is executed
(i.e., A or F change). The necessary and sucient criteria for a system to be secure in the BLP
are given next:
 Simple Security Property: A state v is secure with respect to the simple security property
if and only if for every s 2 S and o 2 O, read 2 A[s; o] ! F (s) dominatesF (o). This is also
called the \No-Read-Up" rule.
 *-Property: A state v is secure with respect the -property if an only if for every s 2 S
and o 2 O, write 2 A[s; o] ! F (o) dominatesF (s). This is also called the \No-Write-Down"
rule.
The relation dominates is dened as follows: Security Level (L;C) dominates the security level
(L0; C 0) if and only if L0  L and C 0  C.
The Simple Security property prevents a low-level user from gaining read access to higher level
objects (such as les). The *-property prevents a high-level user (or Trojan horse run by a high-
level user) from copying contents of high-level objects to low-level objects so that low-level users
can gain unauthorized access. Security in the BLP model is dened as follows:
Denition 2.2.2 (Bell-La Padula Security). A state in the BLP model is state-secure if and
only if it is secure with respect to the Simple Security Property and *-Property. A system (v0; R; T )
is secure if and only if (i) v0 is state-secure, and (ii) every state reachable from v0 by executing
a nite sequence of one or more requests from R is state-secure.
Bell and La Padula propose and prove the following theorem:
Theorem 1 (Basic Security Theorem(BST)). : A system (v0; R; T ) is BLP secure according
to Denition 2.2.2, for each s 2 S and o 2 O, for all transitions between v and v0, T (v; r) = v0 for
r 2 R, where v = (F;A) and v0 = (F 0; A0), if the following rules about transitions can be enforced:
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 if read 2 A0[s; o] and read =2 A[s; o] then F 0(s) dominatesF 0(o);
 if read 2 A[s; o] and F 0(s) does not dominate F 0(o), then read =2 A0[s; o];
 if write 2 A0[s; o] and write =2 A[s; o] then F 0(o) dominatesF 0(s);
 if write 2 A[s; o] and F 0(o) does not dominate F 0(s), then write =2 A0[s; o];
The proof follows from structural induction as these four rules capture what transitions are
allowed for a system that is BLP secure. The class of systems described by the BLP security
denition is the same as the class of systems that can be derived from expanding the states and
transitions according to the rules specied in BST. The BLP model was the rst to capture this
notion of correspondence between policy and mechanism.
Subsequently, McLean [87] exposed a problem with proving a system secure using a BLP-like
formalism, stating that the interpretation of a valid transition is transparent to the denition of a
secure state. It is not enough to ensure that every state reachable from a secure state is secure.
One needs to show that the manner in which this state is reached is also \secure". This is best
explained with the argument presented next.
Consider a system Z whose initial state is state-secure and has only one type of transition.
When a subject s requests any type of access to object o, all subjects and objects are downgraded
to the lowest security level and access is granted. Now System Z still obeys all transition rules
specied by BST. However, it is not \secure" in any meaningful sense [92].
The main problem with the BLP model is that does not have any restrictions on changing the
protection state, especially the security levels of users and objects, before or after a transition. To
rectify this problem, McLean denes a framework of security models, which places restrictions [92]
on the transactions that prevent anomalies like System Z from passing as secure models. This
restriction is called the \Principle of Tranquility". McLean’s framework is a quadruple (S;O;A; L)
where the elements are the same as those dened in the BLP model. A model within this framework
is a set of state machines of the form (F;A), as in the case of the BLP model.
The framework however contains a new function K : S [O ! 2S , which maps each subject or
object in the system with the set of subjects that are allowed to change its security level. As before,
the system consists of an initial state v0, a set of requests R and a modied transition function
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T : (S  V  R) ! V , which yields a new state for a subject executing a request in the current
state. The new denition of a secure system is given as follows:
Denition 2.2.3 (McLean’s BST). A transition function T between two states v = (F;A) and
v0 = (F 0; A0) and T (s; v; r) = v0 is transition secure if and only if 8x 2 S [O if F (x) 6= F 0(x) then
s 2 K(x). A system (v0; R; T ) is secure only if (i) v0 and all states reachable from v0 by a nite
sequence of one or more requests from R are (BLP) state-secure and (ii) T is transition-secure.
This framework forms a boolean algebra of models whose most restrictive element is a BLP
model where no security levels can change, and whose top element is a BLP model with no restric-
tions on security level changes whatsoever. The two frameworks presented in this section are the
current state of the art for mandatory access control.
2.2.3 Information Flow
Access control policies and mechanisms (especially reference monitors) are convenient abstractions
to model information security and can provide a high degree of assurance. The access matrix and
the BLP models have played an important role in the design of secure systems. However, the models
presented so far are not rich enough to capture what is known as the covert channel problem of
access control.
This problem arises from the diculty of mapping an access control model’s primitives to
individual objects, subjects, and mechanisms in a computer system implementation. For example,
consider the response of a reference monitor for a low-level subject that is trying to write to a
non-existent high-level le object. If the subject is notied about the mistake, a high-level Trojan
Horse can use this channel to communicate one bit of information by creating the le whenever the
bit it wants to transmit is one, and delete it when it wants to signal a zero. If however, the subject
is not informed of this mistake, or if a dummy le is created, legitimate typing errors on behalf of
the subject will be punished unnecessarily.
The problem exists because the BLP model or McLean’s model do not treat the existence of a
le as information that needs to be protected. Modeling and detecting covert channels is extremely
dicult and among other things, involves tracing the information-flow paths of programs [41, 42],
checking programs for shared resources [113], checking for clock asynchrony to prevent timing
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channels [131], and using type-checking [128, 114] and other language based schemes to analyze
information flow. Many of these techniques are intractable for large systems (especially distributed
systems) and can only be applied after the systems are built, and making system changes at this
stage may be prohibitively expensive [12].
Rather than analyze access control models post-mortem for information flow problems, re-
searchers have explored the design of systems that are immune to this type of information exposure,
from rst principles. Interface models of condentiality explore what restrictions on a system’s in-
put/output relation are sucient for preventing undesirable flow of information. The most popular
of these models is Noninterference, originally formulated by Goguen and Meseguer [59].
Goguen and Meseguer view the system as a state machine consisting of the set S of subjects, a
set  of states, a set O of outputs, and set Z of commands. C  SZ is the set of state transition
commands, corresponding to the notion of a subject issuing a command. A state transition function
T : C  !  describes the eect of executing state-transition command z when the system is in
state , and an output function P : C   ! O describes the output of executing command z in
state . Initially the system is in state 0. As the system evolves, the outputs provide a record of
the system’s functioning.
Next, Goguen and Meseguer dene two functions projection proj and purge () as follows:
Denition 2.2.4 (Projection Function). Let T (cs; i) be a sequence of state transitions for a
system, and P (cs; i) be the corresponding outputs. Then proj(s; cs; i) is the set of outputs in
P (cs; i) that subject s is authorized to see, in the same order as these outputs appear in P (cs; i).
Denition 2.2.5 (Purge Function ). Let G  S be a group of subjects and let A  Z be a set
of commands. Then G(cs) is the subsequence of cs obtained by deleting all elements (s; z) in cs.
G;A(cs) is the subsequence of cs obtained by deleting all elements (s; z) in cs such that both s 2 G
and z 2 A.
The purge function captures the eect of making certain command executions invisible to some
users. If the set of outputs any user can see in the system is the same as the set the user can see
when the command history is purged of inputs that another user generated, the system is secure
under noninterference. This is dened as follows:
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Denition 2.2.6 (Noninterference). Let G;G0  S be distinct groups of subjects and let A  Z
be a set of commands. Users in G executing commands in A are noninterfering with users in G0,
written as A;G : jG0 if and only if, for all sequences cs with elements in C, and for all s 2 G0,
proj(s; cs; i) = proj(s; G;A(cs); i).
In order to verify a system satises noninterference, Goguen and Meseguer develop a set of
conditions (output consistent, transition consistent and locally respects) and prove that they are
sucient for establishing noninterference in state machines [60]. This result is called the Unwinding
Theorem.
The Goguen-Meseguer model is dened in the framework of a deterministic state-machine model
of the system. McLean [93] shows how one can relax this requirement and can prove noninterference
directly using trace-based semantics and functional correctness.
Comparing BLP and noninterference is dicult, as the primitives of BLP lack a precise seman-
tics [91]. However it is noted that in general BLP is weaker than noninterference as it allows covert
channels. Surprisingly, noninterference is weaker than BLP, as it can allow a low-level user copy
a high-level object to another high-level object, which would be disallowed as a read by the BLP
model.
The interface approach for condentiality presented so far, is relatively straightforward with
respect to deterministic systems, but is dicult to analyze when it is extended to non-deterministic
systems.
In 1986, Sutherland introduced a new property called nondeducibility [126], which states that
a system is nondeducibility secure if users with low security levels cannot obtain information at
a higher security level as a result of any activity on the part of a higher-level user. Low level
users may still be able to observe high-level user behavior, but they cannot interpret the outputs.
This property is weaker than noninterference and is noncomposable, though it does not assume
determinism.
In order to overcome the limitations of nondeducibility, researchers have proposed various prop-
erties such as generalized noninterference [90]. In addition to nondeducibility, possibilistic and
probabilistic models for nondeterministic [91, 63] systems, along with a notion of probabilistic
noninterference (PNI) and a verication logic for this model have also been proposed [64].
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Recently, researchers have explored notions of behavioral equivalence to model some of these
issues for non-deterministic systems [115]. A complete discussion of this topic is beyond the scope
of this thesis and not directly relevant to our work. There is a great debate in the community about
the relevance and cost of general interface models for security, and whether access control models
augmented with some covert channel analysis are sucient for practical systems.
In the next subsection, I briefly describe dierent models for protecting integrity of information.
2.2.4 Modeling Integrity
Integrity policies are also called commercial security policies as they model accuracy of information,
as opposed to condentiality policies that are commonly referred to as military security policies
and model disclosure. In 1977, Biba [20] proposed three policies to capture the notion of authorized
modication of information resources as dened by an integrity policy.
A system in Biba’s model consists of a set of subjects S, a set of objects O and a set of integrity
levels I. The levels are partially-ordered and the function min : I  I ! I gives the lesser of the
two integrity levels, under . The function i : S [O ! I returns the integrity level of a subject or
object. Relations r; w  S  O and x  S  S denes the ability of a subject to read or write an
object, and the ability of a subject process to execute another process respectively.
Integrity labels are not the same as condentiality labels and are usually assigned dierently.
Biba’s policies are dened in the context of an information transfer path.
Denition 2.2.7 (Information Transfer Path). An information transfer path (or read-write
path) is a sequence of objects o1;    ; on+1 and a corresponding sequence of subjects s1;    ; sn, such
that si r oi and si w oi+1 for all i; 1  i  n.
The three policies dened by Biba are as follows:
1. Low-Water-Mark Policy: Whenever a subject accesses an object the policy changes the
integrity level of the subject to the lower of the subject and the object. Specically, a subject
can only write to an object or execute a subject at a lower level, and must change its level
to the lower level when it reads a low level object. Biba further showed that if there is an
information transfer path from object o1 2 O to object on+1 2 O , then enforcement of the
low-water-mark policy requires that i(on+1)  i(o1) for all n > 1.
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2. Ring Policy: Any subject may read any object, regardless of integrity levels. A subject can
write to an object if and only if i(o)  i(s). A subject s1 can execute another subject s2 if
and only if i(s2)  i(s1).
3. Biba’s Model (Strict Integrity Policy): Biba’s model is the dual of the BLP model and
its rules are as follows:
 s 2 S can read o 2 O i i(s)  i(o)
 s 2 S can write to o 2 O i i(o)  i(s)
 s1 2 S can execute s2 2 S i i(s2)  i(s1)
Within the framework of Biba’s model, we can show that its enforcement preserves the property
that if there is an information transfer path from object o1 2 O to object on+1 2 O, then i(on+1) 
i(o1) for all n > 1. This property prevents indirect as well as direct modication of entities without
authorization.
Lipner combined the BLP model and Biba’s model to obtain a combined system model capable
of specifying both condentiality and integrity policies. Lipner’s model has both security levels and
integrity levels.
In 1987, David Clark and David Wilson developed an integrity model dierent from the level-
oriented BLP and Biba models. Their model is referred to as the Clark-Wilson [30](CW) model.
The CW model introduces the notion of trust explicitly in the model through the concepts of
certication and authentication. It is well suited to model \separation of duty" constraints, which
prevents a subject from having the sole ability to inflict damage on the integrity of protected
information. It is expressed in terms of a collection of nine rules designed to provide integrity
protection. The rules dene well formed transactions as a series of operations that change the
system from one consistent state to another. A set of integrity constraints species the consistency
requirements. Integrity verication procedures test whether data items conform to the integrity
constraints. Transformation procedures implement well-formed transactions and change the state
of data in the system from one valid form to another.
In the next subsection, I briefly describe hybrid models that are capable of specifying both
integrity and condentiality policies under one framework.
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2.2.5 Hybrid Models and Role Based Access Control
While the models presented so far are capable of dening either integrity or condentiality concerns
adequately, most information protection systems require a combination of both types of policies.
As a result, researchers have worked on hybrid policy models that are capable of addressing both
integrity and condentiality concerns under one framework. The most famous of these hybrid
models is the Chinese-Wall Model [25]. This model develops the notion of conflict of interest
(COI) classes and partitions subjects and objects into dierent classes accordingly. It also denes a
framework to capture the notion of how past behavior (or history) should aect future information
access within this framework. The formal Chinese-Wall model is similar in flavor to the BLP model,
and species restrictions on read and write transitions between COI classes based on history of
access.
Other hybrid models include the Clinical Information System Model [9], the Originator Con-
trolled Access Control Model [62] (ORCON), and Role Based Access Control (RBAC).
The Clinical Information System Model was introduced by Anderson and focuses, not on COI,
but on patient condentiality, authentication before access, and assurance that records are not
tampered (integrity) in the context of a hospital administrative system. The model is informal and
describes a set of principles for access, creation, deletion, connement, aggregation, and enforcement
of policies for medical records. The ORCON model was developed by Gaubert [62], in which a
subject can give another subject the rights to an object, only with the approval of the creator of
the object.
The RBAC model[56, 119] is arguably the most popular hybrid model in the industry. The key
concept in RBAC is a role, which is a placeholder for a set of users. Each role is associated with a
set of permissions, which are its rights on objects. These roles may be organized into a hierarchy
to reflect the organizational hierarchy among dierent users in a system. RBAC maintains two
mappings: the User Role Assignment (URA) and the Role Permission Assignment (RPA). These
two mappings can be updated independently and this flexibility provides administrators an ecient
mechanism to manage and administer access control policies. In recent years, an RBAC NIST
standard [55], and a graph-based formalism have also been proposed.
In Section 2.3, I end this chapter with a brief synopsis of the dierent models and techniques
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we presented so far, and provide a preview of Chapter 3, which deals with the problem-scope and
the solution-space of this thesis.
2.3 Looking Ahead
In order to keep the analysis of a system model tractable, many researchers focus on nite-state
state-transition models of subjects, objects, and privileges and permissions and restrict interactive
behavior. These models are mainly concerned about two important but slightly orthogonal con-
cepts. The rst set of models, which include the HRU model and its extensions, are concerned with
the generalized notion of access control as a fundamental building block of a theory of safe systems.
The transitions in these models capture the notion of how access rights change over the lifetime of
a model. Security is dened in this framework as the ability of the model to prevent unauthorized
transfer of access rights.
The second set of models, which include the BLP, CW, Biba, RBAC etc., capture the notion
of security from the point of view of users of the system (or sets of users). They explicitly include
a notion of assurance levels and describe the evolution of the system between levels, using the
abstraction of valid transitions. We observe from these models that condentiality, integrity and
some information flow policies are typically modeled as safety properties (\nothing bad happens")
within this framework. The safety question is usually decidable for such models, which is answered
by exploring the state space for all possible reachable states through valid transitions to show that
unauthorized state-transitions cannot occur.
The modeling and validation process presented in this chapter is an attractive choice for security
engineers seeking to certify that a given model provides assurance guarantees. However, in this
thesis I argue that formal modeling and validation of safety properties using a state-transition
model as described above cannot describe the behavior of a system under attack. One major
drawback of the traditional policy engineering process is that once a policy enforcement mechanism
is compromised, the assurance provided by the model becomes worthless. Safety-property modeling
does not account for the fact that parts of the system may become insecure due to vulnerability
exposures or attacks, and the same resource may be in authorized and unauthorized states over
the lifetime of the system. In real systems that are constantly under threat of attack, discovering
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new vulnerabilities may lead to compromise and invalidate the assurance. In addition, many of
these models cannot capture non-determinism and concurrency, or express quantitative guarantees
in terms of real-time values.
In the next chapter, I explore the need for a new policy specication formalism that can specify
how to recover from information compromise by explicitly modeling insecurity. Instead of designing
for safety, which cannot account for unauthorized behavior, we argue that traditional policies
need to be rened as liveness properties ("if something bad happens, something good eventually
happens") to model survivability or recovery-oriented security.
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Thus, the task is, not so much to see what
no one has yet seen; but to think what
nobody has yet thought, about that which
everybody sees.
Erwin Schro¨dingerChapter 3
Problem Statement
In this chapter I dene my thesis problem, situate it in the broader context of existing formal models
of access control systems, and develop a requirements-specication for survivability analysis.
In Section 3.1, I motivate the need for survivability modeling by examining the set of assump-
tions made by existing models of assurance, and highlighting how they do not represent realistic
operating environments of access control systems. I explore how guarantees made by safety model-
ing are frequently compromised, and investigate how we can extend the scope of these guarantees
by dening survivability properties to accommodate for recovery-oriented security.
I formalize this notion in Section 3.2 using a semantic framework general enough to accommo-
date existing access control abstractions. With this new model, I show how we can write system
specications and explicitly model how \bad" things can happen as the system evolves over time. I
also explore how to model the ability of a system to recover, if possible, when the system is attacked
maliciously, or compromised inadvertently.
I also show how we can redene traditional security properties such as condentiality and
integrity as a special class of dynamic properties we call survivability properties. These properties
describe how if bad things happen, whether we can guarantee that good things will eventually
happen. We also dene a metric for survivability, as the bound on computational resources required
to restore the availability of such resources to legitimate users of the system over time. I show
how we can use this representation to specify and evaluate dierent strategies for recovery, both
qualitatively and quantitatively.
In Section 3.3, I present a high-level overview of my proposed framework, describe how to
represent survivability properties within this context, and present an appropriate formalism for
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this purpose. I summarize all these ideas as my thesis statement in Section 3.4 and discuss success
criteria in Section 3.5.
In Chapter 4, I describe my model, and dene the notion of strategies in greater detail. I show
how we can incorporate timing guarantees and stochastic behavior, in both the model and property
specications, and discuss how to automate the verication of these properties. I also describe how
dynamic access control can be used as an eective RA and discuss how to preserve certain safety
properties and trust relationships in this context. In Chapter 5 of this thesis, I focus my attention
on the network DoS problem and show how survivability modeling and analysis can specify and
verify the eectiveness of DoS resilience strategies.
3.1 Context
Formal methods help a security engineer accomplish two important tasks [130]. Through the
process of specication, it focuses a system designer’s attention on the entities, their behavior, the
nature of their interaction, on the assumptions about a system’s environment, and on the nature
of properties that must be satised, e.g., as invariants, in order to claim the system is secure.
Through the process of verication, it provides additional assurance in terms of properties that
can be preserved within the framework of a semantic or syntactic description of system behavior.
The process of proving a system is secure can be broken into three inter-related tasks [130]. The
rst task (not in any particular order) is to model the system, its entities, and their interaction
using appropriate syntactic or semantic abstractions. Second, we express the security property of
interest explicitly and formally. The third aspect of assurance is the proof, which may be automated
and rely on structural induction, state-space exploration, or deductive reasoning, or may need to
be produced manually, to show that the implication (System Model ) Security Specication) can
be veried.
I develop my survivability properties in the context of an example model of access control
behavior that I present in Section 3.1.1. This model is influenced by both the HRU and BLP
models and appears in [101].
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3.1.1 Semantic Model of Policy Enforcement
In this subsection, we present a formal description of a semantic state-transition model of access
control, that acts both as a motivating example, as well as an introduction to the formal notation
used in this thesis.
The basic formalism used in this thesis is a type of state-transition graph called a Kripke
structure. Kripke structures are traditionally used to describe reactive systems and their behavior
over time [33]. In addition to states and transitions, a Kripke structure also associates each state
with a set of propositions that can be evaluated to truth-values depending on the values of boolean
variables in that state. We show how we can use this feature to describe qualitative temporal
properties of states and paths in a transition graph as the system it describes evolves over time.
Formally, a Kripke structure M over a set of atomic propositions AP , is a four tuple M =
(;0; R; L), where  is a set of states, 0   the set of initial states, R     is a total
transition relation between states, and L :  ! 2AP is a function that labels each state with a set
of atomic propositions that are true in that state.
We now show how to model the access control problem as a Kripke structure. Each state in
 corresponds to the protection state of an information protection system, and consists of the set
S of subjects, the set O of objects, the set R of rights, and an access matrix A as described in
Section 2.1.1.
In traditional access control models, e.g., in the HRU and BLP models, a transition represents
a change in the protection state. The six primitive commands in the HRU model, presented in
Section 2.1.1, represent transitions that can change (add or remove elements from) each of the three
nite sets S, O, and A (assuming R is xed). In the BLP model, transitions are represented by
read , write and execute actions. These actions usually change the values of the elements in O. For
example a write action modies an element of O. Reading an object does not change the original
object, but can change the state of objects (e.g., a read buer) belonging to the subject who has read
the object. Allowing an execute method on an object may change the state of other information
objects in the system. In the BLP model, the access permissions are dened by conditional rules,
and the access matrix A is only conceptual. We include both the primitive commands and the
standard lesystem commands from both models in the set R of our general access control model.
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The states and transitions in the HRU and BLP models dene a labeled-transition system
(LTS), where the transitions are labeled by commands or actions. A Kripke model however does
not include labels on transitions. A standard technique to convert an LTS to a Kripke structure is
to include the initiation and termination of an action or command as propositions that hold in the
start state and end state of a transition.
Let the set R be xed. Let the set of requests Q = fhs; o; rijs 2 S; o 2 O; r 2 Rg be the set of
all subject, object, and permission triples in our system. We represent requests in a state with the
variable REQ in our model. The domain of REQ is Q [ f?g. In a transition i q−! i+1, in state
i, (REQ = q) and in state i+1, (REQ = ?).
These transitions are assumed to be atomic, and the state does not change until the action
completes. A completed action or command results in a new state, where the values of one or more
state-variables have changed, i.e., we assume that only one or no request(s) can be issued in each
state.
The matrix A denes the current set of access rights in the system. These rights dene the
set QA of rights that are allowed by A. For each request q 2 Q we can now associate a boolean
variable PA whose value is true if q 2 QA, and false otherwise. The state of our system now
includes this variable PA in addition to REQ and the sets S, O and A. This corresponds to the
access permissions in the current access matrix A.
Denition 3.1.1 (Access Control System). An access control system can be dened by the
Kripke structure M = (;0; R; L) over AP where:
1.  = 2S  2O  2A Q [ f?g  f0; 1g
2. 0 = fhS0; O0; A0; (REQ = q); (PA = 0)V (PA = 1)ig  
3. R(hS;O;A;REQ;PAi; hS0; O0; A0; REQ0; PA0i)    that is total.
4. L(hS;O;A;REQ;PAi) denes assertions corresponding to values of variables in S,O,A, REQ
and PA.
Next, we show how to describe a traditional secure access control system using the abstractions
presented so far, by restricting what transitions are allowed to occur between states. The syntax
of the transitions T1-T3 between states are specied by the following rules as:
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Denition 3.1.2 (T1). A secure transition between two states is given by
hS;O;A; (REQ = q); (PA = 1)i !T1 hS0; O0; A0; (REQ = ?); (PA0 = 0)i
Denition 3.1.3 (T2). A null transition is given by
hS;O;A; (REQ = q); (PA = 0)i !T2 hS;O;A; (REQ = ?); (PA0 = 0)i
Denition 3.1.4 (T3). An unconditional transition is given by
hS;O;A; (REQ = ?); (PA = 0)i !T3 hS;O;A; (REQ = q); PA0i
Transition T1 species \good behavior". A request should be allowed if the corresponding right
can be found in the access matrix. The precise meaning of the transition for dierent requests q
needs to be dened clearly for any specic model, by carefully dening the changes allowed to occur
in the new state hS;O;A; (REQ = ?); (PA0 = 0)i as a result of the transition.
Each transition or action in our system changes the values of one or more elements of our system
state. The primitive commands change the protection state, i.e., the sets of subjects, objects and
the access matrix themselves. Other actions typically only change the values of information objects.
Each command and action is associated with a precise semantics. The semantics for the primitive
commands are given in Section 2.1.1.
If the resulting state of such a transition adheres to the semantics specied by the system
designer, we can assert that the change was valid. Though we do not include these in our model,
to keep the explanation simple, ideally we would augment each secure transition with a set of
assertions that hold as preconditions in the start state i of a T1|type transition labeled by
action q, and a set of assertions that holds as postconditions in the end state i+1 of a transition
i
q−! i+1.
The sets of propositions Precondition(q) and Postcondition(q) are evaluated in the start state
i and end state i+1 of a transition for a request q 2 Q. The transition is allowed to occur
if the set of assertions in the set Precondition(q) in state i are consistent. After the transition
occurs, the transition adheres to the semantics of the action if the set Postcondition(q) in i+1 is
consistent. Note these sets may be viewed as Horn-clauses, and that the asserted postconditions in
a given state can be used as preconditions when this state i+1 becomes the start state for the next
transition. We can use standard program verication techniques to verify if a secure transition is
semantically consistent.
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Transition T2 asserts if the request is not authorized by the access matrix, the sets S, O,
or A should not change in any way. Transitions T1 and T2 describe what is called the \policy
membership" test of safety for access control models. Transition T3 makes the Kripke structure
total, and states that our model can enter state where there is a request at any time, regardless of
whether PA is true or not.
This formulation gives us a methodology to validate that a system implements its policies by
comparing the observed transitions for each subject with the permissions in the access matrix. If
the transitions in the system are restricted to T1, T2 and T3, we observe that the system only
exhibits authorized behavior.
Note that this denition of a secure access control system is the same as Denition 2.2.1 of
access control safety in Chapter 2.
3.2 Problem
The semantic model of secure transitions with the policy membership test described in Section 3.1.1
is attractive because of its simplicity. To prove this model is secure, we can start with an initial
state that is assumed to contain only rights that are authorized by the system policy specication.
We can can rely on the denition of transitions T1{T3 to assert that any state reachable from this
state is also secure.
The relationship between policies that are enforced by the implementation mechanisms and the
policies actually authorized by some system policy needs to be explored in greater detail.
Let Qauth be the (conceptual) set of authorized requests in the system, corresponding to rights
that are allowed to particular users by the system policy. This set includes all the possible rights
that can be installed in A by authorized users, not just the rights in the current state. In existing
systems, the distinction between an access right and a policy-authorized right is not maintained. A
request is allowed if and only if the corresponding right-to-access can be found in the access matrix
A. We show how this is a weakness of existing access control models.
If the set of requests allowed in a system QA implementation is a subset of the set of policy-
authorized request Qauth then this system is secure. If these two sets are equal, this system is
precise. In Section 3.1.1, we dene transitions that correspond to authorized behavior, explicitly
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allowed by system policies. This formulation assumes that the policy membership test is always
done correctly. This behavior is depicted by the event-graph shown in Figure 3.1.
Denied by PolicyAllowed by Policy
Entity Issues Action
Allowed by Implementation Denied by Implementation
Figure 3.1: Event Graph for Ideal Access Control Decisions
This intermediate test for whether the action is allowed or denied by the policy, represented
by the dotted oval, is not performed in most existing systems. These systems assume that the
policy implementation mechanisms and the access-rights matrix cannot be compromised and
the situational policies in the access matrix are consistent with the policies authorized by the
system policies. In this thesis, we argue that this assumption is a major weakness of existing policy
modeling and analysis techniques. Furthermore, safety guarantees provided by the model become
worthless when a system enters a compromised state.
In order to describe the behavior of a system under attack, we argue that we need to explore
how things can \go wrong". To make the model more expressive, I argue that we need to explicitly
include a notion of compromise and, whenever possible, dene strategies (as a sequence of states
and transitions) that model recovery.
The set of policy-authorized requests Qauth is a good starting point for this exercise. The
challenge is to separate the policy from mechanism, and ensure that any violation or modication
of the policy by attackers can be detected in the system.
In 3.2.1 next, I describe how we can extend the semantic model of Section 3.1.1 to explicitly
accommodate for insecure behavior and subsequent recovery, to model survivability.
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3.2.1 Modeling Insecurity
In real systems, the protection state of the system may be inconsistent with the behavior described
by the authorized policies in the system. For example, an attacker may be able to alter the per-
missions in the access matrix and compromise the condentiality or integrity of the information,
as in the case of a privilege-escalation buer overflow attack. Neither the model presented in Sec-
tion 3.1.1, nor any of state-of-the-art models presented in Chapter 2 can describe this inconsistency
as \undesirable" behavior.
Specically, since the system does not make a distinction between what is authorized and what
is installed in the access matrix, this attack cannot be detected by analyzing existing models. In
order to dierentiate between the actions authorized by actual policy and the actions enforced by
the system’s mechanisms, we argue that this distinction needs to be exposed at the model level.
Therefore we augment the state of our model with a new boolean variable called Pauth. This
variable is true when the current request q is in Qauth and false otherwise.
Another issue that frequently arises in existing systems is when a legitimate subject makes an
authorized request to access an object, and this action is denied. Note this unavailability may only
be temporary. It may be because of poor-resource engineering, in scenarios where many legitimate
users compete for the same resource. Another source of this type of insecurity is a denial of service
(DoS) attack, when a malicious user or attacker denies access to legitimate users by competing for
the same resource. Both these cases may be viewed as instances when the policies are not being
enforced correctly temporarily. This insecurity may or may not result in an inconsistent state.
We show both these types of policy enforcement failures pictorially by augmenting the event-
graph with faults to produce a fault-graph in Figure 3.2.
In particular, the dashed edges in Figure 3.2 correspond to the transitions that violate the
policy authorization test. The rst type of compromise can be viewed as a high-level description
of denial of service (DoS), i.e., an authorized entity is prevented from completing a legitimate
request. However, the information itself may not compromised and its eect on the system is
usually benign. The second type of insecurity can lead to information compromise, i.e., irretrievable
transfer or modication of information by unauthorized entities. Note the distinction between policy
compromise and information compromise. Policy compromise may lead to information compromise.
43
Denied by PolicyAllowed by Policy
Entity Issues Action
Allowed by Implementation Denied by Implementation
Figure 3.2: Fault graph for Access Control Decisions
Denition 3.2.1 (Augmented AC system). The Augmented Access Control System which
explicitly separates policy and mechanism is represented by the following Kripke structureM 0 =
(0;00; R0; L0) over AP as:
1. 0 = 2S  2O  2A Q [ f?g  f0; 1g  f0; 1g
2. 00 = fhS0; O0; A0; (REQ = q); (PA = 0) _ (PA = 1); (Pauth = 0) _ (Pauth = 1)ig  0
3. R0(hS;O;A;REQ;PA; Pauthi; hS0; O0; A0; REQ0; PA0; Pauth0i)  0  0 that is total.
4. L0(hS;O;A;REQ;PA; Pauthi) denes assertions corresponding to values of variables in S,O,A,
REQ, PA, and Pauth.
We introduce these two types of insecure behavior into our model using the following transitions:
Denition 3.2.2 (T4). A benign insecure transition is given by
hS;O;A; (REQ = q); (PA = 1); (Pauth = 1)i !T4 hS;O;A; (REQ = ?); (PA0 = 0); (Pauth0 = 0)i
Denition 3.2.3 (T5). A malicious insecure transition is given by
hS;O;A; (REQ = q); (PA = 1)(Pauth = 0)i !T5 hS0; O0; A0; (REQ = ?); (PA0 = 0)(Pauth0 = 0)i
An insecure but benign transition leaves the system unchanged, even if the action was au-
thorized by the policy. Note an access right corresponding to this action is explicitly present in
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the access matrix, as well in the set of authorized actions. This transition has no eect on the
state variables (S;O;A). The malicious insecure policy changes the variables in hS;O;A; qi, even
though q it is not in Qauth. The exact nature of this unauthorized change is model-specic.
The original transitions T1{T3 are presented next in their modied form. They are essentially
the same as the transitions in Section 3.2, except for the addition of the variable Pauth in every
state. In T1’, (Pauth = 1) indicates that the secure transition is also authorized by the policy.
Similarly, null transition is specically not authorized by the policy, and therefore (Pauth = 0) in
T20 as next.
Denition 3.2.4 (T1’). A secure transition between two states is given by
hS;O;A; (REQ = q); (PA = 1)(Pauth = 1)i !T1 hS0; O0; A0; (REQ = ?); (PA0 = 0)(Pauth0 = 0)i.
Denition 3.2.5 (T2’). A null transition is given by
hS;O;A; (REQ = q); (PA = 0)(Pauth = 0)i !T2 hS;O;A; (REQ = ?); (PA0 = 0); (Pauth0 = 0)i
Denition 3.2.6 (T3’). An unconditional transition is given by
hS;O;A; (REQ = ?); (PA = 0); (Pauth = 0)i !T3 hS;O;A; (REQ = q); PA0; Pauth0i.
For completeness, the state where (PA = 0) ^ (Pauth = 1) indicates that the user is allowed
to execute the action according to the system policy, but the right to execute this action is not
available in A at this point. This may be because the user has not explicitly assigned themselves
this permission. The system may prompt the user at this point with appropriate feedback, or the
user may realize this behavior and assign themselves the appropriate right. Therefore this behavior
imprecise but not insecure.
Once policy compromise occurs, it is useful to explore the nature of damage caused by an inse-
cure transition. In the case of failure to a condentiality policy, the consequences of the compromise
can be malicious or benign as described. To elaborate, a condentiality compromise could be one
of the following:
1. A subject s 2 SC that was allowed to read object o according to the system policy PC , is
denied this action by policy enforcement mechanisms. Information that could be exchanged
freely has now become unavailable. However this compromise does not propagate condential
information.
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2. A subject s 2 SC that was not allowed to read object o now suddenly has access to infor-
mation in o and can further propagate this condential information, possibly allowing other
unauthorized entities in SC access to this information.
An integrity compromise can also be one of two types:
1. A subject s 2 SI that was allowed to write and modify an object o according to the system
policy PI , is denied this action by policy enforcement mechanisms. As a result, the information
may be stale and not useful to other entities in SI .
2. A subject s 2 SI that was not allowed to modify o now suddenly has the ability to change
it. Entities in SI now have to trust an entity in SI . Compromised information may further
propagate through the system.
In the next subsection, I explore what we mean by recovery from information compromise,
specically in the case of condentiality and integrity policies. A complete analysis of compromise
and recovery in the case of information-flow policies is beyond the scope of this thesis.
3.2.2 Recovery
Recovering from policy compromise may involve exercising administrative control and changing
access control permissions dynamically, in response to an attack or vulnerability exposure, thereby
preventing future spread of compromised information. For condentiality compromise, if we can
reliably constrain future interactive behavior of the entity that obtained the compromised infor-
mation, we can argue that condentiality from the viewpoint of the rest of the system is still
preserved.
When a resource’s integrity has been compromised by an unauthorized user, and is detected at
a later point in time, the system may be able to rollback actions and restore values to a previously
consistent state of the system, thereby enabling a weaker notion of integrity. Sometimes it may
be necessary to restart the system in order to accomplish this. Other strategies such as storing
multiple redundant copies, using error correcting codes, etc., can help restore integrity even under
attack.
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Modeling assurance requirements as safety properties cannot describe or quantify the impact
of such strategies that explicitly recognize insecure states and transitions and adapt their behavior
in response, by restricting future behavior of the system, and eventually bringing the system to
an authorized state again. However, it is also important to realize that using these RAs in an ad
hoc manner can create more vulnerabilities and opportunities for attack. The challenge therefore
is to provide a framework that can represent dierent types of dynamic strategies such as the ones
described above, and reason about the impact of these strategies on the security and survivability
of a system model.
In Section 3.3, I explore how to specify survivability properties that can represent the eective-
ness of dierent RAs, using our extended semantic model of access control.
3.3 Solution Space
In this section, I give a high-level overview of how to specify, quantify, and verify the ability of
an access control model to survive policy compromise. I introduce a new class of survivability
properties, modeled as branching-time properties on subgraphs of state-transition models. These
properties describe the ability of (a part of) the system, comprising of specic subjects and objects,
to continue to provide specic security guarantees even when other parts of system are compromised.
These properties specify the notion that even when certain entities in the system are compro-
mised (i.e., bad things happen), the system is able to guarantee, for a specic set of users with
respect to a particular property, that good things will eventually happen. We call these proper-
ties \dynamic policies" since they represent the ability of a model to survive dierent types of
compromise, in both qualitative and quantitative terms
In Section 3.3.1, I dene survivability as a property of execution traces of system behavior. I
show example specications that explicitly model compromise and recovery, and analyze them with
respect to their ability to satisfy survivability properties. At the end of this section, I explore how
we can use standard model-checking and other analysis techniques to validate these survivability
properties in a given model.
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3.3.1 Specifying Survivability
We dene survivability as a special type of liveness property that captures the ability of an in-
formation protection system to continue providing certain security guarantees, even in the face of
policy compromise. Policy compromise or information compromise may cause the unavailability
of a resource to its authorized users. Recovery involves restoring this availability after compro-
mise. Therefore, measuring this availability of the resource to legitimate users is an integral part
of survivability modeling.
In traditional safety property validation, the analysis begins with a \secure" initial state that
satises the property of interest, and the satisfaction of this property is tracked across all reachable
authorized transitions from this state. For survivability, we are more interested in tracking the evo-
lution of a system whenever we observe something \bad" occurs. Furthermore, like condentiality
and integrity properties, we are interested in the survivability from the viewpoint of an authorized
user in the system. With this in mind, we relate survivability to traditional condentiality and
integrity properties as follows:
 Survivability: Given that subjects s0 2 S0  S can access a subset of objects A  O
using rights r 2 R according to either a condentiality or integrity policy p 2 PC [ PI , a
survivability policy pv 2 PV with respect to subject s0 2 S0, partitions the set of subjects
in S0 into two disjoint sets S0V and S
0
V . Subjects in S
0
V are guaranteed that when a policy
compromise occurs and the resources become unavailable, the system will restore their ability
to access it securely, eventually, and innitely often. Furthermore, this recovery behavior can
be quantied in terms of timing or probabilistic guarantees. Subjects in S0A are not provided
any such guarantees.
We dene the notion of a survivability strategy as follows. A survivability strategy can be
viewed as the interactive behavior between two types of entities in our system: an adversary and
a controller. An adversary corresponds to an attacker and the controller is a system administrator
who is authorized to make changes to the protection state. A strategy is modeled as a special state-
transition subgraph that starts with a secure state in our model and an insecure transition, initiated
by an adversary, to indicate the behavior of the system under attack.
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The system evolves through dierent states according to transitions specied by the strategy,
representing the interactive behavior of both the adversary and controller, and ends in a secure
state, indicating the system has recovered from the attack. Note that the strategy can be evaluated
only in the context of the overall model of the system. The start state and end state of a strategy
may be indistinguishable in which case the eect of the attack is neutralized, impacting only the
availability of the resource when the recovery actions were in progress. On the other hand, the end
state of a strategy may be only partially consistent with the policies, indicating that the attack
was partially recoverable. We dene strategies and the notion of an adversary and a controller in
greater detail in Chapter 4.
We dene survivability properties as temporal logic formulas that can be satised by traces of
system behavior augmented with these survivability strategies.
We use CTL [33] and its probabilistic and real-time extensions to formulate these properties.
CTL is the most widely used logic to specify properties of branching-time models, and we believe
is an appropriate formalism in this context. Since CTL is widely used, we do not dene its syntax
and semantics in this chapter, but refer the reader to Appendix A.
Temporal logic formulas in CTL are interpreted in the context of Kripke structures. A compu-
tation in a Kripke structure is an innite sequence of states where each state is obtained from the
previous state by some valid transition in R. A path is a model of a specic computation of the
system. A computation tree is formed by designating a state in the Kripke structure as an initial
state and then unwinding the structure into an innite tree with the designated state as root. This
tree shows all possible executions starting from that state.
CTL formulas are interpreted over such computation trees of entity behavior. A model satises
a CTL state formula Af , if we can prove f is true \in all computation paths" from that state,
it satises formula Ef if it is true \in some computation path" from that state. Similarly the
temporal operator Gf is dened over paths and asserts that the formula f is true in all states
along the current path in the future, and the formula Ff over paths asserts that some state along
the current path that can satisfy the property will be reached eventually. In CTL, G and F must be
immediately preceded by the path quantiers A or E. Therefore CTL formulas describe properties
of states along paths of computation in a model.
49
3.3.2 Example Specication and Verication of Survivability Properties
In this subsection, we illustrate how dening survivability as a special type of liveness property, and
explicitly modeling insecurity can describe specify as well as validate models that are survivable and
have the ability to recover from compromise. We explain this with the help of a simple example.
Consider the following system conguration in the context of the state-transition model described
in Sections 3.2.1:
S = fJohng
O = ffoo; bar; tempg
R = fr; wg
A[John; foo] = r; A[John; temp] = r
Qauth = fhJohn; foo; ri; hJohn; temp; rihJohn; temp;wig
We describe transitions T1 through T5 for this system in Table 3.1 next. Note we do not
explicitly show the state variables that do not change in each state for space constraints:
Start state End State
T1 h(REQ = hJohn; foo; ri); (PA = 1)(Pauth = 1)i htemp := foo; (REQ = ?); (PA0 = 0);
(Pauth0 = 0)i
T2 h(REQ = hJohn; bar; r; i); (PA = 0)(Pauth = 0)i h(REQ = ?); (PA0 = 0)(Pauth0 = 0)i
T3 h(REQ = ?); (PA = 0); (Pauth = 0)i h(REQ = q); PA0; Pauth0i
T4 h(REQ = hJohn; foo; ri); (PA = 1)(Pauth = 1)i h(REQ = ?); (PA0 = 0); (Pauth0 = 0)i
T5 h(REQ = hJohn; bar; ri)(PA = 1)(Pauth = 0)i hftemp := barg; (REQ = ?); (PA0 = 0);
(Pauth0 = 0)i
Table 3.1: Transitions for Example System
John’s behavior can be specied using the behavior graph shown in Figure 3.3(i). The initial
state of John’s behavior can be the start state of any transition. Whenever John issues an action
to read le foo, a transition of type T1 (secure) is enabled because the tuple hJohn; foo; ri is an
authorized policy, and is present in the access matrix. The variable temp is assigned the value of
foo as a result of this action. If John attempts to read le bar, since it is not explicitly allowed,
a null transition (type T2) occurs as shown in Figure 3.3(ii). Note we represent it as two separate
graphs for convenience, and the starting state of a computation tree of this model can be the start
state of Figure 3.3(i) or (ii).
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 (i) (ii)
T3
T3
T3
T3
 
 
   P_A = 1, P_auth = 1 >
< REQ = < John, foo, r >  ,
< P_A = 0, P_auth = 0 >
< REQ =   , P_A = 0, P_auth = 0 > < REQ =   , P_A = 0, P_auth = 0 > 
<{temp = foo}, P_A =0, P_auth = 0 >
< REQ = < John, bar, r > 
P_A = 0, P_auth = 0 > 
T2T1
Figure 3.3: Behavioral Specication for Safety
The traditional denition of access control safety to specify John’s desirable behavior, in a
computation tree starting in state h(S;O;A); (REQ = q); PA; Pauthi is given next. Let Tki be the
start state of a Tk transition and Tki+1 the end state. Traditional access control safety is given as
(! is boolean implication):
Property 1 (Access Control Safety). AG((T1i ! T1i+1) _ (T2i ! T2i+1) _ (T3i ! T3i+1))
This property asserts that John is allowed to read le foo if the policy allows it (T1), and
obtain an appropriate response. It also asserts that John cannot read le bar for which he does
not have access according to the policy (T2). The only other transitions allowed in this system, if
they are not T1 or T2, are of type T3. This property specication can be trivially veried against
the example specication.
Modeling Compromise
Now suppose that the policy enforcement mechanisms are compromised, either explicitly by an
attacker, or inadvertently by poor software engineering. The behavioral model that denes only
authorized states and transitions, presented in Figure 3.3, is not capable of describing this behav-
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ior. The system may enable transitions of type T4 (benign insecurity) or of type T5 (malicious
insecurity). The state-transition graph of Figure 3.3 is augmented with insecure states as shown in
Figure 3.4.
 
(i) (ii)
T3
< REQ = | , P_A = 0, P_auth = 0 > < REQ = | , P_A = 0, P_auth = 0 > 
−
−
< REQ = < John, bar, r > 
P_A = 1, P_auth = 0
< REQ = < John, foo, r > 
P_A = 1, P_auth = 1
<{temp := foo}, P_A = 0,
P_auth = 0 >
< P_A = 0, P_auth = 0 >
P_auth = 0 >P_auth = 0 >
< P_A = 0, 
T1 T4
T3
T3
T3
T5T2
T3T3
<{temp := bar}, P_A = 0,
Figure 3.4: Behavioral Specication with Compromise
In Figure 3.4(i), in addition to T1, a compromised enforcement mechanism can arbitrarily
deny John access to foo by executing type T4 transitions repeatedly. In addition, as shown in
Figure 3.4(ii), John may be able to access le bar, executing a type T5 transition, even though it is
explicitly forbidden by the policy. Expanding the model into a computation tree, we observe that
the safety properties described earlier are violated by transitions T4 and T5.
Now we dene a survivable version of access control safety as an availability property. For the
given system, we claim that the specication is survivable if it can satisfy the following property
for benign insecurity:
Property 2 (Access Control Survivability). AG((T4i ! T4i+1) ! EF(T1i ! T1i+1))
This property asserts that whenever John issues an authorized request to read le foo, and this
is denied, at some point in the future, the system is capable of recovering from this action and able
to satisfy another legitimate request for the same object at some time in the future. Verifying this
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property by inspection in this model asserts that this model is indeed capable of compromise-free
behavior. However, John’s requests to read the le may be denied repeatedly by transitions of
type T4. Furthermore, we show that the model is capable of malicious behavior (transitions T5).
The model in Figure 3.4(ii) also satises:
Property 3 (Access Control Vulnerability). AG((T5i ! T5i+1) ! EF(T5i ! T5i+1))
Recovery
Next, we examine if we can augment Specication 3.4(ii) to include an explicit notion of recovery.
If the information bar is compromised, i.e., John manages to read bar when he is not supposed to,
we explore how we can change the specication and recover from this exposure, without impacting
the rest of the system.
For this we dene the nil as an empty le. We augment the specication of Figure 3.4(ii) with
a new transition that resets the value of temp to nil after it is assigned to bar, before John can
read temp. This hypothetical situation is shown in Figure 3.5.
T3
T3
<{ temp = bar }, P_A = 0, P_auth = 0 > < P_A = 0, P_auth = 0 >
< REQ = < John, bar, r >, P_A =1, P_auth = 0 > 
< { temp = nil }, P_A = 0. P_auth = 0 >
Recover
T3
T5T2
< REQ = | , P_A = 0, P_auth = 0>  
Figure 3.5: Behavioral Specication with Recovery
We dene a new recovery action qr that can be initiated by an administrator of the system.
The transition Tr corresponding to this RA is given as follows:
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Denition 3.3.1 (Tr). A recovery action for the example model can be specied as follows:
hftemp := barg(REQ = qr); (PA = 1); (Pauth = 1)i ! hftemp := nilg; (REQ0 = ?); (PA0 =
0); (Pauth0 = 0)i.
This action resets the value of the le temp to nil. If this action can be executed by the system
before any other action that attempts to read the value of temp is successful, then we can safely
recover from this insecurity.
Property 4 (Access Control Recovery I). The access control recovery property is specied as
follows: AG(Tri ! A(h(REQ 6= hJohn; temp; r=wi))UTri+1)
This asserts that if a transition of type T5 occurs, the model should recover from this by setting
John’s le temp to nil, before John reads or writes to temp. If we can guarantee this modied
behavior, then the system can recover from a condentiality compromise.In a real system, an
intruder detection system (IDS) may alert an administrator that the information is compromised.
The administrator may observe the system at some later point in time, and analyze the trace of
requests after the attack occurred and can decide whether the recover action is useful or not at this
stage. In order to show the model is compromise-free, we have to also show how it can also prevent
transitions of type T4 in Figure 3.4(i) as:
Property 5 (Access Control Recovery II). AG(:(T4i ! T4i+1))
While all the properties shown so far can be veried by hand, we show how we can rely on
model-checking techniques for CTL formulas to automate this process, if we can restrict our focus
to nite-state or nite-state abstractions of access control models, in Chapter 4.
So far we have only modeled a system with one entity. When we have multiple entities and
resources, the specication process can get complicated. To address this issue, in Chapter 4, we
introduce the abstraction of a request-response trace that captures the progress of an access request
across dierent entities in our system, and show how we can describe behavior across these dierent
entities. In addition, we show how we can extend the model to incorporate timing guarantees and
stochastic behavior to develop useful measures of survivability.
When an resource is compromised, recovery may involve temporarily suspending read and
write access by other entities, making it unavailable in the process. In Chapter 4, we explore
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how to change policies dynamically, without sacricing consistency and preserving existing trust
relationships. The mechanisms we describe there can be adapted to this specication process easily.
In addition to malicious behavior, uncompromised resources may become temporarily unavail-
able to authorized users, because of poor resource engineering or poor design of resource access
mechanisms. In addition, malicious users may take advantage of this to overload resource-access
mechanisms with unwanted requests, thereby denying service to authorized users of the resource. In
order to capture this aspect of policy compromise, in Chapter 5, I showcase the expressive power of
our framework by extending our simple semantic model to include resource consumption behavior
on dierent entities in the system, and dene useful properties to explore and analyze dierent
strategies for recovery from DoS attacks.
3.4 Thesis Statement
From the description of the context, problem and solution space, I state my thesis as follows:
 Abstract models of information protection systems can be made more relevant by incorpo-
rating insecure states and transitions explicitly, and by rening traditional safety properties
such as condentiality and integrity as liveness properties in terms of their ability to survive
attacks and be available to legitimate users over time. This new abstraction allows one to
integrate notions of compromise, recovery, and denial of service into policy specication and
verication methodologies, enables recovery-oriented security, and provides a framework to
study dierent attack-recovery strategies and analyze their impact on improving survivability
of critical information resources.
3.5 Success Criteria
I propose the following criteria to evaluate my thesis:
 Does the proposed thesis advance the state-of-the-art with respect to security property mod-
eling and verication?
 Is the formulation of survivability properties in terms of their availability appropriate for the
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context? Can it describe useful measures of recovery and resilience to attacks, and capture
the cost-benet issues of interest to security designers?
 Are the proposed extensions to access control models expressive enough to capture tempo-
ral and stochastic notions of compromise, recovery, and denial of service adequately, both
quantitatively and qualitatively?
 Does the proposed framework for analysis of recovery strategies, based on the abstract model,
address trust and consistency concerns adequately?
 Are these properties veriable in the framework of the model? Is the verication methodology
automatable? Can it leverage existing and incorporate proposed state-of-the-art with respect
to automated verication of properties? Is the verication scalable? How can it be extended
to models of large systems?
 Is the framework capable of describing a suciently complex model to be useful in practice,
as highlighted by the modeling and analysis of quantitative and qualitative aspects of network
DoS attacks and attack resilience?
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Things alter for the worse spontaneously,
if they be not altered for the better
designedly.
Francis BaconChapter 4
Modeling Recovery
In this chapter I show how we can extend the model and the qualitative semantic framework
presented in Chapter 3 to include stochastic guarantees and timing behavior. In Section 4.1 we
motivate the need for these extensions, and show how we can model an access control system as a
PNS (a probabilistic non-deterministic system) that integrates both stochastic and nondeterministic
behavior into state-transition semantic descriptions of reactive systems.
The Kripke model we present in Chapter 3 is equivalent to a non-deterministic nite-state
machine. Modeling the access control problem with nondeterminism captures the behavior that
any user can issue any request at any time. Extending this to describe stochastic behavior allows
us to describe dynamic resource access scenarios, where requests issued by users, say accessing
le-servers or web-servers, can be modeled as random variables. We also present an extension
of PNSes, called the Timed PNS (TPNS) that can be used to model realtime timing guarantees.
With these extensions, we can dene quantitative and probabilistic survivability guarantees in the
context of recovery-oriented security.
A PNS can be represented as a DTMC (Discrete Time Markov Chain), or as a CTMC (Con-
tinuous Time Markov Chain), its real-time variant, if we have a purely probabilistic nite-state
system model. It is equivalent to an MDP (Markov Decision Processes) if we include nondeter-
minism. DTMCs, MDPs and CTMCs have been widely used in the past to describe dependability
and reliability properties of networked systems. The correspondence between a PNS and these
abstractions allow us to transplant related concepts and analysis techniques from these models to
our recovery-oriented model of security. Survivability of a system under attack can be viewed as an
application of these concepts to security models, with the added capability of describing qualitative
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properties using temporal logics and their associated semantics.
In Section 4.2, in order to specify the recovery behavior of a system under attack, we develop
the notion of a recovery strategy, in terms of the behavior of two types of users in our model:
adversaries and controllers. We show how we can model the behavior of these types of users within
the context of a PNS or TPNS, and describe attacks, countermeasures and recovery with the help
of representative examples.
We also show how we can take advantage of state-of-the-art model checking techniques to verify
if a particular system model can provide survivability guarantees of interest. We summarize how
we can specify, analyze, and validate survivability properties against these models using PCTL
(Probabilistic Computation Tree Logic) for DTMCs and MDPs and CSL (Continuous Stochastic
Logic) for CTMCs, and comment on the applicability of runtime verication techniques.
In Section 4.3 of this chapter, I examine how the survivability of a system degrades when a
user’s account in the system is compromised. Specically, I examine the impact of this compromise
with regard to condentiality and integrity policies . I discuss how we can characterize the set of
users who may be aected because of this compromise by analyzing explicit information flows. We
show how to quantify the damage and discuss what properties a policy conguration should satisfy
to minimize or control the impact of such attacks.
Finally, in Section 4.4, we examine the performance characteristics of dynamically changing
access control policies and mechanisms as RAs within this framework, and investigate the nature
of trust relationships and safety guarantees that need to be preserved in order to use them as RAs
eectively.
4.1 Towards a More Expressive System Model
Our model presented in Chapter 3 can describe the behavior of a generic access control system,
in terms of both actions that can change the protection state itself, as well as actions that can
change the values of information objects in the system. It also provides a richer semantics that can
dierentiate between an action that is authorized by a policy, versus and action that is enabled by a
mechanism. This distinction is important to recognize attacks and devise survivability mechanisms
that can respond to these attacks.
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From the point of view of a security engineer, our framework can be used to model access control
mechanisms of a particular system implementation. Using the accompanying analysis framework,
one can evaluate this model-instance by exploring how the system can be compromised. For each
compromise, one can further specify and investigate dierent recovery strategies, and gauge their
overall impact on the preservation of properties of interest in the system under attack.
Existing models of access control behavior are purely qualitative. By this we mean that the
security properties in the model depend only on the semantics of the actions, in terms of changes
in the system state that occur as a result of the actions. While such models of security systems are
useful in their own right, they do not provide the ability to express quantitative properties that are
integral to modeling survivability.
We identify two types of policy compromise that can lead to attacks in Chapter 3: information
compromise attacks and DoS attacks. We argue that in order study the impact of dierent recovery
strategies under these attacks, the model we have presented so far does not give us the necessary
power of expression. In terms of response strategies for information compromise attacks, we are
interested in measuring the relative benets of using one strategy over another. One of the metrics
to perform this comparison is how fast we can recover when a compromise occurs. Ideally, we
would like to restrict our study of strategies to those that are able to provide an acceptable bound
on when the model reaches a consistent state or when a resource becomes available again. This is
called a \bounded availability" property.
In the case of DoS attacks, we need to model the usage patterns of the resource by both
legitimate users as well as attackers over time. By changing the request behavior of dierent users
(including attackers) over time, we can study the impact of their actions on the availability of the
resource to legitimate users of the system. Furthermore, a strategy that is eective against a DoS
attack should be able to demonstrate that the availability guarantees of a resource to its legitimate
users improves over time, as a result of the strategy.
In order to represent both the behavior of a system under attack and the impact of a recovery
strategy on the survivability of a system, we argue that we need to augment the state-transition
graphs with explicit quantitative models of resource-request behavior, including such parameters
as request sending rates, arrival rates and service rates. If we view the information objects in our
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system as network resources, we can leverage the rich theory of stochastic processes and queuing
theory to describe and model this behavior in terms of the request-response behavior of dierent
users in our system. In Section 4.1.1, I discuss how we can extend the simple state-transition
graphs to include descriptions of stochastic behavior. I also show how we can incorporate real-time
into state-transition graph models and describe quantitative survivability properties within this
framework.
4.1.1 Modeling Stochastic Behavior
We present the following abstractions dened in the theory of Probabilistic-Nondeterministic Sys-
tems (PNS) from [109, 110, 19], which can represent a system that displays both probabilistic and
nondeterministic behavior. A PNS augments the state-transition function of a Kripke model with
what is called the next-state probability distribution which is dened as follows:
Denition 4.1.1 (Next-state probability distribution). The next-state probability distribution
for a state space  is a function p :  ! [0; 1] such that P2 p() = 1. For each  2 , p()
represents the probability of making a one-step transition from the current state to state .
Using this function, we can now dene a PNS over a set of atomic propositions AP as follows:
Denition 4.1.2 (PNS). A PNS is a 4-tuple  = (;0; ; L) where:
1.  is the denumerable or nite state space of the system
2. in 2  is an initial state
3.  is a function that associates each  2  with the set () = fp1 ;    ; pkg of the next-state
probability distributions from . Cardinality of j()j is k.
4. L is the labeling function that associates each  2  with the set L() 2 2AP of propositions
that are true in .
Note the close correspondence between the denition of a PNS and a standard Kripke structure.
The relation R is now replaced by the function V between two states. Finding the successor state
of a given state s 2 S is a two-step process:
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1. A next-state probability distribution pi may be selected nondeterministically among set ()
2. A successor state 0 2  is chosen according to the distribution pi on S.
The reachability relation     is dened as follows:
Denition 4.1.3 (Reachability).  = f(; 0) j 9p 2 () ^ p(0) > 0g
With each state  2 , we represent the set of legal innite sequences Ω of states starting at
s = 0 as the set:
Ωs = f012    j = 0 ^ 8n 2 N:(n; n+1)g
The set of computations of this system  is Ωin . For ! 2 Ωs, ! jn is the n-th state of !, with
! j0= s.
The model described here can be viewed as a simple encoding of the parallel composition of m
Markov chains A1;    ; Am [127]. In a PNS  representing A1kA2k    kAm, with each state  2 ,
we can associate the next state distributions (() = fp1 ;    ; pmg, where the distribution pi arises
from a move taken by a chain Ai. The probabilistic behavior of each chain is preserved in , and
the choice of the Markov chain that takes the transition is nondeterministic.
In order to analyze the properties of such a system, we need to dene a probability measure on
the set Ωs of legal innite sequences of states beginning at some state s. The standard technique
is to dene B  2Ωs as the smallest algebra of the subsets of Ωs that contain all the basic cylinder
sets f! 2 Ωsj! j0= 0 ^   ! jn= ng for all n  0 and 0;    ; n 2  that is closed under
complement, and countable unions and intersections. This algebra is called the Borel -algebra of
basic cylinder sets and its elements are measurable sets of sequences.
Due to the presence of nondeterminism, we cannot dene a probability measure on B. However,
for each set of sequences  2 B, we can dene its maximal probability + () and its minimal
probability − ().
Informally + () represents the probability that the system follows a sequence in  given that
the nondeterministic choices are as favorable as possible. Similarly + () is when these choices
are as unfavorable as possible.
Formally, these maximal and minimal probabilities are explained with the help of strategies or
schedules that determine which next state probability distribution is chosen for each state. In order
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to prevent confusion with the notion of a recovery strategy, we will qualify each use of the word in
the other sections.
We are interested in strategies that maximize or minimize the probability that a system starting
in state s, follows a sequence in . We assume that a strategy does not depend on past history. A
strategy is formally dened as follows:
Denition 4.1.4 (Strategy). A strategy  is a set of conditional probabilitiesQ(i j 0; 1;    ; n)
such that
Pkn
i=1 Q(i j 0; 1;    ; n) = 1, for all n 2 N , 0; 1;    ; n 2  and 1  kn.
A strategy  basically resolves the nondeterministic choices of a system that starts at 0 and
reaches n following the sequence 0; 1;    ; n, by choosing the next-state distribution pni with
probability Q(i j 0; 1;    ; n). The probability Pr(t j 0;    ; n) that a direct transition is
taken to state t from state n next is thus equal to
Pkn
i=1 Q(i j 0; 1;    ; n):pni (t)
Therefore with each nite sequence 0; 1;    ; n starting at the root of Ωs, we can associate
the probability
Qn−1
i=0 Pr(n+1 j 0;    ; n). These probabilities for nite sequences give a unique
measure s; on B that associates with each  2 B its probability s;() . The minimal and
maximal probabilities can now be dened as follows:
Denition 4.1.5 (Minimal and Maximal Probability). The minimal and maximal probabili-
ties − () and + () of a set of sequences  2 B are dened by:
−s () = inf(s;()) +s () = sup(s;())
Thus −s () and +s () are the minimal and maximal probabilities with which the system
follows an evolution s = 01; 2    when the nondeterministic choices are as unfavorable or
favorable as possible.
The formalism presented here allows us to map a state-transition graph to a stochastic system
model such as a DTMC, CTMC or MDP, allowing us to leverage analysis techniques for these
representations. We also show how with the help of an appropriate temporal logic, we can specify
qualitative as well as quantitative properties that represent survivability concerns adequately.
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4.1.2 Modeling Real-Time
In order to describe quantitative performance properties of real-time systems, we present a standard
augmentation of a PNS called a Timed PNS (TPNS), rst introduced by de Alfaro [39]. This model
introduces a special operator that expresses bounds on the average time between two events, and
denes a framework for modeling and expressing performance, reliability, and correctness properties
of discrete time probabilistic systems.
This probabilistic realtime system corresponds to an MDP with nite state space. In addition to
the non-determinism and probabilistic behavior already described in a PNS, this formalism assigns
each action from the set of actions associated with a particular state in the model to a cost which
is interpreted as the amount of time elapsed during the action. The cost of an action in the model
presented by de Alfaro can be either 0 , corresponding to immediate actions, or 1, corresponding
to unitary time steps. We present the formal denition of a TPNS next:
Denition 4.1.6 (TPNS). A TPNS over set  = (; in;Act ; ; p; c) over AP where
1.  is a nite state space. Every state in assigns truth value [[x]] to every symbol x 2 AP .
2. in is an initial state in 
3. A is a nite set of actions
4.  is a function that associates each  2  with a nonempty set ()  Act that can be taken
at .
5. p is a probability distribution function such that for all ; 0 2 , and a 2 () p(0j; a) is
the probability of a transition from  to 0 under action a. We require 02 p(0j; a) = 1
for all  2  and a 2 ().
6. c is a cost function such that c(; a) 2 f0; 1g for all  2  and a 2 (). This is the cost of
performing a at , equal to the elapsed time.
Given a state  2 , the successor state of  is chosen in a two step process, similar to the
behavior of a PNS:
1. An action a 2 Act is selected nondeterministically
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2. A successor state 0 is chosen according to probability p(0j; a).
Iterating this process gives the set of behaviors of a TPNS, dened as follows:
Denition 4.1.7 (Behavior of a TPNS). A behavior of a TPNS  is an innite sequence
of states and actions ! : 0a01a1    such that ai 2 (i) and p(i+1ji; ai) > 0 for all i  0.
Given a behavior ! : 0a01a1    , !i denotes state i and !ai the action ai, and !i the behavior
iaii+1ai+1   
Let Ωs be the set of of behaviors starting from any state s 2 . Let B be the -algebra of
measurable subsets of Ωs. With each  in Ωs, we would like to associate its probability measure
(). This measure is not well dened, as the probability that a behavior ! 2 B belongs to 
depends on the criterion by which actions are chosen in each state.
Similar to the notion of strategies in PNSes, the concept of a policy is used to specify the
criteria by which actions are chosen in a TPNS. A policy  is a set of conditional probabilities
Q(aj0a01   n) where a 2 (n). Starting from s = 0 of Ωs, after a nite prex 0a01   n,
action a 2 (n) is chosen with probability Q(aj0a01   n) according to policy .
The probability of a direct transition to 0 after 0   n is given by:
Pr(0j0a01   n) =
P
a2(n) p(
0jn; a):Q(aj0a01   n) .
These transition probabilities now give rise to a unique probability measure s on B. Prs (A) is
the probability of event A in Ωs under policy eta and probability measure 

s .
In this simple model, time is modeled by the values of a ctitious global clock by integers in
Z. In order to understand the operational semantics of this system, we introduce the reader to the
abstractions of a timed transition system (TTS) [5]. At any point in the execution sequence ! of
a TTS, either the system state changes or the clock value changes, usually by a unitary time-step
or \tick", or neither. A timed state sequence  = (; T ) consists of an innite sequence of states
i 2 , i  0, and an innite sequence T of corresponding time values Ti 2 Z, that satises the
following conditions:
 Bounded monotonicity: For all i  0, either Ti+1 = Ti or Ti+1 = Ti + 1 and i+1 = i.
This property ensures that time never decreases.
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 Progress: For all i  0, there is some j > i such that Ti < Tj . This is to ensure that time
never stagnates. Thus there are innitely many clock ticks in every timed sequence.
This progress property denes what is called a Non-Zeno system. Formally, a TPNS  is non-
zeno if a behavior from in follows innitely many time-steps under any policy, i.e., Pr

in(A) =
(
P1
i=0 c(!; !
a
i ) = 1) = 1. A system designer must take care to ensure that their TPNS model is
Non-Zeno.
To generate an execution sequence of a TPNS, at each step we have to either choose a transition
with a certain probability without incrementing time, or increment time by 1 while taking an idle
transition. The bounded monotonicity and progress properties are necessary, but not sucient to
show that the stepwise execution of a TTS cannot lead to a situation where time cannot advance
ever. Henzinger et al [68] present additional conditions on the operationality of timed systems
and prove how these conditions are sucient to prevent descriptions of systems where time cannot
advance ever.
The authors describe these operationality requirements using the concept of a partial computa-
tion. A nite prex  = (; T ) of a timed state sequence is a partial computation if it satises what
are called the initiality, consecution, lower bound, and nite upper bound conditions. The initiality
condition asserts that the initial state of this sequence is an initial state of the system model. The
consecution requirement asserts that the system can always take some transition from a given state
i to a new state i+1. The lower bound and nite upper bound requirements on the transition
specify how if we are at a given state and many transitions apply, then there is a lower bound on
when at least one transition will be enabled. Once a transition is enabled, it will taken by the
model within a nite time. If each partial computation of a timed transition system is a prex of
an initialized computation of the system, then we can guarantee that the a system that generates
partial computations incrementally cannot arrive in a situation in which the progress condition on
time cannot be satised.
The choice of Z as the time domain allows us to discretize time and implement scalable analysis
techniques. However, Alur and Henzinger show how we can include non-negative real numbers,
denoted by < by using the notion of intervals to discretize time. These intervals dene the duration
of system states similar to the function of c presented in the TPNS abstraction. Each interval is
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a convex subset of <. Every interval is of the form [a; b]; [a; b); [a;1); (a; b] or (a;1), where a  b
and a; b 2 < for the left endpoint a and the right endpoint b. An interval I is singular i it is of the
form [a; a], that is the interval is closed and its right endpoint is the same as its left endpoint. Two
intervals I and I 0 are adjacent i (1) either I is right-open and I 0 is left-closed, or I is right-closed
and I 0 is left-open, and (2) the right endpoint of I is the same as the left endpoint of I 0. An interval
sequence I = I0I1    is a nite or innite sequence of intervals that partitions the real line such
that:
1. Any two neighboring intervals are adjacent, and
2. For all t 2 <, there is some interval Ii with t 2 I.
3. I0 is left closed and the left end point of I0 is 0. The last interval of any nite interval sequence
is unbounded.
Using this notion of intervals, we now dene the operational semantics of such a system. The
behavior of the system is dened by a set of timed state sequences that satises the nite variability
property and are fusion-closed. We dene these properties next. Each timed state sequence  2 T
represents a system behavior by identifying a unique system state (t) 2  with every time instant
t 2 <. Formally a timed state sequence  is a function from < to  that satises the nite variability
condition.
Denition 4.1.8 (Finite Variability). There exists an interval sequence I = I0I1    such that
throughout each interval Ii, the values of the propositional variables in a state do not change.
Thus the nite variability condition asserts that in any bounded interval of time, there can only
be nitely many observable events or state changes.
The set T of timed state sequences is fusion-closed if each system state contains all the infor-
mation necessary to determine the future evolution of the system.
Denition 4.1.9 (Fusion-closed). For all timed state sequences 1; 2 2 T and time instants
t1; t2 2 <, if 1(t1) = 2(t2), then  2 T for the timed state sequence  with (t) = 1(t) for t  t1
and (t) = 2(t+ t2 − t1) for t > t1.
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Using the notion of intervals allows us to discretize continuous time and incorporate it into
models of state-transition systems.
In the next subsection, we describe how we can use these models to extend the language of
temporal logic to represent both probabilistic and real time properties of survivable systems.
4.1.3 Temporal Logics for PNSes and TPNSes
In this subsection, we present the syntax and semantics of dierent temporal logics that can be
used to specify quantitative temporal and probabilistic survivability properties. These logics are all
extensions of existing formalisms for specifying qualitative branching time properties using CTL
or CTL. The syntax and semantics of CTL and CTL are presented in Appendix A. These
logics include a special probability operator that can be used to specify the maximal or minimal
probability that an event happens. In terms of semantics, the truth value of a formula  at some
state  is a value p() in the interval [0; 1]. This can be interpreted as the probability that the
formula  holds when the system starts in state .
The logics pCTL and pCTL [19] or probabilistic CTL and CTL can describe branching
time properties of concurrent Markov chains. Concurrent Markov chains allow a choice between
probability distributions on successor states, modeling nondeterminism. This choice is understood
to arise the context of a distributed computation and is made by a scheduler or an adversary. The
logics PCTL and PCTL [65] or Probabilistic CTL and CTL describe branching time properties
of sequential Markov chains, which are basically discrete time deterministic Markov chains. The
logic CSL or Continuous Stochastic Logic describes properties of CTMCs. TPCTL or Timed
Probabilistic CTL [4], PBTL [13] or Probabilistic Branching Time Logic, and pTL or probabilistic
temporal logic [39], introduce a special operator D to express bounds on the average time between
events and allow us to specify quantitative as well as probabilistic branching time properties.
We now present the syntax and semantics of pCTL, pCTL and PCTL and PCTL. Similar
to CTL and CTL, we can specify either path formulas or state formulas. Path formulas can
describe properties of execution paths in the computation tree of a model. State formulas are useful
to specify branching time properties as well as various possibilities in a state. The probability
operator P is only dened on state formulas and is used to express the quantity of paths that
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satisfy a given formula from a given state. The P operator may be viewed as a quantitative version
of A and E which express the universality or existence of (a) path(s) that satisfy a given formula.
When the probability value is 1 is equivalent to A, and when it is nonzero it is equivalent to E.
Syntax: The syntax of PCTL formulas is specied as shown next. In the following production
rules,  denotes a state formula and  denotes a path formula:
 = true j a j : j  ^  j P./p( )
 =  j X j  1 U 2 j  1 Uk 2 j  ^  j : 
(4.1)
The operators X;U stand for the usual next and until temporal operators, and a 2 AP . The
probabilistic operator P./p( ) expresses the quantity of paths that satisfy formula  , where ./
stands for <;;; >, and p 2 [0; 1]. The bounded Until formula quanties the number of states k
that  1 has to hold until  2 holds.
The syntax of the pCTL formulas is specied as:
 = true j a j : j  ^  j A j E j P./p( )
 =  U j G j F 
(4.2)
The operators A,E,G, and F stand for all paths, there exists a path, globally and nally
respectively. The logic PBTL is shown to be essentially equal to pCTL. Logics pCTL and
PCTL are restricted subsets of their starred version, with a limitation that the temporal operators
G, U, and X have to be applied to every subformula.
Semantics: The formulas presented above denes a satisfaction relation ;  j= , indicating
that the state formula  holds in state  of PNS . This denition uses a probability space as
described previously by (Ωs;B). For a sequential Markov chain, in the case of PCTL, the formula
P./p( ) means that the unique measure of the set of paths satisfying the formula  ./ p. For a
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concurrent PNS and pCTL, we have minimal and maximal probabilities depending on the strategy
of the adversary.
The syntax and semantics of CSL [11] is very similar to that of PCTL with the addition of
one new state formula operator S./p() called the steady-state operator. Steady state probabilities
refer to the system behavior in the long run, after the transients have died down. Also, the bounded
until formula UI is now modied to specify a restriction on the bound using an interval I over
reals instead of an integer.
Timed probabilistic logics include the operator D./d in addition to P in the generation rules for
state formulas. The intuitive meaning of ; j= D./d in a TPNS  is that D./d holds at  2 ,
regardless of the policy, if the TPNS reaches a  state in average time ./ d. This denition relies on
the fact that the TPNS is non-Zeno. For exact semantics of TPCTL and TPCTL for sequential
Markov chains we refer the reader to [4], and to [39] for semantics of pTL and pTL for concurrent
Markov chains.
In the next section, we describe how to specify a recovery strategy and present examples of
survivability formulas using the logic presented here.
4.2 Recovery Strategies
We dene recovery strategies formally and describe how we can include them in state-transition
graphs of access control behavior. In Section 4.2.1, I show how to model an attack as the behavior
of an adversary and describe how to dierentiate this from authorized system behavior. Next, I
describe how we can specify controllers who can counteract adversarial behavior. I also present how
we can encode this interaction between a controller and an adversary with respect to a property
that needs to be preserved, as a controller-synthesis problem in the context of an open reactive
environments [80].
In Section 4.2.2 I show with the help of examples how we can use the formalism presented
so far to describe useful survivability properties. I discuss how to compare and contrast dierent
strategies in terms of their impact on the satisfaction of condentiality and integrity policies. Using
these metrics, I describe how to analyze dierent recovery strategies for information compromise.
I focus on specication and analysis of recovery strategies for DoS attacks in Chapter 5.
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I follow this with a discussion of how to validate or verify these properties within the frame-
work of the models presented in this Chapter in Section 4.2.3. I show how there exist decidable
algorithms to model-check dierent temporal logic-formalisms for nite-state models and briefly
discuss whether run-time monitoring verication techniques can also be applied to analyze nite
traces of an innite-state system, providing weaker satisfaction semantics.
4.2.1 Adversaries and Controllers
We identify two types of users in the context of recovery strategies: adversaries and controllers. An
adversary is a user who can cause an insecure transition to occur as a result of their actions. The
impact of their action(s) on the security of the system may not be instantaneous. A controller is
a user who can initiate response actions and attempt to counteract the behavior of an adversary.
In the case of information compromise attacks, adversaries are users that deliberately insert access
rights that contradict system policy. A controller, e.g., a superuser with the appropriate authoriza-
tions, can delete these rights from the access rights matrix if they are detected, before information
can be compromised.
In the case of DoS attacks, adversaries can send (bogus) requests to networked servers and
compete with legitimate users for the resource. A controller can install lter rules to drop these
requests before they interfere with request-response behavior of legitimate users of the system.
However the act of ltering itself may increase the response times for legitimate users in the system.
We study this behavior in Chapter 5.
A recovery strategy is a state transition subgraph that augments an existing state-transition
graph of system behavior. Typically, a recovery strategy renes the behavior of a particular edge
in a state-transition graph that corresponds to insecure behavior.
Denition 4.2.1. A recovery strategy T = (GT ; ET ) augments a Kripke structureM = (; 0; R; L),
a PNS  = (; 0; ; L), or a TPNS  = (; in;Act ; ; p; c) with a subgraph GT = (V;EV ) and
v0; Vf and a set of edges ET where:
1. V is the nite set of states in the strategy.
2. EV is the transition relation between these states.
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3. v0 is the rst state in the strategy and corresponds to the state reachable from a state in 
where the strategy is grafted. This edge to v0 typically encodes the behavior of an adversary
that executes an insecure transition to a potentially inconsistent state 2 V .
4. Vf  V is the set of nal states in the strategy that connect the strategy back to the original
state-transition graph. Edges from states in Vf lead back to states in .
5. ET includes the transitions between states in  to v0 as well as transitions that connect back
states in Vf to .
The new system model now has 0 =  [ V and R0 = R [ ET [ EV . From all states in
the strategy, it must always be possible to reach a state in Vf with one or more transitions. We
introduce two boolean variables to indicate whether the state corresponds to an adversary or a
controller. If boolean variable ADV is true in a state, then the request issued from that state is by
an adversary. If the variable CON is true in a state, then the action corresponds to a controller’s
behavior. Therefore states in the augmented graph that correspond to the strategy are now labeled
with these variables to indicate whether the action is initiated by and adversary or a controller.
Given this model of an augmented state-transition graph, it is now useful to explore what types
of properties can be preserved by strategies. Since a strategy models the behavior of the system
under attack, it is useful to ask if it is always possible to reach a state where some security or
consistency property can be asserted, by describing appropriate atomic propositions that need to
hold in that state as a result of using the strategy over an unaugmented graph. Furthermore, this
property can be rened by quantifying probability and realtime measures on paths that need to be
satised.
We now present an example of how to specify survivability and recovery. During the process of
analyzing a specication and identifying potential attacks, it is useful to validate that the model is
capable of good behavior. An example of a formula in the context of the extended access control
model in Chapter 3 is presented next. Consider the following survivability property that asserts
that it is always possible for some legitimate access request to receive an appropriate response.
This can be encoded for some model M using CTL as follows:
M;0 j= AG(EF(T1i ! T1i+1))
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This property asserts that it is always possible for some requests in the system to execute
correctly. Note this measure of survivability is extremely weak, and only guarantees the existence
of a path in the model where this semantically consistent request-response transition can occur.
With the introduction of a recovery strategy, we want to strengthen this guarantee as follows:
M;0 j= AG(AF(T1i ; T1i+k))
This specication asserts that it is always possible that if we issue a legitimate request in the
system, it will produce an appropriate (semantically consistent) response through one or more
intermediate transitions, modeled here by ;. Note that this assertion is stronger than the AGEF
assertion presented previously because of the universal quantication on the paths. It also allows
branching behavior between the two endpoints of the transition. All paths through these states
must lead to the desired state.
The existence of a path, or the fact that all paths now can reach a specied desirable state is a
qualitative property of the survivability of an augmented state-transition graph. In Section 4.2.2, I
show how we can specify quantitative properties to bound the amount of time before this desirable
state is reached, and evaluate dierent strategies based on probabilistic and real-time behavioral
characteristics described by the underlying transition graph.
So far, we have presented how to specify recovery strategies, assuming we know how to recover
from a given security attack. However, we believe that it more useful to automate this process and
investigate whether it is possible to synthesize a recovery strategy given an attack description. For
this we need the description of a \recovered" state or a formula that encodes a property that needs
to be preserved by the system augmented by the strategy. Using the set of all possible actions
of adversaries and controllers, if we have a nite state system, for CTL (and CTL) Kupferman
et al [80] show how if a property-preserving strategy exists we can always nd it, or show that
it cannot exist, and this is 2EXPTIME-complete (resp. 3EXPTIME-complete) in the size of the
model. We propose to explore the automated generation of recovery strategies for specic problems
as future work.
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4.2.2 Dening Survivability Properties
In this section we present examples of quantitative survivability properties including DoS-free
behavior.
The two survivability properties presented in Section 4.2.1 i.e., AGEF and AGAF represent
two ends of the spectrum with respect to survivable models of system behavior. As shown in
Chapter 3, the Until operator U is also useful to specify the propositions that should hold in a
computation subtree or along a path before a recovery action restores the system to a desirable state,
without compromising the security of the information. When we incorporate stochastic behavior
and real-time into these models, the corresponding probability and timing guarantees replace the
A and E path quantiers wherever appropriate. These properties are summarized next:
 Probabilistic Survivability Properties: The operator P./p where ./=<;; >; repre-
sents a quantity of paths in the model that satisfy the corresponding formula. Examples
of probabilistic survivability properties include AGP./pF() that asserts that along every
computation path, with probability ./ p it is possible to get to a state where  holds, and
P./p1GP./p2F() which asserts that on a probability ./ p1 number of paths, it is possible to
get to a state where  holds with probability ./ p2, etc.
 Real-Time Survivability Properties: The operator D./d represents a bound on real-time
that can elapse before the property is satised. For example, the formula AGD./pF() asserts
that along every computation path in the model, it is possible to get to a state where  holds
within time ./ d. Similarly, the formula D./d1GD./d2F() asserts that along all paths, in
time ./ d1 it is possible to get to a state where  holds in time ./ d1. P and D operators can
also be combined to specify probabilistic timing guarantees.
These examples illustrate how the extended temporal logics can be useful in increasing expressive
power of survivability properties. The examples presented so far are useful to describe information
compromise attacks and recovery. We now present two properties that we claim are useful to model
recovery from DoS attacks:
1. DoS Resilience: In order to specify the ability of a model to recover from DoS attacks, we
propose the following formula:
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M;0 j= AG(T1i ; EF(T1i+1))
which asserts along some path in the future, a request from a legitimate client will eventually
get a response, after going through possibly many intermediate states and transitions (repre-
sented by ;). This property does not put a bound on the waiting time and is equivalent to
a Finite Waiting Time (FWT) property.
2. DoS Resistance: In order to resist DoS attacks all-together we need the following guarantee:
M;s j= AG(T1i ! AF(T1i+1))
which asserts that along all paths in the future we can guarantee that every request will
always receive a response in the next state. Therefore a model that can satisfy this property
is DoS-free.
Once again, the existence of a DoS-free path is too weak to be useful in practice. The DoS-
resistance property on the other hand suers from being too strong. In Chapter 5 I show how we
can model more interesting quantitative properties of recovery from DoS attacks.
4.2.3 Validating Survivability Properties
In this subsection, we explore what techniques are available to validate survivability properties
within the framework of their corresponding system models. Formulas written in CTL for Kripke
structures and in PCTL, pCTL and TPCTL for special types of PNSes and TPNSes all have
ecient model checking algorithms.
Before we summarize known results with respect to the complexity of these techniques, we briefly
introduce the reader to the dierences between model checking and traditional theorem proving for
property verication in system models. Traditionally, theorem provers were employed to facilitate
the process of verifying whether a system’s behavior can satisfy a property specication. A theorem
prover annotates dierent stages (not necessarily each state) in a system’s behavior with formulas
that can be asserted at that stage, and uses an underlying deduction system with appropriate
axioms to prove if the nal property specication can be proved as a theorem in this system.
The limitations of traditional theorem-proving systems are well-known. According to Halpern and
Vardi [66], the rst problem is nding an appropriate language to represent these assertions. The
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need to use logic to model the behavior of the system necessitates the use of expressive logics.
Theorem proving is dicult to automate for arbitrary logics, and undecidable for even rst-order
logic.
Model checking on the other hand works with a semantic model of the system directly. In
contrast to proof-theoretic approaches, the problem of property validation is reduced to checking
whether a given formula is true in the model. In this thesis we extend access control models with
more expressive semantics. We believe that using model checking can be an appropriate choice for
verication in this framework.
The paradigm of model checking was rst explored in the context of nite-state program veri-
cation. The problem was to verify if a nite state program P satises a specication  in some
temporal logic. One way of doing this is to completely characterize the program [89] by a tempo-
ral logic formula P , i.e., P describes all possible transitions of P in each possible global state.
Checking whether P satises the property specication  can be accomplished by checking if the
implication P )  is valid. However this validity problem for temporal logic is known to be
EXPTIME-complete [53].
Clarke, Emerson et al [32, 52, 112] proposed the following approach: Instead of representing P
by a formula, they explored the use of a semantic state-transition model of P called the Kripke
structure MP , where the states represent the possible global states of P and the transitions the
evolution of the model over time. The model-checking approach attempts to nd the set of all
states  in the model that satisfy  , i.e., f 2 jMP ;  j=  g. The system satises the specication
provided (all) the initial state(s) are in this set. Note that the size of the model is essentially the
same as the length of P , and a maximal model is exponential in size of the set of boolean variables
in the system. The model checking problem can however be solved in time linear or polynomial,
depending on the logic, in the size of MP and  . Another added advantage of model checking is
that it always produces a counter-example if a particular specication cannot be satised in the
model, as a path consisting of states and transitions to a state that cannot satisfy the specication.
Recent research has expanded the scope of model checking algorithms to probabilistic and real-time
state models.
One limitation however is the fact that model-checking techniques only apply to nite-state
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systems and this may seem to be severe limitation as most reasonably complicated systems cannot
be described as nite-state models. However techniques such as abstraction, partial-order reduction,
composition, exploiting symmetry, and structural induction [33] can all reduce the complexity of
model-checking innite-state systems by transforming them into nite-state models, with some loss
of expression in the semantics.
We now summarize known results for the complexity of model checking branching time formulas
 for specic temporal logics and models of reactive systems in Table 4.1:
Model Specication Logic Complexity
Kripke structure CTL O(j j:(jj+ jRj) [33]
Sequential PNS PCTL Linear in  , polynomial in  [81]
Concurrent PNS pCTL or PBTL Linear in  , polynomial in  [19]
Non-Zeno Concurrent TPNS pTL Linear in  , polynomial in  [39]
Table 4.1: Model Checking Branching-Time formulas
Model checking PNSes and TPNSes is an active area of research. Many of these algorithms
have ecient implementations based on symbolic manipulation of boolean formulas using what are
called Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams (OBDDs). Model checking has been shown to be feasible
for models with up to 1020 states.
An alternative to theorem proving or model checking for validating survivability properties
is runtime verication. Both theorem proving and model checking aim at proving a model is
correct or that satises a property specication before their execution. In order for these techniques
to be automatable, they need to be nite state systems. Runtime verication on the other hand
is the application of lightweight formal methods applied during the execution of a system. These
techniques rely on observation and monitoring of nite execution traces, of either nite state or
innite state systems. Successful examples of the use of runtime verication include race-condition
detection and deadlock-detection. Runtime verication techniques extend the scope of models that
can be analyzed for dierent properties, but provide weaker guarantees.
However, there are various system properties that cannot be expressed as sets of runs, including
possibilistic and general branching-time properties. As such, the application of runtime verication
to liveness properties is infeasible. However, some recent results for Timed Linear Time Logics may
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be useful for validating bounded liveness properties [79]. We propose to explore this in the future.
In the next section we discuss the impact of changing access control policies on condentiality
and integrity policies in the system, and discuss how we can extend our survivability analysis to
address specic concerns in this context.
4.3 Analysis of Degradation of Access Control Survivability
In this section, we focus our attention to studying the impact of an attack that compromises an
user account in the system. When a user’s account is compromised, it is important to analyze
what eect this has on the security of other users and objects in the system. We are interested in
investigating how actions that can be initiated by a compromised user can aect existing integrity
and condentiality guarantees as the system evolves, and in exploring how this compromise can
spread insecure or inconsistent information through the system.
We start with a snapshot of the consistent system state just before such an attack occurs. At
this point in time, the system contains a nite number of subjects and objects. Let these sets
be S = fs1; s2;    ; sng and O = fo1; o2;    ; omg. The access control policies in the system are
represented by access matrix entries of the form A[si; oj ] = r that correspond to a condentiality
policies and entries of the form A[si; oj ] = w that represent integrity policies.
For our analysis, these policies can be represented as a directed graph (digraph). A read
permission is modeled as an edge that is directed between the object and the subject, and the
write permission as an edge between the subject and the object. For example if s1 can read o1,
then the digraph GP = (VP ; EP ) will contain edge (o1; s1). If s1 can also write to o1, then edge
(s1; o1) 2 EP . We now dene the notion of an information modication path, analogous the
denition of an information transfer path presented by Biba [20], in this graph.
Denition 4.3.1 (Information Modication Path). An information modication path is a
sequence of nodes si1oj1si2    oik−1sik 2 VP such that (sij ; oij) 2 EP ) and (oij ; sij+1) 2 EP for
1  j < k.
An information modication path or a write-read path encodes the explicit flow of modied
information in the system. When a subject si is compromised in the system, a masquerading user
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s0 can:
 Read condential information that si could read, or
 Write over information that si could write.
By reading information si was allowed to read, attacker s0 has violated the condentiality of
all objects OC = foj j(oj; si) 2 EP ; 1  j  mg. Furthermore any subjects in S that can also read
objects in OC , i.e., SC = fskj(oj; sk) 2 EP ; oj 2 OC ; 1  k  ng also have their condentiality
compromised. A user who was not allowed to read the les these subjects were allowed to read, is
now able to do so as a result of the attack. If an object op in the system cannot be read directly
by si or if subject sq in the system does not have any les that can also be read by si, then the
condentiality of this object or subject is not compromised.
However, attacker s0 can cause further damage to the system by writing to objects that si has
write permissions for. Once the integrity of the information has been compromised, this information
can spread throughout the system by anybody who can read the tainted object. The initial set of
objects whose integrity can be compromised include all objects in OI = foj j(si; oj) 2 EP ; 1  j 
mg. The initial set of subjects who can be compromised include all subjects in SI = fskj(sk; oj) 2
EP ; oj 2 OI ; 1  k  ng. This compromised information can aect the integrity of all write
commands issued by subjects in SI , and can further spread along the information modication
paths from SI .
Graph GP = (VP ; EP ) can now be explored for all information modication paths starting in
set SI . Each object and subject encountered along this path can be added to sets OI and SI to form
the set of all subjects and objects whose integrity can be aected as a result of the compromise.
Finding these paths reduces to the digraph reachability problem and the transitive closure
problem for digraphs, which can be solved in size polynomial to the number of vertices (O(V 3))
in the graph and whose lower bound is given by the theorem that it is no easier than the matrix
multiplication problem.
Given a user account that is compromised, we can use this transitive closure analysis to come
up with the maximal sets SC , OC , SI , OI , and change the permissions of user si to reduce this
damage. Given a policy conguration, we can apply this analysis by simulating the eect of
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an attack for each user in the system and come up with a ranking of which users are better
targets for attackers, depending on the cardinality of these maximal sets. Given a set of integrity
and condentiality policies, we are interested in nding minimal directed cuts (or dicuts) that
increases the number of connected components in the graph. By removing these edges, explicit but
unauthorized modication of information can be eciently curtailed.
In the case of buer overflow attacks, we can apply this analysis to policy congurations that
attempt to minimize the impact of an attacker by restricting the address space and permissions
associated with user-level processes running as root (e.g., chroot jails). In this situation, automated
reachability analysis can help us identify the sets of users and resources that can be compromised
as a result of a successful buer overflow attack and validate our designs.
One of the issues with creating these chroot jails is that processes cannot be isolated completely
from each other, especially because of the need to use many common system libraries. Administra-
tors usually decide on what is shared and what is duplicated in an ad hoc manner. Given a digraph
of read-write permissions, we can apply other graph-theoretic analysis techniques such as nding
cutsets and cutpoints that increase the number of components in a graph and reduce dependencies
among these user sets. We propose to investigate applications of the analysis framework presented
here in the future.
In the next section, we discuss how to model trust into the abstractions presented so far and
explore the implementation complexity of changing access control policies dynamically and main-
taining consistency.
4.4 Dynamic Access Control
When an object (le or program) in the system becomes vulnerable to compromise as a result of the
discovery of a new flaw, or when a subject cannot be trusted, changing the access control matrix
is often a suitable course of action for system administrators as a preventive measure. Often, the
required software updates may not be immediately available, and changing the authorizations for
subjects and objects can prevent malicious users or software applications from accessing vulnerable
(but not yet compromised) resources, and vice-versa, thereby reducing the threat of attack.
When an actual attack occurs (information exposure), the situation is less amenable to recovery
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by dynamically changing the access control policies. If attacks can be detected, either by intrusion
detection or other mechanisms, these techniques can still be used to isolate compromised parts of
the system and contain damage.
In traditional access control models, restrictions are placed on the set of subjects that are allowed
to add, update, or delete access rights from the access matrix, to implement dierent types of access
control policies. Mandatory Access Control (MAC) policies restrict this privilege to trusted system
administrators. In Discretionary Access Control (DAC), this privilege is extended to the owner of
an object. Most systems support a combination of MAC (for public or system resources) and DAC
(for privately-owned resources) policies.
In Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2, I examine the issue of changing access rights dynamically, with spe-
cial attention to how they are implemented in practice, i.e., using access lists (ALs) and capability
lists (CLs). Once a threat is mitigated, e.g., by expelling the users, or by installing updates, it is
also useful to be able to restore the original access control policies, i.e., to rollback the system to
its original operating environment. We also explore the costs of changing ALs and CLs for rollback
and recovery. Most of the work presented here has appeared in [102].
Changing the access matrix in an ad hoc manner can have unexpected side eects in terms of
safety and trust assumptions. In Section 4.4.3 we show that in order to preserve access control
consistency during change, we need to implement an atomic broadcast and commitment protocol
in a distributed setting. It is well known that achieving this is dicult without synchronization
assumptions. However, partial consistency and recovery may be implementable with lesser eort in
many cases, to keep the system running, even under threat of attack. In the same section, I describe
how we can change trust assumptions safely during recovery, by augmenting policy specication
and enforcement mechanisms with appropriate guards.
4.4.1 Implementing Access Controls
In a distributed system, shared resources (i.e., objects) can be on dierent physical machines
connected over a network, and the access control enforcement mechanisms can also be distributed
across the network. Each machine may have a reference monitor that intercepts both local and
remote access requests to shared resources. A single centralized access control matrix to validate
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accesses is rarely implemented in practice [21]. In order to reduce performance overheads, these
access rights-sets are also spread across the system.
Two dierent representations for storing the rights across the system are commonly used: access
lists (ALs) and capability lists (CLs). ALs are lists of hsubject;methodi pairs per object, and
correspond to the list of subjects that are allowed to access specic methods for a given object.
CLs are lists of hobject;methodi tuples, and correspond to the list of objects and methods that can
be accessed per subject.
Traditionally, in stand-alone systems where the sets of subjects (usually classied into groups
or alternatively as roles) or objects do not change very often, the relative benets of choosing one
representation over the other are comparable [42, 28]. In an AL-based system, invoking a subject’s
right to access an object is simple and is usually accomplished by deleting specic rights from the
object’s AL. To locate an access right one may have to search through the entire AL. CLs are
usually generated by system administrators and stored in protected shared memory. Each access
request can either carry the capability itself (with sucient cryptographic protection to prevent
modication) or a pointer to the location of the capability in the CL, which is only accessible by
the decision logic. CLs simplify the lookup of rights and speed up the process of access control
decisions. When capabilities are passed around or CLs replicated in dierent process address spaces,
revocation of access rights becomes dicult.
It is not immediately clear which implementation mechanism is ideal to change the access rights
in response to a perceived threat or vulnerability in a distributed setting, since there are no studies
that compare the relative benets of the two approaches. In [75] the authors speculate that ALs are
more popular than CLs because they eciently answer the question \who access a given object?",
whereas CLs are useful to answer the question \what else can a subject access?" [21]. While the
rst question is useful to protect the condentiality of information accessed and directly relates to
access control, the second question is useful to evaluate the flow of information in the system.
In Section 4.4.2, our aim is to evaluate the performance overheads of changing access control
rights in a distributed setting for both options.
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4.4.2 Changing Access Control Rights
When a system is attacked or when a new vulnerability is discovered, administrators may receive
notications (either from other administrators, network monitoring software, software vendors, in-
trusion detection systems etc.) to disallow access to certain users, computers, software applications,
or specic methods for applications (e.g., disable execute for email attachments). I examine the
cost of changing these rights for both AL and CL-based distributed access control implementations
in terms of the sizes of sets of subjects, objects, and methods. We note that these actions can
guarantee that future compromise is prevented, as any future trace of behavior will be denied this
action by the policy-enforcement mechanisms.
We assume that each subject si has an AL and object oj has a CL associated with it for the
same of comparison. Let j S j and j O j be the cardinalities of the sets of subjects and objects,
equal to the number of CLs or ALs in the system respectively. Table 4.2 summarizes the maximum
number of lists that have to be processed (ALs or CLs), in order to remove a user, a resource, or a
specic access right tuple from a distributed access control system. The numbers also correspond
to the maximum number of network connections that have to be initiated by the administrator in
order to decide whether an AL or a CL needs to be updated. The actual amount of time required
to process the list depends on the data structures used to implement the lists, and the number of
access rights in the system.
Recovery Action AL model CL model
To remove user j O j 1
To remove object 1 j S j
To remove a specic
access right 1 1
Table 4.2: Maximum Number of Lists Processed
As shown in Table 4.2, to remove a user si in a distributed AL-based implementation, since the
hsi; rki tuples are distributed across multiple access lists corresponding to dierent objects, each
list must be examined in turn and the tuples purged appropriately. In order to remove a user in
a CL-based implementation, only the capability list of a single user has to be deleted. In both
cases, the maximum number of entries that may need to removed is equal to the number of distinct
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hsi; oj ; rki tuples in the system. This is also the number of entries that need to be stored for rollback
in order to restore the original access rights.
To remove an object oj and all its associated rights, only that object’s AL has to be removed
from the system. In the case of CLs, all CLs corresponding to all subjects have to be examined,
to nd and delete the appropriatehoj; rki tuples. In both cases the number of entries that need to
be removed (or stored for rollback) is equal to the number of distinct access rights that have oj in
their tuples.
To remove an individual permission for a particular object (e.g., disable the auto-execute option
in a web browser etc.), in both AL and CL-based implementations, only one table has to be updated,
corresponding to either the si’s CL or the oi’s AL.
To summarize, in order to remove an object’s access rights from a distributed system, there is
a signicant cost asymmetry in favor of ALs. Similarly to remove a user from the system, using
CLs is more ecient.
From this analysis, we observe that in terms of automating the process of changing access
controls dynamically by removing entries from the ALs or CLs, if the sizes of the sets of users
and objects are comparable, no implementation technique has a clear advantage. If we expect
recovery-actions as primarily removing access to certain objects or disabling specic object rights,
even temporarily, clearly ALs are better. However, in the case of buer overflow attacks, curtailing
a subjects’ rights is more important and CLs are better.
Using RBAC
CLs are more ecient when system administrators discover that certain user accounts are compro-
mised and want to sandbox a user, isolating their actions from the rest of the system. In contrast,
in an AL based implementation, many lists may have to be located and updated. However, ALs can
overcome this limitation if we use an aggregation mechanism such as Role Based Access Control
(RBAC [56, 119]) to simplify administration of users and rights.
In RBAC, users can be associated with one or more roles. Each role is a placeholder for a set
of permissions. The permissions consist of objects and methods that are authorized for that role.
Users can be added and removed from roles, independent of the updates to the role-permission
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assignments. This asynchrony simplies the management of large sets of users and restricts their
behavior according to their \role" in an organization.
RBAC is very flexible and can be implemented naturally using ALs. In addition, it can also
be used to implement both MAC and DAC policies. Instead of specifying individual subjects and
permissions in each AL for each resource, we can aggregate entries according to roles. This has the
eect of reducing the size of the ALs, and reducing the search space for changing access controls.
CLs can also be organized according to object-roles [35]. This reduces the total number of CLs in
the system.
Instead of removing a user from a role-based AL, the user’s access control permissions can be
changed by revoking the user’s current role and assigning the user to a special pre-dened role
that has no access rights, or to a role that reduces the user’s permissions to a restricted set of
rights. This information can be relayed directly to the policy enforcement mechanisms (e.g., the
reference monitors), who must use the user’s new role and disallow any requests made by the user
using their old role. While this eliminates the cost of changing the ALs, the communication cost
of disseminating the user’s new role has to be taken into account.
Another advantage of using pre-dened roles during response actions is the ability to formally
analyze the access control behavior of the system a priori, even when the permissions of a user
change dynamically. By restricting the permissions during dynamic state-changes in the system, it
is possible to determine what guarantees can be made by the dynamic behavior of the system by
formal analysis.
In the next subsection, I examine the possible side-eects of changing ALs and CLs as recovery
actions. I also describe techniques to augment existing specications to overcome these limitations.
4.4.3 Enforcing Safety and Preserving Trust
One of the problems with changing access controls dynamically is the need to synchronize oper-
ations. In distributed systems, an administrator may initiate a recovery-action to change access
controls over the network. Depending on the type of changes requested, the administrator may
have to update many ALs or CLs, distributed across dierent machines. As a result, some lists
may get updated faster than others and the access control safety property many not be consistently
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enforced across the system. As we show in the next subsection, maintaining consistency in this
situation is not easy.
Changing access rights dynamically to alter the access control behavior of a system can have
unexpected side-eects. In a stand-alone operating system, or in a homogeneous distributed system
(e.g., Unix-based or Windows clusters), it may be possible to preserve existing trust assumptions
by relying on the underlying protection model. Implementing protection domains is simplied by
this support, and only network administrators can change access control lists or permissions. In a
heterogeneous distributed system, the trust assumptions and trust validation have to be modeled
explicitly into the system specications, to prevent undesirable side-eects. We explore this in
Section 4.4.3.
Enforcing Access Control Safety
In order to remove users, objects or particular methods from the system, a system administrator
has to keep track of the dierent ALs or CLs stored in dierent parts of the system. Removing
objects in a distributed AL-based system, or subjects in a CL-based system while maintaining
safety is straightforward. The access rights in a particular object or user’s AL or CL are unique,
and are not replicated across the system. Therefore, no consistency issues arise.
However, the problem emerges when an administrator needs to modify multiple ALs to remove
subjects (or CLs to remove objects) in a distributed setting, and keep the lists consistent. A non
blocking atomic commitment protocol [100] (such as a modied two-phase commit) is required to
ensure that updates are consistent. To guarantee timeliness, when multiple update requests are
sent, maintaining safety is reduced to implementing an atomic broadcast protocol [100], which
needs to be both reliable, as well as deliver the update messages in total-order.
It is well known that there are no deterministic atomic broadcast algorithms for asynchronous
systems. This is because the distributed consensus problem can be reduced to atomic broadcasts.
However, there are many schemes [100] that account for clock drifts and periodically send out
synchronize messages that work under the assumption of bounded drifts. The two protocols viz.,
non-blocking atomic commitment and atomic broadcast, can guarantee that the access controls
are consistently enforced across the system even when the ALs and CLs change dynamically. The
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protocols may introduce a non-negligible overhead to change policies and their eectiveness as
recovery actions must be evaluated in terms of these overheads.
In many cases, it may be desirable to implement a weaker notion of consistency. Partial con-
sistency can still satisfy availability guarantees for particular users and objects in the system.
As mentioned earlier, RBAC can overcome the need to change access lists, but revoking a
user’s role and assigning the user to a new role requires similar consistency and synchronization
guarantees.
Preserving Trust Assumptions
In addition to preserving consistency, trust assumptions related to changing ALs and CLs have
to be examined carefully. Trust assumptions are incorporated into the access control model by
including the concept of authorization as follows: allow access if and only if an authorized user
added the access right to the system.
Enforcing this modied safety property is straightforward in a stand-alone system, or in a ho-
mogeneous distributed system (multiple machines running the same OS). Most existing distributed
operating systems automatically provide support to enforce that the access control mechanisms
can only be updated by authorized users (administrators in MAC, and owners in DAC). However,
these mechanisms can be compromised by masquerading users, as in buer-overflow attacks.
One way to circumvent an unauthorized user from changing these controls is by restricting the
address space visible to a process running as superuser, on behalf of a subject with user privileges.
Even if the process is compromised, the user should not have access to the authorizations required
to change the access controls. However, we have to provide a legitimate user enough authorizations
to execute this task normally. Balancing these requirements can be a signicant challenge as
highlighted in Section 4.3.
Another way of ensuring this condition is met is by requiring strong authentication. Further-
more, every time entries in the ALs and CLs need to be changed, to ensure that trust assumptions
can be validated, users in the system can be challenged to produce a proof of authorization.
We describe a systematic technique to augment policy specications with special clauses called
guards that force users to present a proof of authorization, in the form of credentials, attesting that
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they have the right to change the access rights. This mechanism is independent of the underlying
protection model. If we can guarantee that these credentials cannot be obtained by masquerading
users, then the trust assumptions are always preserved by any proper implementation of the speci-
cation. The problem now reduces to separating the authorizations from identity information in a
request. A superuser may store these credentials in a smart-card, for example, and thereby prevent
a masquerading user from changing the access rights. Ideally, we want to encode the \separation of
duty" principle with these checks to ensure that a single malicious user cannot change these rights
even if he or she were able to compromise the mechanisms.
We use the formalism of the HRU model, presented in Chapter 2, but augment the set of
conditions from Table 2.1 with authorization proofs. Our protection state is still dened by the
triple hS;O;Ai where S is the set of subjects, O the set of objects and A is the access matrix. We
include the set R of object methods that correspond to privileges in the HRU model. The set A is
typically the union of dierent ALs or CLs in the system.
Note that the HRU model does not include any authorization checks in its denitions if primitive
operations. If this system was implemented according to the specication, anybody is allowed to
change the access rights matrix. As mentioned earlier, dierent sets of subjects are allowed (or
authorized) to create and delete users, objects and methods. In a DAC system, users are allowed
to create and own objects and add access rights to objects they own. For example, if user1 owns
fileuser1, then user1 can insert huser2; f ileuser1; readi into A. In an MAC system, users and
objects can be added only by administrators.
Next, we present a method to automatically add guards to the primitive operations or protection
state transitions and preserve trust during the modication of access control implementations.
To preserve the trust assumptions, we augment an access control specication with special
proofs of authorization. Henceforth, if a user wants to change an entry in A, the user is required to
produce a proof attesting that he or she is allowed, by some trusted authority, to actually execute
the primitive operation. The policy enforcer (e.g., a reference monitor) has to be suitably modied
to check this proof. The proof check can be veried non-interactively, and needs to be decidable.
This proof-checker is a guard, similar to Dijkstra’s guarded commands [45, 121], and these guards
can be applied to both ALs and CLs without loss of generality.
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One way of generating a proof of authorization is by using an attestation from a trusted ad-
ministrator that gives the holder of the attestation the capability to change an AL or CL entry,
i.e., the permission to call a method to change the entry. This type of capability (also called a
license [129]) or credential is an attestation of trust. These attestations should be protected against
modication by unauthorized entities. They can be made unforgeable by the issuer by attaching
a cryptographic digital signature [96]. The signature should tie in the name of the issuer and the
intended recipient to prevent modication and also provide non-repudiation of ownership.
Generating these credentials na¨vely can cause management problems. Consider the set S of
users who can issue signed capabilities, the set O of shared objects in the system and the set R of
methods corresponding to access rights. The set of all licenses that can be presented to the policy
manager in this system is exponential in size and is given by C  S  2OXR.
A user can have many dierent credentials authorizing some or all methods with respect to a
particular object and may present any subset of these to the enforcer to change an access right. The
enforcer needs to decide whether the decision is consistent with the trust management implications
of these attestations and this may be non-trivial. For example, the monotonicity of the privileges
available after revocation may have to be maintained [129] to prevent undesirable behavior.
Instead, we argue that in the case of MAC or DAC policies, two simple types of credentials
are sucient to attest the identity of the entities (primarily subjects) and the ownership of one
entity by another. These credentials should not be delegated and should not available to any entity
except the actual owner of these access rights. Satisfying these requirements may be a signicant
challenge.
Let C be the set of typeof and owns credentials. An examples of an identity credential is
typeof (Alice; administrator) that asserts that the identier Alice is an administrator. The creden-
tial owns(object;method) or owns(user; object) attests that the method is \owned" or exported by
the object or the object is owned by the user, respectively. We generate one credential per object
and method. Therefore, the size of this credential set is equal to the number of unique access rights
in the system. This simplies the management of credentials and proof verication, though it may
increase the number of credentials a user has to present.
In Table 4.3, I present how we can augment the primitive operations of the HRU model with
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proofs of authorization to enforce DAC policies, where only the owner of an object can enter or
delete access rights into the access matrix. The credential owns(s; o) checks for ownership and the
credential owns(o;m) is an integrity check. Note we need to explicitly identify the subject s who
issues the request to the specications of the create subject, create object, destroy subject
and destroy object operations. The eect of the operation, on the protection state of the system
is the same as in Table 2.1.
op conditions
enter r into A[s; o] s 2 S
o 2 O
owns(s;o) 2 C
owns(o; r) 2 C
delete r from A[s; o] s 2 S
o 2 O
owns(s;o) 2 C
owns(o; r) 2 C
create subject s0 issued by s s0 =2 O
typeof(s;admin) 2 C
create object o0 issued by s o0 =2 O
typeof(s;admin) 2 C
destroy subject s0 issued by s s0 2 O
typeof(s;admin) 2 C
destroy object o0 issued by s o0 2 O
o0 =2 S
typeof(s;admin) 2 C
Table 4.3: Authorizations for DAC
For MAC policies, only administrators are allowed to change the protection state. In Table 4.4
we show how these authorizations are specied for adding and deleting rights, which are restricted
to system administrators. The conditions for other primitive operations are the same as for DAC.
This specication mechanism can also be easily extended for RBAC.
From the augmentations to the specications, we claim that if the credentials are generated
correctly and the administrators keys are not compromised, then the state transitions allowed
in our modied system have the required authorization proofs necessary to guarantee the trust
assumptions are preserved, even when the implementations are changed dynamically. Care must
be taken to ensure that the mechanisms do not allow delegation or theft of these credentials. If
all the guard conditions cannot be satised, the state of the system is unchanged. The protection
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op conditions
enter r into A[s; o] s 2 S
o 2 O
typeof(s;admin) 2 C
owns(o; r) 2 C
delete r from A[s; o] s 2 S
o 2 O
typeof(s;admin) 2 C
owns(o; r) 2 C
Table 4.4: Authorizations for MAC
state is allowed to change only when the proof of authorization is veried correctly.
4.4.4 Applying Dynamic Access Control to Dynamic Environments
When the sets of subjects and objects do not change frequently, though the overheads of changing
access controls in AL-based and CL-based systems seem equivalent, we observe that ALs are better
when the changes involve updating rights for specic objects and object methods. In this section,
we explore the ideas further in the context of dynamic environments where the sets of users and
objects can change dynamically, and the access control matrix entries have short life times and may
be updated frequently. In this situation, we nd dynamic access controls are an important feature
of the system design rather than just a mechanism to enable RAs. In such cases, the performance
overheads for changing the implementations can have a signicant impact on the design decisions.
In this subsection, I describe briefly how we can use our analysis to justify the choices for contrasting
AL-based and CL-based implementations of dynamic access controls.
Examples of dynamically changing environments include ad hoc networks, active networks, and
smart spaces. In an ad hoc network, for example, where users bring in their own computers and
connect together, it is often useful to associate ALs with the mobile resources themselves. Since
dierent users enter and leave over a short period of time, it is not feasible for the participating
subjects to carry CLs for all possible objects. Instead, the participants themselves can build
dynamic trust relationships and assign permissions to each other by updating their own ALs.
In contrast, when the set of subjects can change over time, but the resources themselves remain
more or less xed, it is more ecient to use CLs. We have explored such a solution in the context of
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active networks in our previous work [26, 103] and developed a CL-based architecture to enable the
dynamic installation and update of policies in real-time, to accommodate dierent sets of subjects
using the same resources for dierent active network protocols over time. Our security architec-
ture for active networks also incorporated the access control safety and authorization techniques
discussed in this paper, in the framework of a CL based implementation. With this architecture,
we were able to demonstrate how we can change the access control policies on software routers
dynamically, and deploy a host of reactive security countermeasures, including dynamic rewalls
and vaccines, without sacricing safety guarantees [85, 26].
Another area where we have explored the issues of changing access controls dynamically is in
the context of smart spaces or active spaces [116]. An active space is a physical environment that is
augmented with computing and communication resources and can be programmed and congured
automatically to support dierent tasks and activities. An example of an active space is a smart
room with many display and computation devices that can be congured as a meeting room, a
lecture room, or a recreation room etc., only by changing the software in the room. In this context,
we have developed an AL-based solution to address the access control issues in this room, where
we have dynamically changing sets of users and to a lesser extent, objects. We chose an RBAC
variation of ALs to scale to a large number of users.
4.5 Chapter Summary
We present our extended state-transition model of reactive system behavior that incorporates prob-
abilistic and timing behavior in this Chapter. This model enriches the expressive power of tradi-
tional access control models and allows us to extend the nature of scope of security properties to
model the survivability of a system under attack. We present examples of survivability properties
as temporal logic formulas within the framework of this model, and show how we can leverage
existing techniques such as model checking to validate these properties.
In the next chapter, we focus on the network DoS and related DDoS problem and show we
can apply the techniques presented here to describe and analyze dierent DoS attacks and DoS
prevention strategies.
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\Can you do addition?" the White Queen
asked. \What’s one and one and one and
one and one and one and one and one and
one and one?" \I don’t know," said Alice.
\I lost count."
Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass
Chapter 5
Denial of Service
In this chapter, I explore the Denial of Service (DoS) problem, and show how I can extend our
modeling framework to describe DoS attacks and attack mitigation strategies. I focus on scenarios
where resources become unavailable due to resource exhaustion by requests originating from both
legitimate and compromised users.
Network Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are a classic example of such a problem, and have
frustrated the eorts of network engineers in their quest to build resource-access and sharing mech-
anisms that are both ecient and adequate to enforce authorized usage. Many of the DoS vulner-
abilities of network service access stem from sacrices made by designers to reduce performance
penalties, including coarse-grained accounting, which make the resources readily available to both
legitimate and malicious users alike. The DoS problem arises when a malicious user, or set of
users exploit these sharing mechanisms and monopolize access, or contend with legitimate users for
shared network resources, thereby denying service to legitimate users.
In the context of bandwidth exhaustion attacks, in order to flood a multi-hop network between
a single or a small set of DoS attackers and a network server, the attacker has to do almost as much
work as the victim server, pumping packets on to the network continuously to keep the victim busy.
It is usually easy to characterize such attacks by monitoring bandwidth utilization and attribute the
attacks to the originators. Once the origin of the attack is detected, it can be eectively neutralized
by installing lters and throttling these attackers at source or on intermediate routers. Since most
servers have fat incoming pipes and most clients have thinner outgoing pipes, and since attackers
could be identied easily, such attacks were not considered a major threat in the past.
In recent years, a new type of automated network DoS attack, called the Distributed DoS or
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DDoS attack has surfaced. According to the 2002 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security survey,
respondents to their survey who could quantify their losses reported a loss increase of 350% due
to such attacks. DDoS attack scripts are widely available and can be downloaded and launched
against any type of Internet server with minimum eort on the part of the attacker. These tools
scan the Internet to identify vulnerabilities on network clients and install software attack daemons,
called zombies, on compromised hosts, thereby distributing DoS attackers over several hundreds or
thousands of hosts.
Each zombie sends a low-bandwidth flood, consisting of dierent packet types including ICMP,
UDP, TCP SYN, or HTTP packets towards the victim [49, 48, 47, 46]. These floods are coordinated
by a time-trigger to maximize their collective impact, and are typically issued by a mastermind
daemon, over an encrypted channel. Many tools add multiple levels of indirection to both control
and attack by creating layers of control daemons called masters. The cost of mounting these attacks
per attacker, amortized over the hundreds of attackers, is negligible in comparison to the victim’s
cost in processing these packets. These low-bandwidth floods are virtually undetectable at source
and in most intermediate networks. A DDoS victim is forced to process these packets at the expense
of requests from legitimate clients of the service.
In terms of modeling survivability to DDoS attacks, the stateless nature of the IP-based Internet
makes it dicult to characterize flows and reason about, or even prove the eectiveness of DDoS
attack countermeasures. In recent years, researchers have developed a variety of strategies to tackle
dierent aspects the network DDoS problem [99]. These include better authentication to prevent
unauthorized users, or better accounting to traceback and locate attackers, as well as bandwidth
regulation and ltering mechanisms to prevent malicious users from sending unauthorized requests
to access resources in the rst place. The diculty of obtaining quantitative models of DDoS
attacks and server behavior is seen as a signicant challenge to understand better the impact of
these strategies. To the best of our knowledge, no tools are available to validate the eectiveness
of such strategies or even experiment with dierent strategies and compare their relative merits.
As mentioned in [69], one of the challenges with modeling or simulating DDoS attacks is the
amount of computing resources required to observe, store, and collect statistics about the behavior
of thousands of system components such as individual hosts, intermediate routers, and network
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servers. While large-volume traces for DDoS attacks are available, the challenge is to analyze this
information and come up with meaningful insights. Without such studies however, the eectiveness
of anti-DoS strategies cannot be validated with condence.
Formal methods, on the other hand, can prove to be a viable alternative and provide useful
insights, at the cost of some abstraction and information loss. We believe that one of the short-
comings of existing quantitative models of network trac with respect to DDoS attacks is the lack
of a semantic framework to express and reason about temporal properties of attack behavior. We
show how we can apply the framework from Chapter 4 to model DDoS attack behavior, analyze
the impact of countermeasures, and provide useful insights. In Sections 5.2 and 5.3, I show with
the help of examples how we can use the formalism of a PNS model, and specify DDoS survivabil-
ity properties as temporal logic formulas and evaluate the impact of legitimate and attack trac
behavior on both the DDoS victim and the legitimate clients of a service.
Using our formalism, we can prove estimate the eectiveness of dierent DDoS prevention
strategies. In Section 5.3, Our model exposes the cost-benet issues of implementing strategies
such as stronger authentication and ltering in reducing DoS vulnerabilities.
The techniques we present in this chapter complement quantitative models network behavior,
which are often derived from measurement of dynamic performance characteristics. The data
from such quantitative models can be used to provide the operating assumptions of our formal
models and increase the condence of the results obtained by our analysis. We show how we
can characterize this interaction between qualitative and quantitative properties, and focus our
attention on evaluating how attackers and legitimate users can influence each other’s behavior with
respect to their eect on a DDoS attack victim.
5.1 Modeling DoS Survivability
Shields [122] identies network DoS attacks as attacks that use network services to disrupt network
behavior. These attacks have the eect of causing either consumption or corruption of network
resources, making them unusable by legitimate network users. As mentioned earlier, we only
focus on resource consumption attacks in this thesis. Other types of DoS attacks include DoS by
reservation (e.g., in QoS networks) and DoS by disruption (physical attacks). DoS by reservation
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and physical attacks have proposed solutions (e.g., pricing models, physical security) that are not
directly within the scope of our study.
Traditionally, DoS is measured by the waiting time between a service invocation request and
its corresponding response. Unbounded waiting times correspond to absolute DoS. In order to
make quantitative comparisons between dierent strategies in terms of increasing or decreasing a
client’s vulnerability to DoS, we need to model the response time for a service request explicitly.
Previous research on formal specication and verication of DoS properties [8, 134, 97] focus
on showing how resource allocation models for operating system resources are resistant to DoS at-
tacks. These specications are concerned with modeling constraints on resource access mechanisms
that are necessary (and whether they are sucient) to prevent DoS. Yu and Gligor [134] specify
dierent constraints on resource access and sharing mechanisms in terms of fairness, simultaneity,
and resource allocation properties. Their work introduces a quantitative measure of DoS resilience
in terms of waiting time (WT) policies. Two propose two types of waiting time policies viz., nite
(FWT) and maximum WT (MWT). The FWT property is qualitative, whereas an MWT property
can be viewed as the bounded availability property. An important result from their work is that in
order to prevent DoS, users need to accept some additional restrictions on their request behavior
in addition the constraints imposed on the sharing mechanisms at the server.
Millen [97] expands on this work and argues for a DoS Protection Base (DPB) similar to a
Trusted Computing Base (TCB), with strong trust assumptions to guarantee that these constraints
can be reliably enforced. This work also introduces a state-transition model of resource allocation
and suggests as future work the use of probabilistic models of resource consumption to model
consumption behavior. In eect, both models demonstrate that in order to prevent DoS, resource
access mechanisms, as well as user behavior, have to be reliably constrained.
In the context of a DDoS attack, therefore, the property we are most interested in is the waiting
time, measured as the end-to-end delay observed by a legitimate user of a network server. When
this waiting time is unbounded, the server is potentially undergoing a DDoS attack. Traditionally,
the average end-to-end delay on a network is modeled using queuing theory. Quantitative stochas-
tic models of network behavior are commonly used, often requiring simplifying assumptions, and
provide the foundation for delay approximations in networks. These techniques have shown useful
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insights, even though it is impossible to obtain accurate quantitative delay predictions on the basis
of these models alone.
Traditionally, the waiting time or the delay between a request and response within a communi-
cation network is typically modeled by four components [18]:
1. Processing Delay : This is the delay between the time a packet is received at a node in the
network, to the time it is assigned to an outgoing queue for transmission.
2. Queuing Delay : This is the delay between the time a packet is assigned to a queue for
transmission, to the time it starts being transmitted.
3. Transmission Delay : This is the delay between the time the rst and last bits of a packet are
transmitted.
4. Propagation Delay : This is the delay between the time the last bit of a packet is sent out on
the link from the sending node, to the time this bit is received at the receiving node.
This accounting of the time spent by a packet on a network does not factor packet retransmis-
sions. The propagation delay depends on link-characteristics and does not change per packet. The
link itself is viewed as a bit-pipe over which a given number of bits per second, called the capacity
of the link, can be transmitted.
The most commonly used model for allocation of capacity among multiple competing streams of
trac is statistical multiplexing. Under this scheme, packets of all streams are merged into a single
queue and transmitted in a rst-come rst-serve (FCFS) order. A slight variation of this scheme is
a system that maintains a separate queue for each trac scheme and serves the queues in sequence
one packet at a time. Statistical multiplexing provides the best performance characteristics for
best-eort trac.
The timing characteristics of the behavior of clients and servers are modeled as stochastic
processes with probability distributions describing:
 Inter-arrival time: This corresponds to the arrival of a client request at a server, and
is modeled as a random variable from a probability distribution of the time between two
successive arrivals.
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 Service time: The corresponds to the time required by the server to process a client’s request
and is represented by a random variable from a probability distribution of service times.
The goal of analyzing such systems is to estimate the average number of requests in the system
that are either waiting in some queue or undergoing service, and use this to estimate the average
delay per request. These parameters allow resource engineers estimate analytically what the average
waiting time for a client in the system will be, and whether this is acceptable. The average number
of requests in system N and the average delay T per request are related by a simple formula known
as Little’s Theorem and has the form N = :T where  is the average request arrival rate. This is
given by (assuming this limit exists) limt!1 (Average number of arrivals in [0; t]=t).
Many dierent stochastic models of inter-arrival times and service rates are popular. The
simplest of these are based on what is called the \memoryless" property, where successive inter-
arrival times and service times are assumed to be statistically independent of each other. The
memoryless assumption is controversial. Many empirical studies in the 1990s [107] have shown that
Internet trac is not memoryless, but in fact bursty in nature with long range dependencies in
packet inter-arrival and service times.
In recent years however, there is an increasing belief due to the changing characteristics of Inter-
net trac (no longer dominated by dialup lines and large le transfers or \mice" and \elephants")
that the inter-arrival rates are indeed tending towards memoryless distributions, most notably the
Poisson [27] distribution. This belief is validated by statistically analyzing large amounts of Inter-
net trac on stub and core networks. Assuming that the inter-arrival rates can be indeed modeled
by the Poisson distribution, we already have a wealth of theoretical results to analyze such sys-
tems. We present this theory in Section 5.1.1 to show how Markov chains can be used to estimate
average-end-to-end delay.
5.1.1 Background on Delay Analysis
Consider a single-server queue where packets arrive according to a Poisson process with rate .
Traditionally, request service times are modeled as a memoryless exponential distribution with
mean 1= seconds. The standard technique to describe the dynamic behavior of such a system is
by modeling it as a CTMC.
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Each state in a Markov chain model corresponds to the number of requests in the server’s queue
waiting to receive service. When a new packet arrives, the state of the system changes with the
queue size increasing by one. When a packet is serviced, the state changes again with the queue
decreasing by one. Given independent identically distributed (IID) inter-arrival times, over a small
time interval , the state of this chain changes with probability : that a new packet arrives, and
does not change with probability (1− ): initially. Given a packet is being serviced by the server,
a packet leaves the server with probability :, a new packet may arrive with probability : and
no change occurs with probability 1− :− :. These transition probabilities are specied with a
small margin of error o() [18].
In order to estimate the average delay for a request in this model, we are interested in calculating
what are called the steady-state probabilities of a given Markov chain, that will help us estimate
the average number of requests waiting to be serviced in the service queue when the system is in
equilibrium. This value can be used to estimate the average waiting times from Little’s Theorem.
In steady-state, the probability that the system is in some state n (i.e., n elements in its queue)
and makes a transition to n + 1 at the next transition instant is the same as the probability that
the system is in state n+ 1 and makes a transition to n, i.e.,
pn: = pn+1:
This equation is called a global balance equation for this Markov chain. Since pn is independent of
, taking the limit of the equation as  ! 0, we obtain:
pn+1 = :pn, n = 0; 1;   
where  = =.
Using this equation, we can now nd the average number of requests in the system in steady
state as:
N = 
1− =

−
The average delay per request is given by the sum of waiting time in the queue and the service
time can be calculated using Little’s Theorem as: T = 1=− .
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General Service Time Models
When the request service times have a general distribution, not necessarily exponential, but the
arrivals can be still modeled as a Poisson process with rate  we can use what is called the Pollaczek-
Khinchin formula [18]. This formula gives the expected waiting time for a request in the queue of a
single server system. Suppose requests are served in the order they arrive and that Xi is the service
time of the ith arrival. We assume these random variables (X1; X2;    ) are identically distributed,
mutually independent and independent of inter-arrival times. Let
X = EfXg = 1= = average service time
X2 = EfX2g = second moment of service time
The expected request waiting time in the queue W is given by the Pollaczek-Khinchin formula
as:
W = :X2=2:(1− )
T = X +W
When service times are exponentially distributed, we have X2 = 2=2 and reduces to the
formula presented earlier. When service times are identical for all requests, X2 = 2=2 and:
W = =2::(1− )
The techniques presented in this section summarize the theory behind estimation of waiting
times for requests in a memoryless analytical model of network behavior. These formulas work well
for a single server with multiple requests. However, analysis becomes really dicult when many
transmission queues of this type interact in tandem, modeling the behavior of a request passing
through heterogeneous intermediate routers where many trac flows intersect before the request
reaches a server. The description of arrival as a stochastic process in a downstream queue in such
a network can get very complicated. When packet lengths and inter-arrival lengths are correlated,
no analytical results are known for even a tandem queuing of two Poisson processes [18].
In the next section, we show how we can model the victim of a large-scale DDoS attack as a PNS
using some of the theory presented in this section, and analyze it as a Markov chain. Our analysis
is dierent from traditional models of queuing behavior in one important aspect. Specically, our
model of the state includes qualitative as well as quantitative attributes, which lets us dene the
notion of useful work, and use this as a measure of the survivability of the server. In section 5.3, I
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extend this analysis to incorporate clients and intermediate routers, show how we can estimate the
bound on the average delay characteristics, and use this as measure of the survivability of dierent
DDoS prevention strategies.
5.2 Modeling A DDoS Victim
We focus on modeling a DDoS victim as a single server, which serves multiple clients, legitimate and
otherwise. These requests arrive at the server via multiple interconnected routers. The model we
present here only abstracts characteristics of server behavior that are relevant to resource consump-
tion in the context of a DDoS attack. In the following subsections, I dene our model(Section 5.2.1),
specify survivability to DDoS attacks from the viewpoint of a server as temporal logic formulas that
are meaningful within the context of the model, and analyze an example server specication by
varying the parameters to correspond to dierent situational characteristics in Section 5.2.3.
5.2.1 Modeling a Network Server
We describe the behavior of the DDoS victim server as a sequential CTMC augmented with atomic
propositions, as described in 4. Including atomic propositions in the state of CTMC does not
impact its stochastic behavior. Subsequently, we show how can use CSL to analyze behavioral
characteristics of the model under dierent adversarial behaviors. To build our model, we observe
the following characteristics about a DDoS victim:
 There are two distinct aggregate classes of trac: useful and unauthorized. We need some
semantics in the model to dierentiate between requests belonging to these two classes in
order to describe the behavior of a server under attack.
 The service time for each packet in the queue depends on the class of the packet being
serviced. In a webserver for example, the service rate for processing an HTTP request will
be dierent from the service rate for an ICMP Echo request. This may vary further within a
given protocol itself, corresponding to dierent options in the headers of these requests.
The denition of a DoS attack on a server depends on what constitutes \useful" work in this
context. A typical web server serves HTTP requests to web clients. Requests arrive to the server
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over the network and are stored in its input queue. In addition to HTTP requests, web servers
also respond to other packet types. In particular most servers accept and respond to legitimate
ICMP (including ping requests) as well as certain types of UDP datagrams [86]. Whenever the
server nds an ICMP or UDP datagram in its input queue, it devotes some amount of time to serve
it. In addition to these three types of packets, the server’s CPU can also spend time discarding
bad packets(incomplete headers, other unrecognizable packet types, unauthorized packets etc.). A
simple state-transition graph that captures this CPU utilization behavior of a web server is shown
in Figure 5.1.
 
         
 
Discarding
Bad Packets
HTTP Requests
Serving
Serving
ICMP Requests
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Figure 5.1: State-Transition Graph of Server
We use the PNS framework of Chapter 4 to dierentiate between states in the model where a
server is processing a useful packet or an attack packet, by modeling this knowledge as an atomic
proposition that is true in that state. We rst present a simple model of server behavior based on
these characteristics with the assumption that the server is capable of classifying a packet as useful
or unauthorized upon inspection. Within these two aggregate classes, individual packet flows may
arrive at the server at dierent rates and may be processed at dierent service rates. Characterizing
these rates can be extremely dicult and depend on client behavior, operational parameters of the
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server, and the bandwidth of its incoming link.
In the case of a DDoS attack, we observe from empirical data [104, 69] that multi-source DDoS
attacks typically saturate the pipe to a server or a subnetwork. A victim server is continuously
processing packets from its input queues, with almost zero idle time. The data in [104] illustrates
how low bandwidth requests from individual servers suer from unbounded waiting times, typically
larger than their voluntary timeout periods.
We make some simplifying assumptions about the characteristics of request arrival rates and
service rates at a DDoS server, given that DDoS attacks are dicult to characterize and analytical
models of DDoS trac are not available. One thing we would like to emphasize however is that our
modeling complements quantitative models of network trac, and provides a framework to reason
about the behavior of the system under attack. A better model of a specic server’s network trac
can be plugged into our framework in the future and the analysis can follow the general procedure
outlined here.
In our simplied model, the service rates at a DDoS server are dened by the memoryless
exponential distribution, and are only dependent on the class of the packet and not its origin or its
arrival rate, since a new request is always waiting for service. The probability that server moves to
a state with a new request in the model is therefore determined by the service rate of its current
request class.
The dierence in the arrival rates of attack trac and legitimate trac determine the probability
distribution on the next state of the model. To study the interaction between these arrival rates,
we simulate the eect of how increasing amounts of attack trac can aect the server’s ability
to do useful work. Later, in Section 5.3 I show how we can estimate some of these probabilities
and coarsely approximate the average waiting time for dierent types of clients in a system, with
respect to dierent DDoS prevention strategies. For now we focus on describing our server with
four memoryless parameters: the probability that the next request is legitimate, the probability
that it is an attack, and the probabilities that the server will nish processing its current request
for both attack and legitimate packet types.
We claim that the server is doing useful work if its computation consists of states where CPU
time is spent serving legitimate requests, HTTP or otherwise. For a given attack prole, described
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by the relative arrival rates of attack packets and legitimate packets, we dene this probabilistic
behavior as CTMC and show how we can estimate the proportion of time spent by a server doing
useful work. This value also depends on the service rates for each packet class. The steady-state
analysis of this CTMC will give us a measure of the survivability of the system against an attack
prole, as a proportion of total time spent by the process doing useful work versus processing all
packets, including any unauthorized packets that it receives
Modeling behavior in this fashion does not address attacks where a group of clients get to-
gether and send legitimate HTTP requests to the server with the intention of competing with
other legitimate HTTP requests from being served. If the attackers’ requests are behaviorally in-
distinguishable from legitimate requests, this cannot be dierentiated in our model. However, a
server may be able to dierentiate between packets generated by an automatic daemon vs. packets
generated by realtime user trac using spectral analysis as shown in [69].
We now present the CTMC model of a DDoS victim server:
Denition 5.2.1 (DDoS Victim Server). The CTMC MServer is a tuple (;R; L) where:
1.  is a nite set of states
2. R :   ! <0, the rate matrix
3. L :  ! 2AP , which labels each state with the set of atomic propositions that are valid in that
state
The rate matrix R characterizes the transitions between the states of the CTMC. If R(; 0) > 0
then a transition from state  to state 0 can occur. If R(; 0) > 0 for more than one state 0,
and if we can assume that the service rates can be characterized as a memoryless distribution (e.g.,
the exponential distribution), then we can estimate the probability of moving from a state  to the
state 0 as the probability that the delay of going from  to 0 nishes before the delays of other
outgoing edges from  . Let E() =
P
02 R(; 
0), the total rate at which any transition from
state  is taken. P(; 0) = R(; 0)=E(), except if  is an absorbing state when P(; 0) = 0.
To return to our example, we group the trac to our webserver into two aggregate classes of
packets, labeled as the HTTP class that corresponds to useful work, and a generic Attack class
that corresponds to attack packets of any type.
103
HTTP
(1,0) (2,0)
HTTP
(0,1)
AttackAttack
(0,2)
muh
1 − ph
ph
pa
1 − pa
mua 1− mua
1 − muh
Figure 5.2: DDoS Victim Server as a PNS
Our model consists of two status variables http and attack. Each variable can take on one of
three values f0; 1; 2g. Therefore the values of these variables dene six atomic propositions of the
form (http = 0), (http = 1), (attack = 2) etc. The probability that the next packet is an HTTP
packet is given by ph, the probability that it is an attack is given by pa. The probability that the
model stays in its current state processing a HTTP packet is given by muh and the probability that
it stays in its current state processing an Attack packet is mua. These four parameters and the
status variables dene the PNS presented in Figure 5.2.
Here, state labeled (1; 0) corresponds to the model executing an HTTP request (i.e., http=1
and attack=0). It stays in state (1; 0) with probability (1 - muh) and moves to state (2; 0) with
probability muh, indicating that it is nished processing the request. At this state it can again go to
state (1; 0) with probability ph, or to an attack state (0; 1) with probability pa = (1 - ph). From
this state similarly, the model can move to a state (0; 2) with probability mua = (1-muh) or stay
in the same state with probability (1 - mua). From state (0; 2), the model can move to (0; 1) with
pa or to (1; 0) with ph. No other transitions are allowed in the model.
A computation of the model starting at state sHTTP can be represented as an innite tree as
shown in Figure 5.3. At each state, any of the two transitions can be enabled as shown, corre-
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sponding to the probability of leaving a state in Figure 5.2. From this tree we observe that in
addition to paths containing only useful states, there exist valid paths in the model that do not
include any HTTP states. If the server only receives a large number of ICMP, UDP, or other badly
constructed packets to ll up its input queues, then it may end up not doing any useful work, since
HTTP requests do not reach the server’s input queue. In fact, automated DoS and DDoS attack
scripts generate exactly these types of packets in their attempt to flood [48, 47, 46] the input queue
and deny service to HTTP requests. For a given attack prole, we can annotate the transitions
with appropriate probabilities and estimate what states are more likely to occur in the model in
steady-state.
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Figure 5.3: Server Computation Tree
In Section 5.2.2, we formalize the notion of a server’s ability to always do useful work in terms
of CSL properties and show how we can measure this in the CTMC specied here. In Section 5.2.3
we show how we can use our model to study the impact of dierent DDoS prevention strategies on
the server.
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5.2.2 Specifying and Verifying Server DoS Properties
The property we are most interested in, given a specic CTMC modeling a DDoS victim server is
how the attack trac rate aects the ability of the server to do useful work. In terms of the model,
given an attack prole as (ph, pa), and the service rates (muh, mua) we want to estimate how
the probability mass flows through the CTMC as time passes.
If the system started in some state  2 , at time 0 (the probability of being in state  at time
0 is 1), the vector (t) = (0(t))02 denotes the probability distribution among the states 
0 at
time t where t is a non negative real number. The set f0(t); 1(t);    ; n(t)g for an n state
CTMC is called the transient distribution of the CTMC at time t.
The limiting probability distributions  as t!1 is called the steady-state distribution of
 and always exists for arbitrary nite CTMCs. Obtaining the steady state distribution for a given
attack prole gives us the probability that the model will be each of the four dierent states in
steady state. This can be used to measure the survivability of the model to a given attack strategy.
We show how to model and compute this steady state probability for useful work with the help of
an example.
We pick the probabilities in our example from the measurement data in [69]. This data corre-
sponds to measurements made on attacks captured at Los Nettos, a moderate sized ISP near Los
Angeles. The typical packet load on the Los Nettos network is 38K packets/s. During attack this
increased to 100K packets/s. A total of 80 large scale DDoS attacks were logged. Approximately
85% of the packets were TCP during normal load, dominated by DNS and web trac. During
attacks, TCP reflection attacks against web servers and FTP servers were the most common packet
types.
Since most networking characteristics are tailored for normal load, we pick 38K packets/s as the
value for the service rate for useful packets. Most commercial servers come with benchmarks that
give average and peak services rates which can be used to estimate this parameter. The peak trac
under attack was 100K packets/s, which we assign as the service rate for attack packets. Under
this load, this gives us us muh= 38=138 = 0:27 and mua= 100=138 = 0:73. From this measurement
data, we only have two types of information: the behavior of the system when no attacks are
occurring, i.e., the probability of attack pa= 0, or the behavior of the system under attack when
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the probability of attack is close to 1.
We specify the example as a PNS using a probabilistic model checking tool called PRISM [111].
This tool allows us to analyze systems that exhibit probabilistic behavior. The tool requires two
inputs, a description of the system to be analyzed, and a set of properties to be checked against
the system. The system to be modeled is described in the PRISM language, which is a simple
state-based specication language. Appendix B presents the model we specied using the PRISM
language. This program represents the CTMC of Figure 5.2.
The fundamental components of a PRISM program are modules and variables. A system is
composed of a number of modules that can interact with each other. A module can contain a
number of local integer-valued variables. The values of these variables at any given time constitute
the state of the system. The global state of the system is given by the local state of all the modules.
Within a module, commands describe its transition behavior. A command of the form:
[] g -> p1:u1 + ... + pn:un;
describes a transition with guard g as a predicate over the variables of the system. Each update ui
describes a transition the module can make from its current state if the guard is true. Constants
pi assign probabilistic information to the transition.
In our model, states (1; 0) and (2; 0) correspond to our notion of useful work. Therefore sur-
vivability in this model for dierent attack proles can be evaluated by measuring the steady state
probability, for a given attack prole, that the server will be in state (1; 0) or (2; 0). This is expressed
as the CSL formula:
Denition 5.2.2 (DDoS Server Survivability). DDoS Server Survivability is given by the
following CSL formula :Mserver; (1; 0) j= S./p((http = 1) _ (http = 2))
In PRISM syntax this is written as S>p [ http=1 | http=2 ]. From the measurement data
in this section, we have two scenarios, where either pa = 1.00 corresponding to the case where
no useful work is done by the model or to the case where pa = 0.00. Validating these formulas
for these two scenarios in the model is not very useful. However, in Section 5.2.3 I show how we
can use the modeling and analysis framework from this section to analyze the impact of other
attack proles, and show how we can increase or decrease a server’s survivability by implementing
strategies that change the values of either pa or mua.
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5.2.3 Eectiveness of Dierent Server DoS Prevention Strategies
In this section, we show how we can use the model from Section 5.2.1 to analyze the behavior of a
DDoS server by simulating dierent attack proles, changing the values of attack rates and service
rates, and study the impact of dierent DDoS recovery strategies on a server’s DDoS survivability.
The analysis presented here can be used by the owner of a server to determine if any DDoS
prevention measures can be deployed and estimate the projected impact of deploying these mea-
sures. Some of the options for the owner in this case, as suggested in the past, include requiring
strong authentication, proofs of authorization, or devising better attack recognition and ltering
techniques to drop attack packets faster. Techniques such as strong authentication for DDoS pre-
vention are controversial, since attackers can form bad authentication tokens, and force the server
to spend more time discarding them, increasing the end-to-end delay for legitimate users of the
system.
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Figure 5.4: Impact of Changing Attack rates for a Fixed Service Rate
We focus on how we can use the analysis framework to estimate the survivability of the example
server model presented in Section 5.2.2. In Figure 5.5, we plot the impact of changing the proportion
of attack trac to legitimate trac on the survivability of the model, given that we have a xed
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conguration for the service rates. We pick muh=0.25 and change ph from 0:00 to 1:00 in steps of
0:05 on the X-axis. On the Y-axis, we plot the computed steady-state probabilities of the server
under dierent attack proles from the PRISM model. This study highlights the what we term the
vulnerability of the server to DDoS attacks.
As seen from the graph, the steady state probabilities that the model remains in state (1; 0)
or (2; 0) that correspond to useful work, increases as the ratio of the attack packets to legitimate
packets decreases. From measurement alone, we were able to obtain the steady-state distribution
corresponding to the two endpoints of this graph. With the model however, we can analyze dierent
aspects of the behavior without actually simulating dierent attack proles. We observe that as
the server’s rate increases in proportion to the attack rate, the survivability of the system also
increases, because the system spends more time doing useful work per request than in discarding
attack packets.
While this result is expected, the graph also gives us the distribution of how this value changes
over time. As the proportion of attack trac drops from 1:0 to 0:8, the steady-state probability
that the model spends its time in states corresponding to useful work increases sharply. Even with
80% attack packets, the server spends half its time in steady-state doing useful work. After this
point on the graph where the two curves intersect, the slope of the gain in survivability is smaller.
This implies that for the given conguration, an attacker has to send packets 80% faster than the
legitimate servers to cause a serious degradation (< 50%) in the server’s ability to do useful work.
Using the results from this analysis, the owners of the ISP network can estimate the threshold
of attack onset more accurately. Monitoring and ltering packets based on per-flow characteristics
can be very expensive. In [69], the authors suggest that the threshold rate used to detect attacks is
when the aggregate packet rate exceeds 40K packets/s. This measure was determined by observing
the characteristics of attack trac. Whenever the rate exceeded 40K packets/s in the network, it
signaled the onset of an attack. Based on the measurement data, this is a reasonable assumption
to make.
We contend however that such measurements provide only a coarse-grained view of the attack
prole and its potential impact. With our analysis, we suggest that a better estimate on the onset
of a damaging attack can be obtained by doing the steady-state analysis. With our coarse-grained
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model, we can show that even if the ratio of the attack packets to the regular HTTP, regardless of
its current trac rate is 40%, we can still guarantee that the server will spend more than 80% of its
time doing useful work. However, this may come at a cost of decreased throughput for legitimate
clients in the system, which cannot be evaluated by modeling the server alone. Once the rate
exceeds this threshold, the ability of the server to do useful work degrades according to the graph
shown.
This analysis can also be used to focus on what flows to traceback in the case of an attack.
Rather than focus on all flows, the server network can concentrate on tracing back and ltering
packets on upstream on a small number of flows, depending on what their rate characteristics
are, based on how reducing these flows can impact the survivability of the system under attack,
according to the analysis from Figure 5.5.
Another option available to the owner of such a system to increase their survivability to DDoS
attacks is to decrease the processing time required to discard bad packets, and require that legit-
imate packets produce an appropriate proof of authorization (e.g., using authentication tokens).
This strategy has the impact of reducing the processing time for attackers, at the cost of increasing
it for the legitimate users. We show how we can use our methodology to understand these tradeos
better.
One important observation in order to use such techniques is that characterizing bad packets
can be challenging. Many automated DDoS tools randomize packet headers making this problem
even more dicult. However, assuming that we can characterize these packets, we can study the
impact of changing the service rates for dierent request classes given a xed ratio of attack packets
to legitimate packets.
In Figure 5.5 we plot muh on the X-axis, changing it from 0 to 1 in steps of 0:05. The value of
muh in the graph represents the relative processing rate of HTTP packets with respect to attack
packets. For example when muh=0.5, these rates are equal and when muh=0.25, useful packets
are processed three times slower than attack packets. We plot these curves for dierent attack to
legitimate trac ratios, viz., ph=0.85, 0.7, 0.3. The Y-axis plots the steady state probability
that the model is doing useful work, a direct measure of its survivability.
From all three plots that the slower we process attack packets respect to useful packets, the
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Figure 5.5: Impact of Changing Service rates for xed Attack rates
survivability of the model decreases. In other words, if the server spends a comparable amount or
larger amount of time discarding bad packets, in proportion to the amount of time it spends to
process good packets, the overall survivability of the server degrades. However this degradation also
depends on the attack rate. From the graph we observe that this degrade faster as the attack rate
increases. For the three curves, the worst degradation occurs when ph = 0.30 and the attack rate
probability is 0:70. The crossover point for this curve occurs even when the proportional processing
time for attack packets is four times as fast as legitimate packets (represented by muh=0.2. This
suggests that packets need to be discarded much faster and techniques such as strong authentication
which increase this gap are not suitable.
In general, we observe from the plots that discarding attack packets faster than useful packets
always results in better survivability. However, for dierent attack rates, the crossover points
occur at dierent proportions for dierent attack proles. The more number of attack packets in
proportion to useful packets, the earlier the crossover occurs, requiring that the packets be dropped
faster under attack. This implies that characterizing attack packets quickly and discarding them is
extremely important to ensure the survivability of the server.
In Section 5.3, we show how we can extend the server model presented to explicitly incorporate
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clients and model their end-to-end delay characteristics under a DDoS attack. While we focused on
how to make server’s more survivable in this section, we extend our model to include the stochastic
behavior of clients, and analyze a client’s DDoS survivability properties.
5.3 Modeling Client DDoS Survivability
A DDoS or DoS attack is an attempt by unauthorized users in a network to deny access to legitimate
users of a service. As a result of the attackers’ behavior, authorized users’ requests are subject to
unbounded waiting times. The analysis of a server’s DDoS survivability presented in Section 5.2
gives us a methodology to evaluate what strategies a server can adapt to decrease the impact of
these attacks on its ability to do useful work. However, it does not provide us any insights into
how attackers can influence the end-to-end delay observed by legitimate users of a network server.
In this section, we explore how to extend the PNS modeling and analysis framework to include
clients and routers, and describe the delay characteristics of a client’s request, using a traditional
queuing theory model of network behavior. We formally specify client’s survivability to a DDoS
attack as a probabilistic delay guarantee expressed using a suitable temporal logic, and show how
we can study the impact of dierent DDoS prevention strategies on a client’s perceived waiting
time.
In Section 5.3.1 we show with the help of a simple example how to model and analyze the
delay characteristics of dierent classes of trac. Using this example, we show how to specify
client DDoS survivability properties in Section 5.3.2. We use the model to simulate analytically the
behavioral characteristics of dierent DDoS prevention strategies including strong authentication
(Section 5.3.3), and ltering (Section 5.3.4), with respect to the impact a client’s waiting time. This
analysis is in contrast to the analysis in the previous section that focused on the server’s ability to
do useful work.
5.3.1 Modeling End-to-End Delay for Clients
In this section, we show how we can estimate end-to-end per-packet delay for legitimate clients
in our system when the server is undergoing a DDoS attack. Instead of focusing on individual
packet flows, once again we perform a coarse-grained analysis by focusing on aggregate attack and
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authorized-packet flows during an attack.
In a DDoS attack, only the networks closest to a DDoS victim is usually experiencing moderate
to heavy load. Therefore we only model the aggregate trac rates in these networks and use
our analysis to infer end-to-end delay characteristics for legitimate clients. To keep the analysis
tractable, we assume that the aggregate trac rates on these networks are memoryless, especially if
these flows comes from a large number of attack sources. When individual requests from legitimate
servers intermingle with this trac, using Kleinrock’s Independence assumption, any correlations
are eliminated.
Once again, we point out that we chose this model to illustrate our methodology and only
claim that this model is a rough approximation to the actual attack and client request rates. Our
contribution here is the methodology for analysis, which complements the underlying model of the
network, and better models of aggregate trac can only improve the condence of our analysis.
C1
C2
C3
R1
R2 Server
Figure 5.6: Example Client Network
We explain our modeling with the help of the example network shown in Figure 5.6. In this
model, we have three clients, two routers, and one server. The clients in this picture represent
aggregate trac sources and may correspond trac flows across ISP boundaries close to the victim
server. The routers in these networks correspond to border routers on upstream ISPs from the
client. Client streams 1 and 2 contain only legitimate requests, and Client stream 3 only attack
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trac. As more attack requests reach the server, as the server has nite computational resources,
legitimate clients will start experiencing packet losses. If the legitimate clients’ requests are sent
using self-regulating protocol such as TCP, these losses will cause the clients to reduce their sending
rates. The attackers however will not attempt to decrease their rates. We wish to study the impact
of such behavior on the mean end-to-end network delay for the legitimate clients in steady-state.
We illustrate our modeling of DDoS survivability properties of authorized clients using the
example from Section 5.2.2. Measurement data in the example network suggests that the average
throughput under normal load is 38K packets/s. Since networks are engineered to provide optimal
performance for normal load, and a small threshold to handle sudden bursts of trac, we assume
that the processing rate for authorized packets at the DDoS victim server is 40K packets/s. However
under attack, a peak rate of 100K attack packets/s is observed at the server. This suggests that
attack packets can be processed at rates approaching this value.
Let h be the rate at which legitimate packets can be processed by the server, and a the rate
at which unauthorized packets are processed. We are now interested in the steady state behavior
of this network for dierent attack proles. Let the rate of attack be a. Given the peak attack
and authorized packet processing rates, under steady state, for a given value of a, = < 1, and
no queues start to grow unboundedly we have:
h
muh
= 1− a
a
Using this equation, given a sustained attack rate a, and xed values for muh and mua, we can
estimate the rate at which legitimate users can send packets as h. The average end-to-end delay is
given by 1=h for authorized requests. This value is the reciprocal of the rate at which a legitimate
user can send packets, for a given attack prole.
Note the formula above only models the expected rate at which legitimate clients can send
packets, given an attack prole, and the network is stable, meaning that the queues do not grow
unboundedly. This calculation does not include network transmission delays, or transient network
congestion delays. Therefore our model of delay is conservative and the actual delays may be much
higher. However, the trends we observe by modeling the steady state behavior of the network in
this fashion are still useful from the point of view of resource engineering for stability.
In Section 5.3.2, I show how to express the DoS vulnerability of legitimate clients and show how
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we can use the delay model to analyze the survivability of dierent DDoS prevention strategies,
including strong authentication and packet ltering.
5.3.2 Specication and Analysis of Client DDoS Survivability Properties
We dene a measure vulnerability of a client to DDoS attacks as follows:
Denition 5.3.1 (Client DDoS Vulnerability). The vulnerability of an authorized DDoS client
can be measured by the average end-to-end per-packet delay observed by the client for a given attack
prole under steady-state. This corresponds to a probabilistic measure of average waiting time
(PWT).
As mentioned earlier, the reciprocal of the PWT value for a given attack prole represents the
rate at which legitimate clients can send requests to the server and receive an appropriate response.
Sending these requests any faster will likely increase the end-to-end delay for the request.
In order to understand the sensitivity of a network conguration to dierent attack proles, it is
useful to plot how the end-to-end delay per-packet changes as the attack rates increase in intensity.
The rate of change of PWT values can give us important insights into the behavior of a network
under attack.
Figure 5.7 plots the simulated attack rate vs. average end-to-end delay or PWT per-packet,
under steady-state, for legitimate clients. For each attack prole, we calculate the steady-state
packet rate that a legitimate client can send according to the formula presented in Section 5.3.1,
varying the attack rates from 0 packets/s to 100K packets/s in steps of 1K. We only plot values
of the delay observed by legitimate and unauthorized users attack rates from 6K to 88K packets/s
since the delays increase unboundedly outside this range and the details at these levels are lost on
the graph.
The curve labeled \No Attack" represents the average end-to-end delay given by the reciprocal
of the normal workload for the example network (38K packets/s). The curve labeled \Authorized"
represents the change in a legitimate user’s PWT and the curve labeled \Unauthorized" represents
how the attackers PWT changes. From the graph we observe that the PWT for legitimate clients
degrades rapidly when the attack rate exceeds 60K packets/s. This suggests an appropriate thresh-
old for detecting attack and deploying prevention strategies from the point of view of legitimate
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Figure 5.7: Baseline
client. Analysis results from Section 5.2.3 can be consulted to further rene this value and balance
both server and client survivability needs.
As expected, the attackers’ PWT decreases rapidly initially. At the crossover point of the two
curves, around 28K attack packets/s, the PWT values for both trac classes are equal. Beyond
this point, it increases sharply for the legitimate clients, and falls less sharply for unauthorized
packets. This crossover point can be used as a direct measure of the vulnerability of the network.
If an attacker needs to send a greater amount of packets/s to cause this crossover, then the system
is more resilient to DDoS attacks.
In the next subsection, we model the impact of dierent DDoS survivability strategies, including
strong authentication and ltering on the PWT of legitimate clients.
5.3.3 DDoS Prevention Strategies
The rst strategy we examine is strong authentication on the server. This is one strategy the
server can implement even when the other network entities (clients and routers) cannot be reliably
constrained (e.g.,, when they belong to dierent administrative domains). Each legitimate request
can carry an authentication credential that authorizes the client making the request. The server
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processes all requests and looks for the credential. If the credential can be found and validated,
the appropriate response is sent. Otherwise, the request is dropped.
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Figure 5.8: Strong Authentication
Adding a credential check to each request increases the time required to process each request.
When the system reaches a steady state, this has the eect of decreasing the packet arrival rates.
In Figure 5.8, we plot the impact of na¨evely changing the server to include strong authentication,
without changing the behavior of the server to attack packets. As shown by the curve marked
with \mu = 35k packets/s", the PWT of legitimate clients increases with respect to the baseline.
Furthermore the crossover occurs earlier at 25K packets/s, making it more vulnerable to DDoS
attacks.
We also show how if we change the behavior of the server to lter unauthorized packets, the
PWT for legitimate clients changes less slowly as shown by the curve labeled \mu = 35K packets/s,
2 * lter". This indicates that a combination of strong authentication and ltering can be useful
in increasing the survivability of a DDoS client.
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5.3.4 Filtering
We now plot how ltering attack packets faster at the server can impact the DDoS survivability
from the viewpoint of a client in the system. Figure 5.9 shows how ltering attack packets faster
at the server (without changing any other parameters) can improve the DDoS survivability of the
clients in terms of their PWT policies. As the curves illustrate, dropping attack packets faster
directly impacts the observed waiting times for authorized users in the system.
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Figure 5.9: Filtering
5.4 Chapter Summary
In this Chapter, I present a formal model of network resource consumption and dene network
DDoS survivability as probabilistic temporal properties can be veried within this framework. Our
modeling and analysis complements existing stochastic network models, and allows us to specify
and measure both qualitative and quantitative aspects of DDoS survivability. To the best of our
knowledge, this the rst systematic treatment and analysis of survivability to DDoS attacks.
While researchers have developed many dierent techniques to tackle DoS and DDoS attacks,
in the absence of a formal model it is dicult to reason about the relative impact of these dierent
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techniques in terms of their survivability. Using our model, we can quantify the costs of deploying
dierent DoS prevention strategies such as strong authentication, and ltering on network servers
and observe their impact on qualitative and quantitative survivability properties. We evaluate the
impact of dierent DoS prevention strategies using both standard automated model checking and
stochastic analysis techniques.
In the next chapter I summarize related research, in the context of recovery-oriented security,
availability policies, dynamic access controls and denial of service policies to dierentiate how the
work I present here in this thesis diers from the existing body of research.
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Some have relied on what they knew;
Others on simply being true. What
worked for them might work for you.
Robert Frost, \Provide, Provide"Chapter 6
Related Work
In this chapter, I present a summary of existing research and show how my thesis complements
related topics. In Section 6.1 I show how concepts such as fault-tolerance, reliability and depend-
ability relate to the model of survivability presented in this thesis. In Section 6.2, I summarize
results in the context of analysis of access control models. In Section 6.3 I present a brief summary
of dierent modeling techniques for state-transition behavior, especially for networks, including
Petri-nets and Stochastic Activity networks (SAN) and show how our analysis extends to these
models. Finally, in Section 6.4, I summarize existing research with respect formal models of DoS
behavior, and strategies that tackle dierent aspects of DDoS attacks.
6.1 Modeling Dependability
The notion of specifying and analyzing the dependability of a system is not new. Research into the
fault-tolerance and reliability of both hardware and software components in a distributed system
is quite mature. For most part, this research has focused on developing robust techniques to
handle a specic class of failures. In terms modeling robust protocols for dependability, the most
common failure model for components is the independent and arbitrary (or Byzantine failure)
model. Techniques to handle such failures include replication of components, load-balancing and
sharing, checkpointing for recovery, probing, feedback, leader-election, and voting for consistency
etc. The robustness of such models is measured purely quantitatively in terms of [100] the mean-
time to failure (MTTF) and the mean-time to recover (MTTR) parameters.
Increasingly, researchers have started to include security as an attribute for dependability anal-
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ysis. Avizienis et al. [10] have dened dierent attributes of dependability that include availability,
reliability, safety, condentiality, integrity and maintainability. The term survivability is used in
this community to focus on two related problems : intrusion tolerance and database survivability.
Intrusion tolerance in distributed systems [44] is a well researched area. The area evolved from
the study of the relationship between fault-tolerance and security techniques. More recently, re-
searchers have focused on dierent abstractions and mechanisms for specifying intrusions, as an
analogy to the fault classication and analysis. Researchers have worked on design of intrusion tol-
erant applications [132], communication protocols [50] and software infrastructure. The ITUA [37]
project describes a middleware architecture along with a suite of intrusion tolerant communication
protocols and analysis techniques that exploit adaptation and unpredictability for tolerating the
impact of cyber attacks. These techniques do not directly address the integrity and condentiality
concerns of specic users and information objects in an information protection system. The focus
is mainly on availability of resources and maintaining consistency in the face of arbitrary failures.
Database survivability is also a well researched topic. In [84, 6] the authors illustrate the prin-
ciples of trusted recovery in defensive information warfare [105] with respect to military databases.
This work denes the notion of malicious and benign transactions and their dependence. They
also present techniques for recovering databases from inconsistencies after an attack, by relying
on redundancy and fault-tolerance. However the treatment of the material is almost exclusively
geared towards maintaining transactional integrity. Their research does not address condentiality
properties or DoS protection directly.
More recently, Jha and Wing [73] propose a systematic method for survivability analysis based
on injecting events into a system model and observing its eects in the form of a scenario graph.
This work also extends the scope of traditional dependability models. They propose a general
framework to specify dierent aspects of survivability as general safety and liveness properties, and
suggest techniques for reliability and cost-benet analysis.
The notion of survivability of security models is dened as the ability of a system to continue
operation, especially in the presence of accidental failures or malicious attacks [51]. Our goal in
this thesis is more modest. We rene the scope of this denition and explore how survivability can
be specied and analyzed in the context of systems security. Instead of modeling for accidental or
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arbitrary failures, or for general system models, we focus on specic attack descriptions within the
framework of a more expressive access control model. Furthermore, our analysis is restricted to
survivable notions of condentiality, integrity, and availability properties from the point of view of
resource access behavior. We believe that this is our unique contribution.
6.2 Access Control Analysis
To the best of our knowledge, we are not aware of any systematic studies that evaluate dier-
ent access control policy implementations with regard to changing implementation mechanisms
in response to a perceived threat or vulnerability. However, our work on analysis of access con-
trol models, with respect to RAs that can change access permissions and preserve consistency, is
influenced by several recent research eorts.
The model for incorporating a proof of authorization as a guard that is evaluated before exe-
cuting an RA, directly follows from the formalism presented by Schneider in the context of policies
that can be enforced by execution monitoring [121] that can be enforced by execution monitoring.
Schneider proves that if we can rely on the guards for consistency, then any system that correctly
implements these mechanisms also correctly enforces the policy. This forms the basis for our proof
of trust validation.
While we rely on a simple state-based specication language in this thesis, many researchers
have focused on high-level languages and frameworks to describe access control policies and models.
These languages typically abstract the logical properties of interest to capture delegation and
interoperability between dierent access control specications.
For example, Bertino et al. [17] describe a logical framework for reasoning about the expressive
power of dierent access control models. Specically they address the task of evaluating dierent
flavors of extensions to database authorization models (e.g., negative authorizations, multi-policy
models, role based authorizations etc). Koch et al. [78], analyze the interaction between dierent
policy models using a theory of graph transformations. Jajodia et al. [72] propose a language
for expressing authorizations that enables the enforcement of multiple access control policies and
show how programs written in this language eectively capture the abstractions necessary to dene
dierent types of authorizations encountered in access control models.
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In our work, we have focused on low-level mechanisms that implement access control policies.
We recognize that our simplied semantics may not exploit the power of expression available by
using these higher-level languages to dene access control models, especially in database systems.
A full treatment of the survivability of these models by describing their semantics is beyond the
scope of this thesis.
In order to evaluate the flow of trust in an access control , many dierent formal analysis
techniques are available. Weeks [129] provides a formal semantics for expressing trust management
systems via a xpoint lattice model for monotonic assertions. This model is useful to understand
the trust management of capability-based assertions. Chander et al. [28] provide a state transition
approach to model the interaction of trust management and access control. The interaction of
access control and trust management presented in our thesis, including the use of unforgeable
credentials to provide authorization proofs, and the equivalence of ALs and CLs can be validated
in their framework.
The capability-based KeyNote system of Blaze et al. [23], provides a single language for both
policies and credentials, based on predicates that describe the trusted actions permitted by holders
of specic public keys (or other cryptographic identiers). Our model integrates access control with
a simple trust management mechanism. The main purpose of KeyNote is to express and evaluate
policies and trust delegations that occur in PKI applications. KeyNote can be integrated into our
framework for trust management for other types of dynamic policies that require more require
credentials.
We believe that the model of access control behavior we used in this thesis abstracts the relevant
entities and their interactive behavior adequately to describe survivability properties of interest.
The analysis techniques summarized here enchance a designer’s understanding of the flow of trust
and the power of expression of more complicated or composite models of access control behavior.
These techniques can be used to complement our survivability modeling for integrity, condentiality
and availability properties.
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6.3 Models of Access Control Behavior
In Chapter 5 of this thesis, we used Markov chains to describe network access behavior. Markov
chains are nite-state models of probabilistic phenomena. Using DTMCs and CTMCs to model
queuing systems and estimate steady state probabilities is fairly standard [77]. In general, these
models are useful to specify and analyze quantitative aspects of probabilistic system behavior.
Formal verication techniques such as model checking on the other hand try to answer ques-
tions related to the functional correctness of reactive system behavior, in a qualitative manner.
Fortunately, the model of a PNS presented in this thesis allows us to integrate both quantitative
and qualitative analysis techniques in one framework. The state-transition based techniques used
to represent quantitative network behavior ts in well with qualitative state-transition formalisms
of nite-state systems that exhibit probabilistic phenomena. This integrated approach to system
specications provides a best of both worlds framework for analysis of survivability properties.
In addition to augmented Markov chains as presented here, various other techniques are available
to specify and analyze qualitative and quantitative aspects of model or network behavior. These
include stochastic Petri nets, and process algebras. Eventually, for analysis purposes, these models
are converted into nite state non-deterministic automata and the underlying theory behind these
techniques is the same. However, some of these models provide richer abstract semantics, and are
easier to use.
Petri Nets [108] are a formal and graphical language appropriate for modeling systems with
concurrency. The language of Petri nets is a generalization of automata theory and allows one
to express concurrent, asynchronous, distributed, parallel, nondeterministic, and/or stochastically
occurring events (as Stochastic Petri Nets). A Petri net is described in terms of places, transitions,
and arcs. Some places are marked as input and others as output. Places can contain tokens; the
current state of the modeled system called a marking, is given by the number of tokens in each
place, and their type if the tokens are distinguishable Transitions are active components. The
tokens model activities which can occur, causing a transition to re, thus changing the state of the
system. Transitions are enabled, or allowed to re, when all the preconditions for the activity are
fullled, i.e., there are enough tokens available in an input place. Transitions re at dierent times,
or concurrently, based on the system being modeled, and the tokens are moved to output places.
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The number of tokens removed or added depends on the cardinality of each arc. The interactive
ring of transitions in subsequent markings is called token game. Timing characteristics can be
included by specifying ring delays.
A Process Algebras [16] is formal description technique used to specify reactive systems involving
communicating and concurrently executing components. The fundamental abstraction is a process
graph, which corresponds to a labeled transition system (LTS). A node corresponds to an agent in
the system, and the labels to atomic actions. Process graphs are represented algebraically in the
form of terms. Process algebra focuses on the specication and manipulation of process terms as
induced by a collection of operator symbols. Process algebra imposes an equational logic on process
terms, such that two terms can be equated only if they are behaviorally equivalent. Process Algebras
are attractive because they can describe composition naturally, and for their ability to compare
behaviors. Probabilistic process algebras are the closest equivalent to our Markov chain formalism
and adhere to Markov chain semantics.
Stochastic Petri nets (SPNs) and Stochastic Process Algebras (SPAs) can be viewed as high
level description languages for Markov processes. Many comparisions of SPNs and SPAs are avail-
able, concentrating on their dierent representations of causality, concurrency, compositionality,
and the ability to recognize equivalent behaviors. SPNs have a very clear notion of states, whereas
SPAs focus on actions. At the specication level, SPNs are graphical, whereas SPAs are a textual
language. Any Markov chain can be expressed, although as a degenerate form, using either formal-
ism. The choice of an appropriate specication language can impact the usability of our analysis
framework, but does not detract from the general techniques presented.
6.4 DOS Related Work
In this section, we present related research, both in the context of formal modeling and analysis of
DoS, as well as dierent DoS and DDoS prevention strategies. We also highlight how other service
models such as QoS networks and ATM networks address the DoS problem.
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6.4.1 Formal Modeling
Shields [122] presents informal, but comprehensive denitions of network DoS. However, the DoS
problem itself has received some attention in the past. One of the rst attempts to formalize
the notion of DoS resistance was by Gligor [58] who dened a quantitative metric called MWT
(Maximum Waiting Time). Amoroso [8] highlights the need for specifying a service model in terms
of policies as predicates involving subjects (users) and objects (resources) and resource consumption
operations. DoS policies are specied in terms of predicates that specify conditions, using priorities,
under which a subject can deny other authorized subjects access to a critical objects.
Subsequently, Yu and Gligor [134] extended the MWT notion to include qualitative aspects of
resource access and sharing behavior and devised a specication and verication proof methodology
(manual) to guarantee nite waiting times (FWT) and prevent DoS. As mentioned earlier,
Millen [97] analyzes trust assumptions, species a state-transition model of resource consump-
tion behavior, and suggests the use of probabilistic waiting time policies. In Millen’s resource
allocation model [97] provides a framework for expressing detailed time and space constraints to
specify denial of service rules and policies. Service denials occur when the space and time allo-
cations for some process does not meet its requirements. FWT and MWT policies can be easily
specied in this context. PWT is suggested as future work in the model.
In [95] Meadows denes a formal framework to analyze network authentication protocols. With
the help of a cost-benet analysis framework, this work shows how cryptographic protocols can be
made more resistant to DoS by trading the costs incurred by a defender against the costs to the
attacker. By making the attackers (or unauthorized clients of a service) do more work than the
defenders, the benet of mounting a DoS attack can be made less attractive.
We are not aware of any formal characterizations of network DoS behavior that explicitly include
qualitative and quantitative denitions of DoS and DDoS survivability as presented in this thesis.
6.4.2 DDoS Attacks
Many innovative solutions have been suggested to tackle dierent aspects of DDoS attacks. We
observe that most anti-DDoS solutions rely on ltering attack packets as a basic mechanism to
prevent DoS. The key to applying ltering is the ability to distinguish between attack and non-
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attack packets. DDoS tools spoof source addresses to prevent administrators from tracing back the
flow to the zombies. However, these spurious addresses can be detected by vigilant border routers.
Filtering these datagrams by border routers (called ingress or egress ltering [54, 70]) can prevent
these packets from entering intermediate networks and contending with legitimate packets there.
In addition, most attack packets are ICMP or UDP floods and most ISPs lter out non-HTTP
trac to HTTP servers. However, many DDoS attack scripts have started randomizing the elds
in a packet header to defy classication [86]. Therefore, identifying such attack packets may be
dicult and may require a large amount of per-flow state on routers deep in the network.
We examine some of the proposed anti-DDoS solutions to characterize attack trac. The D-
Ward Project [38] explores the use trac monitoring to detect \abnormal" flows on routers in source
networks (or client networks) to detect DDoS attacks and use appropriate ltering to tackle these
attacks at the source. In CenterTrack [125], network monitoring is used to detect abnormal levels
of attack trac using special diagnostics-only routers that are interspersed with regular routers,
but also form a separate physical network. Malicious flows are directed to these routers, and they
can be isolated from the main routing paths in the network. In SOS [76], a secure overlay network
is formed over existing networks to route useful trac to servers. Instead of burdening edge routers
with anti-DoS ltering, SOS pushes the ltering of trac deep into the network where routers can
easily process and lter large amounts of trac.
Many schemes to traceback and lter IP datagram attack "streams" to their source interfaces,
in spite of spoofed addresses, have been proposed in the recent years. We present a brief summary
here to highlight the importance of such schemes to help identify the source of attack floods.
In ICMP Traceback [15], a router generates an ICMP traceback message with a certain prob-
ability and sends this packet along with the rest of the flow to the destination. Over time, the
destination receives enough traceback messages to determine all the trac sources, including the
zombies. IP Traceback [120] is an alternative to ICMP traceback. Here routers probabilistically
mark packets (in the IP header eld) with partial path information during packet forwarding. The
victim can reconstruct the complete paths after receiving a modest number of packets. The per-
formance overheads of IP Traceback are improved in Advanced and Authenticated Marking [124],
which basically authenticates the packets markings in IP Traceback. The analytical properties of
127
probabilistic traceback have also been studied [106]. Hash based IP traceback [123] uses an inno-
vative technique to encode the IP address of intermediate routers concisely in the packet itself. In
[133], the authors propose a new packet marking approach called Pi, for path identiers, which are
embedded as ngerprints in IP datagrams and can be reconstructed by victims to identify attackers
in spite of spoong.
IP Pushback [88, 57, 71] is a proposed IP router mechanism that enables routers to characterize
floods of suspicious attack trac and deploy aggregate congestion control (ACC) mechanisms to
stem their flow to the victim. IP Pushback enables the mechanisms to implement ltering on
chosen intermediate routers and can be used with Traceback. A variety of dierent heuristics to
characterize attack packets have been proposed. However, since the dening characterizations of
DDoS attack packets are becoming harder to detect, coming up with reasonable heuristics to use
Pushback eectively is a signicant challenge.
We observe that many of the solutions presented here advocate ltering as a mechanism to
prevent DDoS attacks. Some of the solutions enable ltering at the source, some on intermediate
routers and still others on servers. We believe our modeling and analysis will help quantify the
costs and benets of implementing dierent ltering mechanisms and help administrators decide
which solutions are most eective in their particular context.
In the next subsection, we discuss how a QoS network addresses the DoS or DDoS problem.
6.4.3 QoS
The Internet oers very simple quality of service or QoS model, i.e., point-to-point, best-eort
data delivery. In order to get better support for real time applications and to control the ability
to share bandwidth on a particular link among dierent trac classes (controlled link sharing)
various modications to the basic service model have been proposed. Two design philosophies have
emerged in recent years : IntServ and DiServ. The IntServ model includes best-eort service,
real-time service and controlled link sharing. It uses resource reservation[24] and admission control
as its basic building blocks.
Diserv uses packet marking and advocates the use of special eld in the IP packet[22]. Packets
are classied and marked to receive a particular per-hop forwarding behavior on nodes along their
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path. Sophisticated classication, marking, policing, and shaping operations need only be imple-
mented at network boundaries or hosts. The mechanism of interest to us is the \In-Out" packet
marking scheme [31]. This scheme maintains a threshold value per user called the trac meter and
marks packets in excess of a trac meter, as \out", but they are not dropped by the sender. These
packets may be preferentially dropped by downstream receivers. The trac meter species the
end-to-end QoS parameters required by the application, but does not take bandwidth thresholds
on links into account.
A technology that provides end-to-end QoS using hop-to-hop admission control is ATM. ATM
functionality corresponds to the MAC layer and physical layer in the IP protocol stack. ATM[1]
is a switch-based connection-oriented protocol with xed packet sizes. The xed packet size al-
lows better prediction of QoS parameters. It denes a protocol for end-to-end service parameters
negotiation.
ATM provides ve service categories: constant bit rate (CBR), real-time variable bit rate (rt-
VBR), non real-time variable bit rate nrt-VBR), available bit rate (ABR), and unspecied bit
rate (UBR). Trac is classied into one of these ve categories, based on an application’s end-
to-end QoS requirements, and packets from dierent applications in dierent classes will receive
dierent QoS. The protocol reserves chunks of bandwidth to dierent QoS classes, and implements
an admission control mechanism per class. In RSVP or some existing DiServ schemes, unused
bandwidth within a reserved class is wasted if it is not used by the application. ATM denes a
class called ABR that uses an adaptive admission control strategy to probe and utilize unused
bandwidth belonging to other classes.
QoS networks can reduce the vulnerability of server to denial by consumption attacks by virtue
of their trac shaping and trac policing mechanisms. However, end-to-end resource reservation
does not prevent a malicious sender from sending excess packets that violate the service level
agreement. For this reason both admission control and per-flow statistics are necessary to detect
and punish misbehaving users in QoS networks. If the amount of state that needs to be maintained
in order to accomplish this is very large, scalability could be a issue.
To summarize our discussion on related work with respect to solutions to the DDoS problem,
we observe that a variety of techniques to address dierent aspects of the problem are available.
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Our framework presents a general framework evaluating the ecacy of these techniques.
We present our conclusions, catalog lessons learned, and suggest directions for future work in
Chapter 7.
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When one admits that nothing is certain
one must, I think, also admit that some
things are much more nearly certain than
others.
Bertrand RussellChapter 7
Conclusions
This chapter highlights the lessons learned from my study of modeling and analysis of survivability
properties for recovery-oriented security in access-control models, and summarizes solutions I ex-
plored to address relevant problems. In Section 7.1 I revisit the questions I posed in Section 3.5 and
justify how I address these concerns. This is followed by a summary of contributions in Section 7.2.
Finally, I discuss how the concepts and models I propose in this thesis can be extended in the future
in Section 7.3.
7.1 Conclusions
In this section, I present an evaluation of my thesis in terms of the success criteria I dened
in Chapter 3. Each numbered paragraph in this section is a justication of the corresponding
evaluation question from Section 3.5.
1. In my thesis, I claim that existing models of access control security make strong assumptions
about the nature of security guarantees that can be enforced by access control mechanisms
in real systems. In particular, modeling access control security as safety properties provides
a very restricted notion of information assurance. Existing state-of-the-art models cannot
capture the behavior of an access control system under threat of exposure or attack, and
fail to provide useful abstractions to model notions of recovery, from compromise or policy
enforcement failure. I believe that the modeling, specication, and verication methodology I
present in this thesis addresses these issues directly, and highlights the importance of including
these notions to build survivable security solutions. The importance of survivable security
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can only be understated.
2. I develop my theory of recovery-oriented security using a general temporal logic framework.
I extend the state-transition formalism of access control models to explicitly incorporate
both qualitative and quantitative measures of system behavior. Qualitative temporal logic
formalisms are widely used to specify concurrent system behavior, because they can describe
the ordering of events in time, without the need to model time explicitly. The meaning
of a temporal logic formula is dened in the context of labeled state-transition graphs of
execution semantics called Kripke structures. Both synchronous and asynchronous models of
execution can be specied using these abstractions. My choice of branching time temporal
logic for specication of survivability properties is well suited to capture the nature of user
actions in the context of non-deterministic and stochastic behavioral models of access control
systems. Furthermore, I show how we can use standard augmentations of temporal logic
frameworks to model probabilistic and real-time guarantees in these models. Therefore I claim
that choosing this framework to model recovery-oriented security is well-suited to describe
temporal properties of such systems.
3. One of the major contributions of my thesis is the ability to capture the temporal nature of
security (or insecurity) guarantees in models, using availability as a measure of survivability
as well as recovery. The ability of a system to resist compromise can be measured in terms of
how long it can provide authorized access to uncompromised users and resources. The ability
to recover quickly, whenever possible, can also be captured by measuring how long the system
was unavailable, or by how fast it can become available again. Making a model resilient to
denial of service can be formulated easily as making it more available. I show how we can
specify survivability, recovery, DoS resilience and DoS resistance as availability properties.
Therefore, we can use the same concepts to describe dierent guarantees in the model and
use the same verication methodology uniformly. Our model provides a cost-benet analysis
framework in terms of availability, and can be used to study the usefulness of dierent design
choices for recovery.
4. In my study of recovery strategies, I show how we can extend the lifetime of critical resources
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in the system by changing access control policies and mechanisms on the fly, in a controlled
manner, without sacricing consistency guarantees. I describe how to augment a policy
specication automatically, to preserve trust-relationships of interest. I also demonstrate
how implementation mechanisms can aect the overheads of changing access controls. The
formal study of dynamic access controls for recovery is also an original contribution of this
thesis.
5. I show how we can directly employ standard model-checking techniques to verify survivability
policies. Model checking is widely used for verifying nite state concurrent systems. For
branching time formulas expressed in CTL, PCTL and CSL, model-checking is decidable
and ecient. The models presented in this thesis are small, yet rich enough to prove dierent
properties about the behavior of systems under information exposure or DoS attacks.
While the need to abstract system behavior using nite-state semantics may seem restrictive,
symbolic model checking algorithms can increase the eciency of this process. Techniques
such as abstraction, exploiting symmetry and reduction can further expand the size of models
that can be veried within a given set of memory and processing constraints. Systems that
are not nite state can be veried using model checking in combination with abstraction,
induction, or even deductive reasoning and theorem proving.
6. I claim that this thesis work is the only formalism of DDoS attacks, to the best of our knowl-
edge, which models the unique characteristics of network resource-consumption behavior. By
integrating stochastic models of arrival rates, service rates and trac congestion behavior into
our state-transition model of access request behavior, security engineers can analyze the im-
pact of dierent network operating characteristics and their eect on a model’s vulnerability
to DoS and DDoS attacks. As shown by our examples, the modeling and analysis framework
can be used to study and prove survivability properties of dierent proposed DoS-prevention
strategies.
7.2 Summary of Contributions
In this section, I itemize the major contributions of my thesis as follows:
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1. I describe a new methodology for information assurance that challenges the \all-or-nothing"
nature of guarantees provided by existing access control models. In particular I claim that
access control systems are regularly compromised, either maliciously or inadvertently and
safety guarantees are invalidated periodically. I argue that we need a new abstraction I call
recovery-oriented security to explore the nature and scope of guarantees in realistic system
models that are under threat of attack. I dene survivability in this context as the ability of
a system to provide flexible response and recover from policy compromise.
2. I show how to extend existing access control behavior models to explicitly capture the eect of
information compromise as well as DoS behavior. I incorporate nondeterministic, probabilis-
tic, as well as real-time behavioral attributes to extend the power of expression of traditional
models. I claim these extension are the key to dene as well as analyze the temporal nature
of security guarantees in real systems. I show how we can specify appropriate notions of
survivability and recoverability, as well as resilience to DoS and DDoS attacks in this ex-
tended behavioral model, using appropriate flavors of temporal logic. One of the benets
of this methodology is the ability to use standard automated model-checking techniques for
verication of temporal security guarantees. I show how we can dene models of dierent
3. I also explore how changing access control policies in response to vulnerabilities and threats
of exposure can preserve temporal security guarantees and increase survivability of a system.
I study the overheads of implementing flexible response using dynamic access control, and
explore how we can preserve safety and trust assumptions in this context.
4. Finally, I show how my framework can be used to formalize of the network DoS and DDoS
problem, and specify and verify both qualitative and quantitative DoS survivability proper-
ties. This formulation allows us to study dierent DoS-prevention strategies and compare
their relative eectiveness in reducing DoS vulnerabilities. I also show how we can integrate
stochastic modeling and analysis with behavioral models of network access control to study
the DoS problem in the context of specic network models and validate the usefulness of
dierent response strategies.
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To summarize, I claim my thesis provides a rich semantic framework to specify temporal notions
of recovery-oriented security and explore the nature and scope of flexible response strategies to
improve the survivability of access control models.
7.3 Future Research
Using the specication and verication methodology from this thesis, I would like to focus on
automating the process of generating strategies to augment system models and improve the sur-
vivability of an information protection system under attack.
The ability to respond to security threats and recover from attacks on operating systems and
networks is viewed as a particularly challenging problem in information assurance. While the
administrators of a system or a network’s security-conguration have a variety of options with
respect to automated tools for intrusion detection and conguration management, it is becoming
increasingly dicult to shrink the window of opportunity for an attacker using existing tools and
mechanisms, between when a vulnerability is detected to when it is exploited. In this context,
automatic response is seen as an interesting if not controversial solution, with signicant technical
and legal challenges before it can be adopted widely.
This problem can be investigated at dierent levels, with the nal goal of developing a framework
to implement automated response actions. However, solution need to have a strong theoretical basis,
in terms of providing a methodology to prove and analyze the impact of these response actions,
with regard to their ability to recover or restore security guarantees.
To accomplish this, we propose to leverage my thesis work, and study specic instances of
automatable responses in the context of a particular installation, and design an administrative
interface that can pro-actively apply these actions in response to alerts from system logs and
intrusion detection systems.
Specically I would like to incorporate risk analysis to study the cause and consequences of
threats and exposures on an abstract model of an information protection system. Identifying
potential sources of exposure can greatly influence a security engineer’s ability to design policies
for robustness and understand the tradeos between safety and availability. However, subjecting a
real system to attacks is dangerous and impractical. I propose to build a vulnerability analysis tool
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that can take dierent abstract system models and associate risk values, as well as dierent attack
models, and analyze and quantify the costs and benets of choosing dierent response actions.
To automate this process, I would like to explore techniques to build abstract models automat-
ically from a system installation. The tool will also include fault-trees and event trees, as well as
options to specify dierent risk models. Fault trees are used to capture the consequence of informa-
tion compromise and propagation of condentiality and integrity failures. Fault trees are generated
by intrusion detection and anomaly detection systems and can also be compiled from vulnerability
reporting sources such as Bugtraq and CERT. A fault tree database can be automatically con-
structed for a given system model by collating the fault trees for dierent entities. Event-trees
capture the dynamic transitions of our abstract model and can be gathered from system logs or
specied by the user using an appropriate specication tool.
This proposed tool will also include dierent risk models as well as risk analysis techniques to
perform a cost-based cause-consequence analysis. Using availability as one metric, for example,
we can explore the consequence of dierent attacks on our model and identify critical paths and
entities that are high-risk and therefore may need stronger protection. This process will also give
us a mechanisms to study insider attacks, which have so far been notoriously dicult to model,
and use the specication and analysis techniques described above to capture insider threats and
observe their consequence. The modeling and analysis should ideally output a list of strategies to
reduce the vulnerability of attack, and a cost-benet analysis of these strategies.
136
Appendix A
Semantics of CTL
Two flavors of temporal logic are popular. They dier in terms of whether they represent flow of
time implicitly in in terms of states and transitions, or whether they also include real-time in their
formalisms explicitly. In models where real-time values are not included explicitly, the two standard
temporal operators are henceforth and eventually. The henceforth operator is written symbolically
as 2 or as G (for \globally"), and asserts that the property is true in all states of the model in
the future. The eventually operator is written usually as 3 or as F(for \nally"), and denotes
that some state that can satisfy the property will be reached eventually. In addition to these two
temporal operators, the regular boolean connectives can also be used to construct temporal logic
formulas.
Temporal logics are interpreted in the context of Kripke structures, which are essentially state-
transition graphs.
We describe availability using the operators in CTL, which is a powerful logic for describing
properties of computation trees. Note that our abstraction of request-response trace is essentially
a computation tree. CTL formulas are composed of path quantiers and temporal operators.
Path quantiers are used to describe the branching structure of computation trees. There are two
path quantiers in CTL: A, which stands for \in all computation paths" and E for \in some
computation path". In addition, we also have G and F as described previously, as well as X, which
requires the property hold in the second state of the path, and binary operator U for two properties
that holds if there is a state on the path where the second property holds, and at every preceding
state on the path, the rst holds. Operators _, :, X, U, and E are sucient to represent any
CTL formula. There are two types of formulas in CTL: state formulas and path formulas. State
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formulas are true in specic states and path formulas along specic paths. They are dened as
follows:
 If p 2 AP , then p is a state formula.
 If f and g are state formulas, then : f and f _ g are state formulas.
 If f is a path formula, Ef and Af are state formulas.
 If f is a state formula, then it is also a path formula.
 If f and g are path formulas, :f , f _ g, Gf , fUg, Xf , and Ff are path formulas.
For the Kripke structure M , a path  2M is an innite sequence of states  = s0; s1;    such
that for every i  0, (si; si+1) 2 R. i is the sux of  starting at si. If f is a state formula, the
notation M; s j= f means f holds at state s in M . If f is a path formula M; j= f means f holds
along  in M . The j= relation is dened inductively as follows:
1. M; s j= p$ p 2 L(s)
2. M; s j= :f $M; s 6j= f
3. M; s j= f _ g $M; s j= f or M; s j= g
4. M; s j= Ef $ there is a path  from s such that M; j= f
5. M; s j= Af $ for every path  from s, M; j= f
6. M; j= f $ s is the rst state of  and M; s j= f
7. M; j= :f $M; 6j= f
8. M; j= f _ g $M; j= f or M; j= g
9. M; j= Xf $M;1 j= f
10. M; j= Ff $ there exists k  0 such that M;k j= f
11. M; j= Gf $ for all k  0, M;k j= f
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12. M; j= fUg $ there exists k  0 such that M;k j= g and for all 0  j < k, M;j j= f
Note X, F,G, and U, are dened only for paths.
There are two useful sub-logics of CTL, one for branching time and one for linear time called
CTL (Computation Tree Logic) and LTL (Linear Temporal logic respectively. In CTL, each of
the temporal operators X, F, G, and U must be immediately preceded by a path quantier (either
A or G). Therefore in CTL temporal operators quantify over paths that are possible from a given
state. LTL is useful for describing events along a single computation path. LTL formulas are of
the form Af where f is a path formula whose only state sub-formulas can be atomic propositions.
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Appendix B
PRISM Code for PNS of DDoS
Victim Server
// DDoS Server Model as a CTMC
// Model as one process with two state variables http and attack
// and four probability values muh mua, ph, pa
stochastic
const double muh;
const double nmuh = (1.0-muh);
const double mua = nmuh;
const double nmua = muh;
const double ph;
const double nph = (1.0-ph);
const double pa = nph;
const double npa = ph;
module DDOS
http : [0..2] init 1;
attack : [0..2] init 0;
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[] (http=1) & (attack=0) -> nmuh:(http’=1)&(attack’=0) + muh:(http’=2)&(attack’=0);
[] (http=2) & (attack=0) -> ph:(http’=1)&(attack’=0) + nph:(http’=0)&(attack’=1);
[] (http=0) & (attack=1) -> nmua:(http’=0)&(attack’=1) + mua:(http’=0)&(attack’=2);
[] (http=0) & (attack=2) -> npa:(http’=1)&(attack’=0) + pa:(http’=0)&(attack’=1);
endmodule
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